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SOME REFLECTIONS ON A THEORY OF THE MINISTRY

By H. BALMFORTH

STUDENTS of theology, and especially of Biblical theology, are indebted to Professor T. W. Manson for so much that they will welcome his latest volume,[1] in which he treats of the Church's ministry. In a field of especial difficulty, where Christians are deeply divided and controversy is unavoidable, he may be relied upon to write with learning, sagacity and wide charity. Nor does he disappoint this hope. His statement of the Free Church doctrine—or, should we say, "a" Free Church doctrine?—has a dignified courtesy that wins respect, a scholarly care in the handling of historical and theological issues and a deeply penetrating insight into the underlying doctrine of the Church and the true task of the reunion movement. His strong, rich understanding of the Church is a notable feature of the discussion; and we may be heartily thankful for his firm grasp of the truth that reunion means not some ingenious device for a merger of ecclesiastical corporations but the realization and expression of a unity of the One Body that already exists, because it cannot be broken by man.

All this an Anglican rejoices to find and thankfully applauds. But what of the theory of the ministry here so ably and pleasantly presented? To that question one turns with a special interest. Will it give us a basis of agreement? Dr. Manson believes it will, because he rejects as intolerable and untrue the view that "you have only to state the 'Catholic' and the 'Free Church' views fully and fairly to see that they

[1] *The Church's Ministry.* By T. W. Manson. Hodder and Stoughton. 6s.

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are irreconcilable" (p. 81). Such a view, he says, "would present as strong a challenge to the Christian faith as I can well imagine." So he seeks a theory adequate to the conviction that "both conceptions of the ministry embody some basic truth which can be found if we will look earnestly enough for it" (p. 83).

We can only study carefully a theory conceived in such an eirenic spirit. What, then, is it ?

It is a slightly modified form of the Congregationalist theory as stated by the late Bernard Manning and by Dr. Cunliffe-Jones. According to this, ordination is the acceptance by a congregation of Christ's previous call and equipment of a man as his minister. It matters not at all whether the acceptance is given by a bishop, a presbytery or a congregation. "What does the ordaining body do ? It accepts the offered gift, having first taken steps to assure itself that it is a real gift of the Lord" (p. 96). The only objection that Dr. Manson makes to a thorough-going congregationalism is that Bernard Manning overstates the autonomy of the local congregation beyond anything that is warranted either by the Bible or by the history of the Church. If this excessive independency is corrected so that "congregational omnicompetence and omnipotence" is modified by "the real recognition of the existence and effective functioning of *the* Body of Christ of which all congregations are part" Dr. Manson is satisfied with this theory of ordination.

If we may take this as the essence of the Free Church idea of what ordination means, there is at least one valuable gain. We can emerge from the clouds of ambiguity and vagueness that swirl round the long-drawn debates on reunion in these latter days. Dr. Manson leaves the reader in no doubt that the Free Church idea means nothing more or less than that "ordination" is the recognition of a *prophet*. All that he says about the minister supports this conclusion. There is no "apostolic succession" of ministers. Ministers and ministries appear from the general body of believers as "organs" of the body,

but they are direct, not ecclesiastically mediated, gifts and actions of the risen Lord: the body can only accept them. The "settled ministry" need not be a whole-time job, we are told; and it is admitted that the inherent logic of the Free Church position is "pushed to the limit" by the Society of Friends (p. 79).

Here, obviously, is something much more fundamental than the exact interpretation of *shaliach* and *apostolos, episcopos* and *presbyteros*. We may, indeed, take up some of Dr. Manson's points about the apostle. We may wonder why Jesus did something for the first generation of Christians which the second and subsequent generations were not to have, even in part—a ministry continued from those whom he himself appointed in the days of his flesh. We may ask why the Twelve should have been appointed to linger on into the post-Resurrection period, a dying relic of the pre-Resurrection days side by side with the ministries that were being called out from the Christian body to supersede them. We may think that in the New Testament the apostle and his representatives do not appear to have any suspicion that they must resign their authority to the new ministries. We may see in the Lord's commission to evangelize and to shepherd the flock an essentially *transmissible* commission, unlike the non-transmissible elements in the apostolic office: *i.e.*, direct appointment by Jesus in his earthly life and the privilege of being eye-witnesses. Only on the view (not apparently held by Dr. Manson) that Jesus made no provision beyond "this generation" does it seem reasonable to suppose that his creation of the Twelve as an evangelistic and pastoral body was to have no continuance in the Church but was to be abandoned and a fresh start made in a prophetic type of ministry: this prophetic ministry being thrown up in various forms, not to supplement but to supplant the apostolate created by him. Is not this, we may ask, a kind of Montanism?

We can, indeed, heartily agree with Dr. Manson that there was no "rigid uniformity of worship or organization" up to

the middle of the second century. But it is putting an enormous weight on one man's shoulders to suggest, as Dr. Manson does, that the " insistence of Ignatius " (Streeter's villain of the piece reappears, as naughty as ever) is the cause of the early second-century change. Can it be as simple as that? When we come to the sort of ordination we have in Hippolytus, when the primitive fluidity has received some measure of order and settlement, is it all a novelty ? Has it nothing to do with the original apostles of Jesus Christ, nothing to do with the continuity of life and worship of the Roman *ecclesia* ? Let us suppose (it is likely enough) that the Liturgy had a good deal to do with the emergence of the second-century bishop. Does it follow that there was nothing to go on in the ministry of the apostolic age ? Nothing that made this office of bishop a direct evolution from the primitive ministry ? Can we dismiss it as the handiwork of a single Syrian martyr ?

But this is by the way. I am not now concerned to argue these admittedly obscure historical issues. Rather I wish to consider the implications of the positive theory of ministry and ordination that Dr. Manson has put forward. Various difficulties seem to beset it.

The prophetic theory, which goes back to the great prophets of the Old Testament and to the Christian prophets of the first age for its prototypes, will not fit the actual historical ministry of the Church from the second century to the sixteenth; and it will not fit the ministry of the Orthodox, Roman and Anglican communions to this day (and I do not imagine it will fit the Lutherans and the Calvinists, either). Prophets may be true or false prophets and it is well that there should be some way of trying the spirits whether they be of God. But prophets appear mysteriously and unexpectedly. They cannot be officially and permanently organized nor can they be regularly and evenly distributed as the normal pastors of the flock by ecclesiastical authority, episcopal, presbyterian, congregational or any other. They have always appeared alongside the regular ministry, from the laity, religious orders and the clergy; and not in any embarrassing numbers from the clergy.

But will they fit the Free Church ministry ? Suppose we attempt to go back to the day when the Christian prophet was prominent in the life of the Church. Suppose we try to reverse the whole process of Christian history and base the ministry on a prophetic call recognized (but no more) by some section of Christians. We are surely brought to an extremely difficult position. For it means that all ordained ministers are full-time prophets of the Lord, raised up by him for a strictly personal mission which prevents them from earning their living in any other way, unless they are members of the Society of Friends. With the greatest respect for the many admirable Free Church ministers I have been privileged to know, I cannot quite see them in this awe-inspiring role. I remember a Methodist minister telling a gathering of Anglican and Free Church people of an old Baptist minister who, after listening to a speech on the prophetic character of the ministry by an enthusiastic young colleague, turned to him and said, " My dear boy, we are not prophets; we are scribes." Not the whole truth, no doubt; but a necessary corrective to what is a quite unworkable conception. For it is just not true that all Christian ministers are prophets or ever could be.

There is certainly an element in the ministry of the Church that can be called prophetic. It is one element in a larger complex, an element that appears prominently in the second-century bishop. The second-century bishop has the privilege and duty of teaching the people. His throne is the teacher's chair and in virtue of his episcopal *charisma* he speaks with an authority of exceptional weight. But it is not because he is already a prophet that he becomes a bishop; it is as bishop that he receives authority to teach in the name of God; and what he teaches is that which he has received, the " tradition " of which he is the guardian.

Is there not, too, a grave ambiguity in the thesis that the varying existing ministries are all organs that " the Church " has grown ? Did " the Church " grow the Geneva ministry or the Independent or the Wesleyan ? Most of the Church

refuses to use them and prefers the ancient ministry common to East and West. We have to face that fact squarely. Anglicans have no wish to deny that the Free Church ministries are real ministries. It would be not only insulting to make such a denial; it would be gravely presumptuous and sinful. But there are differences between ministry and ministry, and it is not only the Catholics who have said so. The mutual recognition of existing ministries, which Dr. Manson counts as a prime necessity, has not always commended itself to Protestants. On what principle, we have to ask, do the more generous-minded modern Protestants repudiate the not-negligible conviction of some, at least, of their ancestors that priests were not gospel-ministers and needed to be reordained for the Protestant ministry ? I am not interested in debating points or attempting a controversial *tu quoque*. It is really a serious question of principle that is involved. The Protestant theory of a prophetic ministry does seem to harmonize with the more rigorous view. Which brings us to what is surely a point of central importance yet is hardly treated at all in Dr. Manson's book: the question of the priesthood.

Dr. Manson never really handles this theme. He refers—it seems with full approval—to the Baptist reply to the Lambeth Appeal and quotes these words from it: "we hold firmly the priesthood of all believers and therefore have no separated order of priests" (p. 80). Apparently the "therefore" is accepted as a valid step in the argument, for he never questions it or shows himself aware that Anglicans reject it as no argument at all, drawing precisely the opposite conclusion. If a priestly body exists, it seems highly probable that the ministerial organs of the body have a ministerial priesthood to exercise in and for the body. So much at least might be inferred from the priesthood of all believers, whatever view is taken of the further question whether this priesthood, exercised in and for the body, is also derived solely *from* the body.

Priesthood is, we must insist, something that all who discuss the Christian ministry must take seriously, with a full

theological seriousness. The matters at stake are not "forms of ecclesiastical organization", the pragmatic value or otherwise of diocesan episcopacy, presbyterian synods and local congregational independence. They are profound theological questions about Christ, his ministry in and through his Church, the doctrine of his work as High Priest, Good Shepherd, Apostle. If St. Paul can use priestly and sacrificial language about his ministry, as he does in Romans xv, 16, that is not irrelevant metaphor, to be cast aside and ignored; it is something deeply embedded in the ministry of Christ in his Church. It is trifling with this great matter to dismiss it, as is sometimes done (not by Dr. Manson), with superficialities like "the Christian minister is never called *hiereus* in the New Testament" or "sacerdotal ideas are a corruption that come into the Church by false analogy with the Jewish priesthood." If priesthood is a valid category for Christ, as the epistle to the Hebrews makes out, then his ministers are *sacerdotes secundi ordinis* just in so far as they are his under-shepherds and the messengers of his gospel. There is and can be only one Priest, creatively and originatively; so, too, and for the same reasons, there is only one Pastor, only one Announcer of the Gospel. Of men none of these terms can be predicated except derivatively and dependently. But all these terms indicate foci in the work Christ carries on through his Body. *Totus Christus* is not *Christus dimidiatus.*

Dr. Manson would apply a pragmatic test and it is the only one he will have. A ministry is validated by the results—"the Signs of the Apostle." Yet this is a deceptive phrase. What precisely is the equivalent of St. Paul's *semeia kai terata kai dynameis* in the workaday ministry of the Church? What determines whether this or that congregation and its minister possess them? Can we do without any standards whereby these questions may be judged? It is no sufficient answer to refer in general terms to the continuing presence of Christ in his Church and the continuing guidance of his Spirit. The way is left wide open to the sectarian. If the only test is pragmatic, it is open to any group of Christians who have grounds for dis-

satisfaction with their church authorities to break away and produce another denominational ministry by their own act and will. They will certainly act in the hope and belief that their ministers will be godly and devoted men who will have a good influence over their flocks and lead them into pureness and holiness of life. History gives them ground for this hope. And so we are back in the old desperate condition: altar against altar, sect vying with sect, external divisions sanctioned by a theory the one ministry of the one Body!

We need some better way. There seems no hope of calling a halt at some halfway house between the conception of a "clergy" exercising a ministerial priesthood, and the Quaker view that "the ministry" is not a function and status of certain men set apart for a lifelong specialized service but is something diffused among the "gathered" congregation and is exercised in varying degrees and with varying frequency by an indefinable number of men and women in the congregation. Such a halfway house calls for no "professionals"; the ministry of the Word and (if desired) of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, and the pastoral care of the congregation can be done without them. Theologians and scholars, evangelists to the heathen, social workers, educationists—these can be found a place, for they are properly full-time workers. But the "Rev." at the manse: does this theory really justify his existence?

What, then, must we look for in a theory of the Christian ministry? I suggest that we do less than justice to so great a theme unless four things at least are kept in view.

(1) There must be the call to the individual. The Christian must be able to say *nolo episcopari*; he must be inwardly convinced that he ought to offer himself for the ministry. Yet the call to the individual must not be romanticized into a simple Damascus-road immediacy. The call of God to the individual may be mediated by the Church in various ways. Nor is it ever to be presumed that it appears in isolation from the organic relationship in which the would-be ordinand stands to the Church, the sacramental system and the existing ministry.

(2) There must be the assent of the Church to the candidate's becoming a minister. It is a complex assent, which involves the people, those who testify to the candidate's fitness, the ordaining authority.

(3) There must be ordination, by which a man is empowered or commissioned to be and to do in the Church what he was not, and could not do, before; and that commission must come from those in the Church who have the authority to give it.

(4) There must be also the integration of that ordaining authority in the *total* ministerial provision made by Christ for his Church. This provision cannot but include his creation of ministers (the Twelve) in his earthly life, the ministers who in each generation have duly exercised the Christian ministry, the contemporary ministers at any given time. To secure this integration the principle of continuity by succession would seem to be indispensable.

Nothing less than this can be the one Christ's one essential ministry perpetuated throughout the historical life of the Church. I take Dr. Manson's ground and agree that all ministry is of Christ. I am not arguing for a "high" or a "low", an "Anglican" or a "Free Church" view of the ministry. I am putting the ministry where Dr. Manson puts it, on the New Testament teaching of the one essential ministry, "the perpetual ministry of the Risen and Ever-present Lord himself." None of us wants to put it anywhere else. But to put it there does not let us slip out of the question of the *media.* The Lord is the *source* and in that sense his is the only "essential ministry". Our problem is one of *media,* and whether among the *media* through which Christ's ministry is exercised in the Body down the centuries there is some central ministry of men upon which the other ministries turn. The apostolic ministry does not rest, it may be, solely on the *shaliach-apostolos* argument. But neither can it rest on the theory that the only way Christ makes ministers is a personal unmediated call, which the contemporary congregation, in some way or other, recognizes and acknowledges.

Ministry is a large and comprehensive word. It is quite true that ministry is Christ's operation in his incarnate life on earth and in his Body the Church. It is also quite true that all Christians have a ministry. But these truths tell us nothing about the *specific form* of that *kind* of ministry which for a thousand years or more was exercised solely by bishops, presbyters and deacons; which the "reformed" churches largely rejected as unscriptural and superstitious, and which they sought to perpetuate, only after a drastic purging and reconstruction, in the Protestant ministry of preaching. The matters in debate have shifted somewhat, in that the Protestant ministry is now made parallel with, not superior to and exclusive of, the earlier common ministry of the Catholic Church. Even with that modification I fear that the debate must still continue. May it be continued in charity and prayer!

CHRISTIANITY AND THE METAPHYSICS OF HUMAN EXISTENCE

By J. V. LANGMEAD CASSERLEY

THE widespread interest aroused in this country by contemporary French versions of the existentialist type of philosophy which derives from Kierkegaard[1] is partly, no doubt, a well deserved tribute to the literary brilliance with which it has been "put across", but it is also symptomatic of a new sense of our need of a metaphysical study and interpretation of our own existence. True, existentialism purports to be a practical and positive alternative to metaphysical studies, as classical metaphysicians have traditionally conceived and defined them, but when more carefully examined it appears to propose not so much that we should abandon metaphysical methods of thought and interpretation but rather that we should bring them to bear upon a different problem—our own private being, known to us in our self-consciousness, rather than the universal Being of the classical philosophers. Existentialism thus bids me be metaphysical about my own being. (Possibly, as in Heidegger, walking here in the footsteps of Plato and Augustine, I am to be metaphysical about my own being as a prelude to being metaphysical about Being as such, but the more usual existentialist attitude is one which rejects traditional metaphysics and

[1] In this paper I have primarily in mind the atheistic existentialism which Sartré derived primarily from Heidegger and expresses in his novels and plays as well as in his philosophical writings. In its origins, of course, existentialism is religious and theistic and writers like Marcel still continue to interpret it in a profoundly Christian fashion. Nevertheless the existentialism which to-day attracts most public attention is of the atheistic sort. The context will indicate places where I have had Christian existentialism in mind.

substitutes its own introverted philosophical preoccupations. It is indeed a new kind of positivism, the positivism of alert and profoundly philosophical minds, unable to accept the banalities and ineptitudes of the more conventional positivism and yet sharing its despair of traditional metaphysics.)

This feeling after a metaphysic of human existence is a new development in contemporary thought. In the same way, and no doubt in response to the same conditions and causes, contemporary theology has been moved to seek a " doctrine of man " in a formal, architectured sense of the word " doctrine " which the Christian idea of man has never assumed in traditional theology. I remember Dr. Temple saying that as a young student of theology he never felt that need for a doctrine of man which so engrosses the theologians of this generation, nor apparently did any of his teachers. Thus philosophy and theology, which have pursued widely divergent paths for several generations, are shewing welcome signs of a joint return to a common theme.

This tendency represents a profound and important reaction against the " positive " studies of man which gained ground during the second half of the nineteenth century and the first third of the twentieth. The assumption underlying and sustaining most biological, psychological and sociological human studies, is that of a human nature which is a real kind, like the real kinds studied by other sciences, one which can be validly abstracted for scientific purposes from the accidental, individualizing qualities which invariably accompany it upon all actual and concrete occasions, a real kind obedient to laws which may conceivably be discovered and formulated by careful observation and analysis, a composite being which theory can take to pieces, or a dynamic functioning which can be captured in a formula as a curve can be expressed in an equation.

I shall try to shew in a moment how the very progress of these sciences has tended to call this basic assumption in question, but first we must examine the more general grounds which render it unsatisfactory from the outset. The real implication of these morphological, " behaviouristic " ways of studying man is that the investigator's relation to man in the humane

sciences is analogous to the scientist's relation to nature in the natural sciences. This is plainly untrue, and has only to be stated in order to be rejected. We know what it is to be scientific about nature and we know what it is to be scientific about man, but whereas, in the natural sciences, we have no intuitive knowledge of what it is to be a part of the natural reality which is being investigated—a source of knowledge which we might employ if we possessed it to "check up" on our objective theories—in the humane sciences we do know what it is to be the objects of scientific scrutiny. That is why we find ourselves laughing at the humane scientists much more often than at the natural scientists. In short, nature is known to us externally whereas man is known to us both internally and externally. It is two hundred years since Vico pointed out this fact to an unheeding world and commented on the perversity of our concentration upon the quest for a science of nature, which is to us unknowable, and our comparative neglect of the humane sciences, which hold out an endless vista of thrilling and practicable intellectual possibilities. This observation implies a great gulf between humane and natural science. The former is capable of yielding an intellectually satisfying form of knowledge, science in the fullest sense of the word, whereas the latter only provides a useful calculus of appearances. If Vico is right, the phenomenalists and pragmatists have told us the truth, not indeed about truth itself, but about that measure and mode of truth which the natural sciences are adapted to attain.

The adoption, as a basic methodological rule, of this principle that the presuppositions and conclusions of a scientific discipline must be checked, wherever possible, against our intuitive knowledge of what it is to be the object of the scrutiny of the science in question, is one which immediately puts us on our guard against the prevalent assumption of some analogy between the procedure of the humane sciences and that of the natural sciences. The latter, in their quest for broad generalizations and laws which will unify many diverse instances, have adopted the basic methodological presupposition that the

individual is the accidental, that what individuates is irrelevant to science. Now if we approach, on the philosophical level, the mystery of the being of nature through analogy with our own being, we may well suspect that this presupposition is untrue even in the realm of nature. However, we are not compelled to philosophize in such a pan-historical fashion, and so it is at least possible to go on in the natural sciences in the naive confidence that this particular presupposition may be true, but in the realm of the humane sciences, on the contrary, we know it to be untrue. Indeed the demonstration of its falsity is the first and most elementary step in the adumbration of a metaphysic of human existence. Existentialism at least begins by fixing our attention upon the primary human reality, the coexistence of distinct centres of consciousness, centres of a consciousness which is both apprehensive and reflexive and in a measure causally effective in both these spheres of interest. Nor is their distinction from each other merely numerical. A distinct centre of consciousness implies a unique relationship to all possible objects of consciousness, and hence a unique bias of its causal activity. Thus Kierkegaard describes the human being as "the exceptional . . . . a particular relation to God."[2] (But he is also, and by the same logic, a particular relation to all creatures.) Thus in the realm of human reality what individualizes is not a set of relatively superficial accidental characteristics, but the primary fact of being an individual, an immediate datum of self-intuition which is also a profound metaphysical conception. In the realm of human reality, indeed, it is rather what is common and unifying which is relatively superficial and accidental. This can be seen in recent sociological studies of the impress of culture upon personal development. Here the requisite scientific universal is found in the concept of a common conditioning process rather than in certain alleged structural identities in the beings so conditioned. The conception of a common native endowment is no doubt assumed, but it is minimized, and the prin-

[2] *Journals.* (Oxford University Press), p. xx.

ciple of explanation, and object of scrutiny, is that of different conditioning processes.[3]

So far we have been considering the metaphysical protest, a justifiable one in my view, that the conception of individuality is a metaphysical one, which demands metaphysical analysis and interpretation. But this reference to the contemporary sociology of culture draws attention to the tendency of those very generalizing, morphological sciences of man which have aroused this protest to converge by a more devious route upon the same point of view. In particular both psychology and sociology increasingly emphasize the centrality and finality of particular conscious minds.

Paradoxically this new emphasis upon consciousness in psychology is a by-product of its more widely canvassed emphasis upon the unconscious. Nevertheless, the whole psycho-analytic technique bears witness to the ultimate sovereignty of consciousness, by its insistence that repressions and complexes and their neurotic effects can only be healed if the conscious mind can be persuaded to recognize and understand them. It is only by affirming himself in the light of consciously embraced purposes and deliberate personal judgements of fact and value that a man becomes himself, and in becoming himself makes himself. Thus the objective worth and character of his purposes and beliefs is seen to be a factor of vital importance for his inner mental harmony and stability. According to anthropologists the mental product of a Balinese upbringing

[3] " The fact that most human behaviour is taught in the form of organized configurations rather than simply developed by the individual on the basis of experience, is of the utmost importance to personality studies . . . Until the psychologist knows what the norms of behaviour imposed by a particular society are . . . he will be unable to penetrate behind the facade of social conformity and cultural uniformity to reach the authentic individual."—Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality* (Kegan Paul), p. 17. But what will the psychologist have then ? If a sheer individual he will have something which is not a possible object of science, although it may well provide the theme of historical description and metaphysical interpretation.

under the influence of the beliefs, customs and values which compose Balinese culture, are symptoms which in a western context would be diagnosed as schizophrenic,[4] whereas on Bali island they are regarded as characteristic of normality. This observation of the influence of culture upon mental health, and even upon our notions of what constitutes mental health, points towards the view, now rapidly gaining ground, that the major portion of the content of the unconscious mind consists of processes which are social rather than mental. "If agreement may be said to emerge from the controversy still raging", writes Mr. M. M. Lewis, the Director of the Educational Institute at the University College of Nottingham, in his most interesting book *Language and Society*, "it is this: there may be a few innate patterns of behaviour; but, in general, behaviour that is common to all the members of a society consists of habits that have grown up unconsciously or with the minimum of consciousness and now function beyond consciousness."[5] In other words unconscious mind becomes a rather dubious substantive term for what is in fact a conditioning process. Again the result is to emphasize consciousness as the very core of selfhood. It is only what I consciously accept which can function freely as an integral part of my whole being. Jung's conception of a "racial unconscious" seems to point in the same direction. My unconscious is not so much part of me as my point of deep contact with other selves in history and society.

In such instances, the generalizing humane sciences are clearly being brought to the frontier of what is individual and stubbornly resists generalization. In psycho-analysis, the form of psychology most popularly acclaimed, it has long been difficult to decide whether we have to do with what is primarily a science or with what is primarily a technique. A system like Freud's, for example, considered purely as an intellectual construction, proposed for rational analysis and acceptance, looks

[4] Kimball Young, *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Kegan Paul), pp. 49-56.

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 81.

like a mere farrago of high-falluting nonsense. If this is psychology, it would appear to be at the same stage of development as that of Aristotelian and scholastic physics. The method is one which purports to explain observed processes, or even apparent or alleged processes, by inventing an occult name and entity with which to describe them. Freud should have read William of Occom. He was one of the very few modern thinkers who had much to learn from that somewhat dreary gentleman. Judged as a technique, however, psycho-analysis has more in common with history than with natural science in its concentration upon the individual life and the expansion of its self-consciousness. "The main aim," says Dr. Alexander, "is to understand each individual in terms of his own life history."[6]

In sociology, we find a similar tendency to accept the verdict and testimony of the conscious mind in the anthropological and field sociology of "mass observers" like Tom Harrison. For them social facts are facts for consciousness, and can only be known and interpreted as they impinge upon conscious thought. There is much to be criticized, in my view, in the work and standpoint of this particular school, but at least they convey a welcome suggestion that we are growing out of the habit of supposing that sociology and history can appropriately be written in a series of airy generalizations about alleged underlying social and historical processes, of which individual lives and states of consciousness are mere functions and exemplifications.

We are thus led to the view that the more conventional, morphological and behaviouristic sciences of man are studies of the biological, psychological and sociological processes which condition human existence, rather than interpretations of human existence itself. It is not merely that these sciences, when carefully analysed, can be shewn to leave room for metaphysics, more and more they are themselves overtly making room for metaphysics. It is in such a situation that we are able to perceive the point and relevance of Sartré's apparently strange

[6] *American Journal of Psychology.* May, 1937, p. 795.

dictum that men are bound together not by any common human nature but by the common human condition. "Although it is impossible to find in each and every man a universal essence that can be called human nature, there is nevertheless a human universality of *condition*."[7] Heidegger propounds the same doctrine. For him, *das mann* is precisely the nobody. It is the illusion that we are human beings, and must therefore condition our behaviour in accordance with some spurious objective norm, which prevents most of us from becoming ourselves.

I must confess that I find this a somewhat difficult doctrine. Can beings share a common condition without sharing a common nature? The other types of being and thing which coexist with us in space and time do not appear to share our inward condition. Surely susceptibility to a common condition argues a common nature. Sartré explicitly propounds his rejection of the conception of human nature as a logical consequence of atheism. The view that the universe consists of real kinds, that there is, for example, a morphology of man which can be isolated and analysed and expressed in universal laws and generalizations, is dismissed as a mere corollary of the creationist hypothesis of a universe conceived and executed by a divine being in accordance with an eternal plan. Thus both the positive, morphological human studies, with their hypothesis of some universal human nature, and the existentialist approach to the interpretation of man, with its stress upon the uniqueness of each person, are of theological origin. The former is rooted in the theology of creation, the latter in the theology of redemption. Sartré's sly insinuation that the positive studies of man have a theological basis is clearly one which rebounds upon his own head. Both attitudes have a theological origin, and hence the theological mind is more concerned to make a synthesis of them than to take sides in their present squabble.

Our more immediate concern, however, is with the timeliness of Sartré's dictum that human unity is the product not of a common nature but of a common condition. It cannot be a mere coincidence that it runs parallel with a tendency on the

[7] *Existentialism* (trans. Mairet) (Methuen), p. 45f.

part of the positive human studies to transform themselves into sciences of the human condition rather than sciences of human being. Of course it would be possible to adopt a merely functionalist and phenomenalist attitude towards human studies and to deny that this distinction has any meaning, to assert that processes conditioning man are all there is of man, or at least all that there is of man which can be known to science. But again, apart from our immediate, intuitive rejection of such a thesis as contradictory of our most intimate personal experiences, and from our sense of the metaphysical difficulties inherent in such a position, the development of the positive human studies of itself calls such a verdict in question. For the more we know of the processes which condition us the less efficiently and effectively they do their work. The neurotic who is made aware at last of the causes of his symptoms promptly loses them. A sociological study of propaganda in modern society inoculates the student against its contagion. Analogies can be found even in the biological sphere, although here no doubt the disconditioning is less automatic and immediate. Nevertheless, awareness of the part played by microbes in the genesis of certain diseases is enabling us gradually to decrease their incidence. The general rule holds that to be aware of a conditioning process is to achieve at least a certain degree of release from its mastery.[8] Mr. Michael Foster in a most interesting supplement to the *Christian News Letter*[9] has referred in a different connexion and in other terms to this same paradoxical disconditioning of man which advances hand in hand with his knowledge of his condition. Mr. Foster is inclined to welcome these developments as factors forcing man back to a reluctant but salutary consciousness of his ultimate conditioning by God. He is perhaps insufficiently conscious of how desperate a remedy this is. The sophisticated man who turns up his nose at the Divine manipulation of the secondary

[8] Toynbee's "challenge-response" terminology may help us to elucidate this paradox. To apprehend a process or a situation as a challenge is to envisage at least the possibility of a novel response.

[9] No. 299.

causes will find himself face to face and alone with the Final Cause. Awful judgement! Nevertheless Mr. Foster sees clearly, and expresses accurately, the terms in which the Church, on the prophetic level, must handle and interpret the emerging situation.

For the moment, however, I am more concerned with the way in which Mr. Foster's position directly contradicts Sartré's interpretation of man and human freedom. For Sartré the point at which the conditioning processes studied in the positive human sciences fail to condition us is the point at which we become free. Freedom is not a state of harmonious well-being appropriate to our condition, but the always uneasy and insecure transcendence of our condition. To be free is to be unconditioned, to become a mortal God. This kind of existentialism is thus but one more manifestation of that underlying human ambition to be God which has been the cause of so many literary and metaphysical perversions and so many political and personal sins ever since the Creation. "Ye shall be as God . . ." The temptation was too much for Adam and Eve, and Caesar and Alexander, and Faust and those whose delight in the Faustian legend expressed a blasphemy they dared not speak, and Hitler and Lenin, and perhaps even the rubric-ridden little Rector of Lower Muddleham piously but ruthlessly donning his new vestments on the first Sunday after his induction !

For Sartré the conditioning processes which have been conventionally studied in the positive humane sciences are the only conditioning processes. The revelation that they rarely work with "100 per cent. efficiency", and that they are becoming increasingly less effective in sophisticated, contemporary society means that there is a little oasis of at least potential freedom in the heart of every man's existence, and that its boundaries may be increased almost indefinitely by strenuous personal effort and resistance. The point at which he ceases to be positively conditioned, or succeeds in freeing himself from thraldom to the conditioning processes, is the point at which he is free to create himself and his own destiny, to become *causa sui* like God. True, this kind of freedom is always precarious and

haunted by anxiety, always overshadowed by a sense of impending doom, for one conditioning process, mortality, must ultimately prevail. But at least within a restricted area, and for a restricted time, it can enable a man to feed his own heart with the illusion that he is a kind of God. We may say that the taste for such satisfactions is a perverted appetite, but we can hardly deny its persistence and reality.

This identification of freedom with the absence of objective conditioning is a new development. In traditional rational philosophy and Christian theology freedom has implied not indeterminism but a special kind of determination, determination by objective and consciously approved rational and spiritual forces. Thus according to Kant freedom implies the causal efficacy of reason in personal life and development. In Christianity to be free is to be dominated by the grace of God, whose service is perfect freedom. In either case, or in both—for the synthesis of the two is common and easily formulated—freedom is conceived as freedom for this specific kind of being, i.e., the determination of his existence towards a destiny appropriate to his nature, by and through causal agencies which not only emphasize but also stimulate and exercise his salient characteristics. Sartré by contrast conceives freedom as the unconditioned conditioning itself.

Such a conception of freedom is perhaps understandable in a civilization which has ceased to be a culture and has become a mere chaos of alternative and competing cultures surviving side by side with each other. The assumption of so many historical thinkers from Vico onwards that there is a real and objective *zeitgeist,* an *esprit des lois,* which makes a unity of the whole historical life of a people living together in a particular place and time has probably never been so literally true as they have tended to suppose, and has never been less true than to-day. For many centuries in the West tradition has not merely permitted but demanded that the individual should base his life upon ultimate choices between alternatives which itself proposes. To-day, however, the breadth of cul-

tural and religious choice is so vast that it is increasingly recognized as a major cause of neurotic disorders.

Margaret Mead has described a typical example of the complex religious and spiritual crisis which the educated young person in western society must survive as a necessary part of the process of growing up. The whole paragraph is so amusing that I quote it almost in full:

> ". . . the girl's father may be a Presbyterian, an imperialist, a vegetarian, a teetotaler—a believer in the open shop and a high tariff, who believes that a woman's place is in the home, that young girls should . . . not smoke nor go riding with young men in the evening. But her mother's father may be a Low Episcopalian, a believer in high living, a strong advocate of States' Rights and the Monroe Doctrine, who reads Rabelais, likes to go to musical shows and horse races. Her aunt is an agnostic, an ardent advocate of women's rights, an internationalist who rests all her hopes on Esperanto, is devoted to Bernard Shaw, and spends her spare time in campaigns of anti-vivisection. Her elder brother, whom she admires exceeedingly, has just spent two years at Oxford. He is an Anglo-Catholic, an enthusiast concerning all things mediaeval, writes mystical poetry, reads Chesterton, and means to devote his life to seeking for the lost secret of mediaeval stained glass. Her mother's younger brother is an engineer, a strict materialist, who never recovered from reading Haekel in his youth; he scorns art, believes that science will save the world, scoffs at everything that was said and thought before the nineteenth century, and ruins his health by experiments in the scientific elimination of sleep. Her mother is of a quietistic frame of mind, very much interested in Indian philosophy, a pacifist, a strict non-participator in life, who, in spite of her daughter's devotion to her, will not make any move to enlist her enthusiasms. And this may be within the girl's own household. Add to it the groups represented, defended, advocated by her friends, her

teachers, and the books she reads by accident, and the list of possible enthusiasms, of suggested alliances, incompatible with one another, becomes appalling."[10]

In such an atmosphere a philosophy of freedom which thinks in terms of unfettered choice rather than in those of what we may call the higher determinism is perhaps an appropriate and inevitable commentary upon prevailing cultural conditions. The practice of such a freedom is not unnaturally accompanied by anxiety and depression, as productive of neurotic conditions and disorders as inevitably as the sparks fly upward.

Mr. Michael Foster, however, is thinking in more traditional and perhaps more wholesome terms. When we have reached a point at which we are no longer conditioned so entirely and so successfully as we were by the tangible processes studied in what we have called the positive morphological sciences of man, we have not therefore entered into the realm of the unconditioned. There remains a last and more ultimate teleological conditioning of man by the will of God, whose final ends indeed the other conditioning processes have long subserved. This view is in many fundamental respects the antithesis of Sartré's. Man cannot make himself, he is already made; man cannot make his own destiny, because his destiny is in fact a predestiny.

The doctrine of predestination has been an unpopular one with most Christians ever since Calvin brutalized its morality in refining its logic. It is well to remember that the term was New Testament and Pauline for many centuries prior to its becoming Calvin's own. It is perhaps time that we overcame the chill and abhorrence which it now arouses and considered its essential place in a Christian doctrine of man and a Christian analysis of society and history. To assert that a creature's destiny is a predestiny is to say that his destiny is given him with his being. It is a teleological conception. To be is always and inevitably to be appropriate for this purpose and inappropriate

[10] *The South Seas.* (Morrow & Co.), pp. 201f.

for that. We may set this observation side by side with Dr. Demant's important dictum that "the natural law is an eschatological conception." The natural law is thus man's predestiny. The destiny of man is not something which can be deduced from an empirical study of his present behaviour, still less something which can be devised by a pseudo-metaphysical rationalization of his present aspirations. (As when, for example, philosophers discover that modern man lacks a purpose and proceed to supply one in a spiritually minded volume.) Man's destiny is what he is for because he is what he is, it is that which eludes every finite fulfilment and qualifies each temporal satisfaction.

Set side by side with the popular existentialism of Sartré, these Christian conceptions confirm the legitimacy of the main bias of his interests, but in other respects contrast favourably with his somewhat difficult and often unwholesome doctrines and formulae. That the positive, morphological sciences of man cannot constitute an exhaustive study of man, that there is not merely room but also an urgent need for a metaphysic of human existence is a conviction that Christians and contemporary existentialists seem to share, however differently they may choose to express and supply it. The Christian interpretation of man, however, allows for a more appreciative attitude towards the positive morphological sciences of man, one which is interested not only in establishing their limitations but also and equally in justly estimating their worth and importance within their limitations. More important, the Christian tradition has a conception of freedom which is not frankly neurotic in its causes and consequences. The existentialist doctrine that "existence precedes essence" is at least right by contrast with the behaviourist in perceiving that human nature is as much a matter of submerged potentiality as of observable action. Although Christianity cannot agree that a man has literally to *make* himself, it is quite clear that all men have to *discover* themselves, and that this may well prove an equally protracted and exacting operation. In rational balance and sanity Christianity thus far surpasses contemporary existentialism. Never-

theless the importance for the Church of this particular heresy demands and deserves a more positive appreciation. I propose to conclude by summarizing briefly under four heads what appear to me to be the points at which it is most of all significant for Christian thought and action.

(1). It signalizes a widespread disillusion among thoughtful people with those ideologies and attitudes which were once the chief stock in trade of agnostic conviction and propaganda. The man who has once been moved by existentialist thought to recognize the problem of himself in all its depth has at least grown decisively out of the positivist domestication of the intellect, the stale second-rate values of the "scientific outlook" and the ranting mythologies of the political saviours. If this kind of existentialism is overthrowing the idols for the wrong reasons, it is at least overthrowing them effectively enough. It is primarily as a creator of disillusion, as a philosophy more apt to leave spiritual gaps in men's lives than to fill them, that it calls for the earnest consideration of the evangelist. A high proportion of those upon whom for a time it casts its spell will find that merely to be disillusioned is not enough. Used with understanding it may well prove a veritable *praeparatio evangelica* in the lives of many.

(2). In Sartré and Heidegger the phenomenology of atheism are expressed with a clarity unrivalled elsewhere, except perhaps in some of Doiestoiffsky's atheists. Normally, and perhaps mercifully, atheism and agnosticism go hand in hand with a superficial degree of self-awareness and, in consequence, with shallow philosophies of man. Positivism, the "scientific outlook", hedonism, associationism, illuminism, these have been the second-rate philosophies which have accompanied European anti-religion from the eighteenth century to almost our own time. Now, however, we witness the tragic spectacle of men who combine a profound self-awareness with a sense of the all-pervading absence of God. To intensify one's self-consciousness, to become aware of one's existence and consequent need for self-interpretation at a level

upon which one is no longer part of nature and society, and then to find oneself alone there, that way madness lies. Kierkegaard and the religious existentialists dug deeper than the horizontal natural and social relationships in man in order to discover his ultimate vertical relationship to God. Sartré and the irreligious existentialists forfeit both the temporal distractions which make a superficial existence tolerable and the mystical insights which keep a profound and introverted existence sane. As a result they display to perfection the stark tragedy of atheism. The older atheists were for the most part relatively shallow personalities unaware of the depth and enormity of their loss. They looked exactly like other people in the street, and made a great parade of their loyal acceptance of the reigning bourgeois values which, as they supposed, constituted the durable essence of Christianity. Now at last we have something at which we can point, a spectacle capable of arousing both pity and terror, as we say, "There is atheism indeed." Not even the Marxists can stomach it.

(3). Social criticism is beginning to take a new direction. The cry of the working masses for justice is ceasing in western civilization to make the primary appeal to the sensitive conscience and the alert mind. The conventional values and jargon of the political left have become a disgusting cant beneath which a new dominant class cloaks its lusty enjoyment of power, an opium which lulls the masses into assisting drowsily at the birth of the managerial society, as though this bosses' paradise were their own. In some places, and in some hands, it has even become a quisling ideology which seeks to provide a "new look" for an old-style imperialism. It is perhaps significant of the future that in this age of right and left totalitarianisms, with their crude mass slogans, their horrid gospels which bid the common man be commoner yet, which perversely emphasize communal values by travestying what men truly have in common, the most original word spoken, and heard, among us is one which tells of a metaphysical individualism more extreme and uncompromising than any to be found in western philosophical history.

The failure of Christian Socialism in the nineteenth century to capture the conscience of the Victorian Church, and in consequence to provide the forces of social criticism, moving in the socialist direction which was then both just and inevitable, with authentic spiritual leadership, was a melancholy one which must bear at least a portion of the responsibility for the manifest moral decline of the left. It is a far cry from Keir Hardie to Laski and Shinwell, further perhaps in eternity than in time, yet this sad descent has been made in less than two generations and is already an irreversible tendency. We must face the fact that social democracy, vulgarized by victory, will appeal less and less to the most awakened consciences and the most responsive intellects. (Social undemocracy, of course, will continue to appal every intelligence capable of comprehending what Marxian communism really means.) On the contrary, the profoundest forces of social criticism, those most deeply rooted in the social situation and most relevant to our new needs, will express the reaction of authentic, self-conscious personality to the spectacle of a mass society which ignores those elements of human aspiration which a secularized socialism is congenitally incapable of comprehending. Will the Church, we may ask, be more successful in understanding and guiding this new kind of social criticism, which is as inevitable and just in our age as the young socialism was which Kingsley and Maurice sought in vain to baptize a century ago ? The statement of a Christian individualism, the upholding of the unpopular gospel of personal responsibility to God, and hence personal transcendence of society and history, in a mass age, is the same kind of task as that which they shouldered, because equally relevant to the needs and dangers of its own time. It must be tackled in their spirit, and, we may pray, with a measure of their sympathy and discernment, and by many times their number.

The fact that existentialism can still be plausibly represented as no more than the latest intellectual fad of a sophisticated coterie may blind us to the dangers and possibilities inherent in the situation. Side by side with the growth of this

extreme and unbalanced metaphysic of individualism, we can see everywhere the rise of a more popular exasperation with clumsy and short-sighted social disciplines and an easy forgetting of the injustices which once recommended them.[11] At any time ideology and exasperation may fuse in an undiscriminating class hatred and an irresponsible social dissidence which will arraign and condemn the planned society for the wrong reasons, the exasperation giving the ideology a popular appeal which as a mere intellectualism it could never inspire, the ideology turning the exasperation into a cohesive doctrine. It is surely for the Christian mind to understand the needs and frustrations out of which such tendencies are born, and to assist them to achieve for themselves balanced, valid and constructive modes of expression.

(4). The vogue of contemporary existentialism may also cheer the evangelist with the reflection that an increasing number of contemporary men and women are at last wistfully asking for precisely what he wants to give them, and what his gospel is most apt to provide—an interpretation of their own existence, not an explaining away of their own existence in mass terminology, a " relationizing " of reality which dissipates what it analyses, like the peeling of an onion, but a genuine metaphysic of man's being and destiny. How differently, and how much more effectively, Christianity can meet this need, I have already tried to show. But I may fittingly conclude by remarking how welcome this new challenge is, how native to the genius of the Biblical faith. The kind of question which existentialism disposes a man to ask is just the kind of question which, if the Biblical account of man is the true one, men are bound to ask when they are most aware of themselves, most exercised by the predicament of finding themselves human.

[11] Note how contemporary government propaganda persistently seeks to justify and commend itself by keeping alive memories of the age of mass unemployment, a strategy which must inevitably yield diminishing returns.

A GREAT ENGLISH CASUIST

By THOMAS WOOD

PUBLIC applause is notoriously short-lived and in theology as in other spheres the giants of one age are not infrequently forgotten in another. But Robert Sanderson (1587-1663), for the last three years of his life Bishop of Lincoln, provides a refreshing illustration for what is perhaps a commonplace text. It was in the academic year 1647-8, while occupying the chair of Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford to which he had been appointed by Charles I in 1642, that Sanderson read his lectures *De Obligatione Conscientiae* which, when later published in book form, were soon recognized to be among the most outstanding contributions made to the study of *Practick Divinity* during the seventeenth century. Now, therefore, exactly three hundred years after those lectures were delivered, would seem to be a fitting occasion to recall both the tremendous reputation their author once enjoyed among English Churchmen, and also the importance of that department of theology the more widespread and sound study of which it was his desire to promote.

So lavish were the tributes paid to Sanderson by his contemporaries that, reading them now with ears attuned to a different idiom, we may be tempted to dismiss them as only part of a general extravagance prevalent in that age. If the only praise were that of Izaak Walton it would not be wholly unjust to do so. That most charitable of biographers seriously wished "both for the Reader's, and Dr. Sanderson's sake, that Posterity had known his great Learning and Virtue by a better Pen; by such a Pen, as could have made his Life as immortal as his Learning and Merits ought to be."[1] But Walton's was

[1] Walton's *The Life of Dr. Sanderson* 1678, Preface (*World's Classics* Edition), p. 347.

by no means the only tribute. On Archbishop Laud's recommendation Charles I received Sanderson as his Chaplain in Ordinary in 1631, and the King "would usually say 'I carry my ears to hear other Preachers, but I carry my conscience to hear Mr. Sanderson'";[2] and at their last meeting Charles requested Sanderson "to betake himself to the writing Cases of Conscience for the good of Posterity."[3] Nor did Dr. Thomas Barlow (later Bishop of Lincoln), himself no mean casuist, conceal his genuine admiration. He had known Sanderson personally, heard his lectures, read his books and corresponded with him; and in his own *The Case of The Jews* he referred to Sanderson as "the best Casuist of our Nation and may be of any Nation else."[4] In a letter to Walton he also wrote: "Sure I am, that the life and actions of that pious and learned Prelate will afford you matter enough for his commendation, and the imitation of Posterity."[5] The distinguished layman Robert Boyle not only read Sanderson's lectures *De Juramenti Obligatione* "with great satisfaction", but also counted it a pleasure to become the casuist's patron and by his financial assistance made the publication of the *De Obligatione Conscientiae* possible.[6] The admiration and gratitude felt by Archbishop Ussher also found enthusiastic expression: "I proposed a case to judicious Doctor Sanderson, who grasped all the circumstances of it and returned that happy Answer, that met all my Thoughts, satisfied all my Scruples, and cleared all my Doubts."[7]

[2] *ibid.* p. 368.

[3] *ibid.* p. 375.

[4] *The Case of The Jews*, p. 35. This is one of seven detailed casuistical discussions made by Barlow and published posthumously as *Several Miscellaneous and Weighty Cases of Conscience*, 1692.

[5] Bishop Barlow's *Letter* to Walton, appended to *The Life*, p. 422.

[6] Barlow's *Letter*, pp. 423-4, and *The Life*, pp. 399-400.

[7] This is quoted (p. 30) in a *Life* prefixed to the 1722 Edition of the English translation of *De Juramenti Obligatione*, the Title-page of which reads: *The Nature and Obligation of Promissory Oaths Explained, In Seven Prelections, Read publickly in the Divinity School at Oxon, in the Time of The Great Rebellion.*

And when Anthony à Wood speaks of Sanderson in his *Athenae Oxonienses* he seems to vie with Walton in superlatives: "Such is that Solidity and clearness of Reason, which runs through all his Discourses and Writings, that so long as Men make *these* the only Tests and Measures of their Judgings and Censure, as they do still, so must they needs likewise in after Ages, continue in the greatest Esteem and Veneration; and *He* be always placed in the highest and first rank of *English* Writers."[8] While not least impressive among the less eloquent tributes to Sanderson's casuistical skill must be reckoned: first, the university's request that he should take a leading part in drawing up the *Reasons of the present Judgment of the University of Oxford, Concerning The Solemn League and Covenant, The Negative Oaths, The Ordinances concerning Discipline and Worship. Approved by General Consent in a full Convocation; June* 1, 1647;[9] and, secondly, the requests which came to him so often by letter in his parish of Boothby Pagnell, to resolve cases of conscience for men who might easily have sought elsewhere.[10]

The quotations given above not only reflect to the credit of Sanderson, they also bear indirect witness to the high esteem in which *casuistical divinity* was widely held in England at least until the third quarter of the seventeenth century. That subject was far from being simply the obscure study of a few learned divines, though it may be admitted that such an impression could possibly be derived from the answer alleged to have been given by Sanderson to a "Person of Quality" who asked "What course a young Divine should take in his Studies to inable him to be a good Casuist". The learned Doctor replied "That a convenient understanding of the Learned Languages (at least of Hebrew, Greek and Latin) and a sufficient knowledge of Arts and Sciences presuppos'd; There were two things in humane Literature, a comprehension of which would be of very great

[8] This is also quoted in the same work, p. 31.

[9] Title-page of this reply, included in same vol. as *Nature and Obligation of Oaths*, 1722, p. 283. Sanderson made the English translation, *ibid.* Preface, p. viii.

[10] See note 16. Cf. Walton, p. 391.

use, to inable a man to be a rational and able Casuist, which otherwise was very difficult, if not impossible. I. A convenient Knowledge of Moral Philosophy; especially that part of it which treats of the Nature of Humane Actions: . . . II. The second thing . . . was a convenient knowledge of the Nature and Obligation of Laws in general . . ."[11] If it be said that his answer sounds very forbidding, it is equally relevant to remark that perhaps the question would never have been asked had it not been assumed that every diligent town and country parson would try to make himself as efficient in this as in every other part of his theological study.

In the production of sound moral treatises peculiarly fitted to the needs of the conscientious pastor in England, there had been an unfortunate but perhaps inevitable time lag after the initial movements of the Reformation. Dr. Thomas Barlow observed that "For *Protestants,* there is no part of *Divinity,* which has been (I know not the reason) more neglected, very few having writ a just and comprehensive Tract of Cases of Conscience."[12] Yet at least one good reason for this neglect was quite evident and had, in fact, been pointed out by William Ames[13] and Jeremy Taylor[14] before Barlow wrote. There is no reason to doubt that the Reformers recognized the need for a sound and authoritative casuistry so as to ensure at least a minimum standard of Christian conduct in the everyday affairs of the faithful. But a sound casuistry is not the product of a day, and the task called for the time and labour of their most capable and experienced theologians whose energies continued to be largely consumed by doctrinal controversies. Inevitably, therefore, the medieval and "popish" manuals were freely drawn upon by conscientious pastors within the Reformed

[11] Barlow's *Letter,* pp. 425-6.

[12] *Directions for the Choice of Books in the Study of Divinity,* 1699 Edition, p. 41.

[13] *De Conscientia eius Jure et Casibus* 1630. E. T. *Conscience with the Power and Cases Thereof,* 1643, *Address to The Reader.*

[14] *Ductor Dubitantium,* 1660, Preface, p. v, Vol. IX. *Works,* Ed. C. P. Eden and A. Taylor, London, 1850-59.

Churches: for the time being it was either Roman casuistry or none at all. But the moralists of these Churches were not prepared to pay this unwilling tribute to Rome longer than they could possibly help, and the seventeenth century witnessed a series of noble attempts, made by Anglicans and Separatists alike, to provide for their own communions a body of *practick divinity* which they could call their very own.

Of these English moralists, all of them aware of the exacting and pioneer nature of their task, Robert Sanderson was one of the most learned and acute. His contribution was threefold. First we may notice his written replies to individuals or groups about particular cases of conscience. Some of them were published posthumously. Five appeared in 1666, ascribed to "a late Learned Hand", and were later recommended as from Sanderson's pen by Bishop Barlow in his *Directions for the choice of Books in the Study of Divinity*.[15] In 1674 they were reprinted[16] with three more and prefaced by a letter in which, once again, the admiration for Sanderson is unbounded. After stressing their genuineness, and approving their publication, the writer adds: "Indeed the least remains of so matchless a Champion, so invincible an Advocate *in foro Theologico,* like the filings and fragments of gold, ought not to be lost; and pity the world was not worthy many more of his learned Labours." These cases are valuable now both for the light they throw on the kind of doubts engaging the minds of conscientious men at that time, and also for exhibiting in brief compass those features of extraordinary precision, acute analysis and a tendency towards rigorism, characteristic of all Sanderson's writings.

In the first, "The case of the Sabbath", he shows how the various obligations arising from the divine, natural and human laws, are to be assessed, when he gives succinct answers to three distinct questions: What is the most fitting name for the

[15] *op. cit.*, p. 42.

[16] *Eight Cases of Conscience: Occasionally Determined By The late Reverend Father in God, Robert Sanderson, Lord Bishop of Lincoln, London: Printed for Henry Brome, at the Gun in St. Paul's Church Yard* 1674. Title-page of edition quoted in this essay.

Christian day of rest and worship? What is the full significance for a Christian of the "Lord, have mercy" after the Fourth Commandment? Whether and to what extent it is lawful to indulge in physical recreation on the Lord's Day. Then come two matrimonial questions: the first a case of marriage with a Recusant, which he discourages as inexpedient though not unlawful; and the second a case of unlawful love, where he explains the difference between a vow and a promise and the validity and binding force of each in particular circumstances. The "Case of the Military Life" he answers by considering in order, men's employment in general, a soldier's in particular, the essentials of a just war, the ends to be proposed by a soldier, and the points to be considered by a lay man before volunteering for active service. Turning next to the problem of Scandal, he explains that in cases of this kind we must look not so much at the event as at the cause, and gives rules about the four chief ways in which scandal may be given and its gravity assessed. The sixth case refers to a minute point of law rather than a problem of conscience. But the "Case of the Engagement",[17] which follows, is a closely reasoned discussion upon the principles of the natural bond of allegiance and the positive oath of allegiance taken by the subject to the sovereign power. The last case is that of "a Rash vow deliberately iterated", wherein he shows that, while every rash vow is a sin, whether or not it ceases to bind depends not upon its rashness but upon its matter being contrary to piety, justice, charity or mercy.

More important than these occasional pieces, however, are the seven lectures *De Juramenti Obligatione*,[18] delivered during the Michaelmas term of 1646—a dangerous time for such an enterprise since the Parliamentary forces were already garrisoned in Oxford. Tradition has it that they were first translated into English by Charles I during his imprisonment in the Isle of Wight. This was believed by the editor of the 1722

[17] To be sworn in loyalty to the Commonwealth 1650.

[18] For details of the edition of the English translation quoted in this essay see note 7 above.

edition which he claimed to be a revision of the King's original translation. The seven lectures fall conveniently into four divisions.

First we are given a studied definition of an oath[19] which is followed, as commonly in Sanderson, by a careful explanation of every part of it. Then comes a distinction between assertory and promissory oaths which leads on to a full discussion of the nature and force of obligation. The second section is devoted to the statement and examination of certain "Canons or Rules of the Whole future Discourse; from whence are to be derived, and to which are to be reduced the Determinations of most Doubts." Section three extends from Lecture III to the end of Lecture VI and is the most important part of the whole work, being a resolution of doubts and scruples as they relate to oaths. Though Sanderson says that he will not be too precise about method and classification, he groups them carefully, after the manner of Aristotle, according to the four "causes", material, formal, efficient and final. Lecture III considers all the doubts arising when the matter of an oath is impossible, necessary, unlawful, indifferent, indefinite, or uncertain. Lecture IV discusses the efficient cause, examining the obligations which arise when the swearer is not endowed with judgement, when he is not in his own power, when he is uncertain of the authority of the deferent to require an oath, when heirs and successors are implicated, and when impulsive causes like anger and passion or deceit and force intervene. It closes with the well known test question about making a promise under oath to a thief. Lecture V opens a discussion on the formal cause, which may be internal or external, and resolves doubts about the obligations arising from the signs or words actually used, with the aid of four tests by which the true meaning of the words of an oath may be distinguished. The ceremonies which accompany an oath are also commented on.

[19] "An oath is a Religious Act, by which God is called to Witness for the Confirmation of some matter in Doubt," *op. cit.*, Lect. I, sect. II, p. 4

The first half of Lecture VI, on the internal form of an oath, is virtually an examination of the doctrines of equivocation and mental reservation with a castigation of the Jesuits; the second half, devoted to the final cause, treats of doubts arising when oaths are made with a wrong intention or to an ill end, when they are made unnecessarily by evil custom, when a man is uncertain whether he has sworn, or when he swears not intending to oblige himself. The fourth section coincides with Lecture VII which concerns the fulfilling of an oath, and so introduces questions of dispensation, commutation, " irritation " (i.e., nullity declared by a lawful superior), cessation of the matter, and relaxation by the party to whom the promise under oath was made. The treatise is concluded by a few general admonitions about the right use of oaths.

So we come to the third and finest of Sanderson's contributions to the century's casuistry, the ten lectures *De Obligatione Conscientiae,*[20] aptly described by Bishop Barlow as " A book little in bulk; but not so if we consider the benefit an intelligent Reader may receive by it."[21]

In the opening lecture which, as Sanderson himself recognized, is the most difficult and intricate of all, he defines conscience,[22] and in the manner of the Schoolmen proceeds to consider its name in detail, its genus, its subject, its object and its proper act. He then pauses to " try and uproot three popular fallacies, which so dangerously deceive the conscience, and lull it into fatal security."[23] These are, " that the pretence of a good intention, or the example of some holy man, or the

[20] *De Obligatione Conscientiae — Praelectiones Decem Oxonii in Schola Theologica Habitae Anno Domini MDC.XLVII.* Edited in Latin text by William Whewell, C.U.P., 1851. Quotations in this essay are taken from the E. T. *Bishop Sanderson's Lectures on Conscience and Human Law,* Bishop Christopher Wordsworth, 1877.

[21] *Letter* to Walton, p. 424.

[22] " A faculty or Habit of the Practical Understanding, which enables the Mind of Man, by the use of Reason and Argument, to apply the light which it has to particular Moral Actions." *op. cit.,* Lect. I, 2, p. 2.

[23] Lect. II, sect. 3, p. 31.

authority of some eminent divine, are sufficient to justify and give a sanction to all their actions."[24] These he disposes of with many clear arguments in Lectures II and III. But if conscience is to execute her office as she ought, she must know by what rules or laws she is to be obliged. He shows, therefore, that "God alone has a proper and direct power of command over the consciences of men";[25] and that "the proper and Adequate Rule of the Conscience is the Will of God, in what manner soever it may be revealed to mankind."[26] This law of God will express itself as a "proximate rule of the Conscience" in the form of "right reason"; and this "light of the mind" is threefold—the innate light of Nature, the infused or revealed light of Scripture and the acquired light of Doctrine.[27] This is the subject of Lecture IV. Besides the law of God which is absolutely binding, there are other laws, inferior and secondary to it, which are relatively binding in virtue of some divine precept on which they are founded. These may be either human laws imposed from without, or "laws" made by the free choice of our will, like vows and oaths, promises and contracts. Lecture V is therefore devoted to a discussion of the general obligation of all human laws. All the foregoing forms a necessary preparation for his main concern, which is a discussion of the general cases of conscience arising from the varied obligations which human laws impose. This, the longest section of the book, occupies Lectures VI to IX and, for the purpose of convenient classification, he considers them under the heads of the four "causes" just as he considered oaths in the *De Juramenti,* giving a lecture to each. By this method he is able to discuss systematically the obligations arising from laws whose matter is impossible, unjust, burdensome, permissive of evil, or indifferent; the supreme legislative authority of the king, and the degree of popular consent necessary to make a law valid; the sufficient promulgation of laws; the problem of vincible and invincible

[24] *ibid.*
[25] Lect. IV, sect. 8, p. 92.
[26] *ibid.* sect. 20, p. 103.
[27] *ibid.* sect. 24, p. 107.

ignorance; the interpretation of penal laws; and the ordering of all laws to their true end which is the good of the people. The final Lecture considers in more detail this last point, *salus populi suprema lex est.* The lectures ended, however, by necessity and not by choice. Sanderson concluded by saying: "I design in a short time (if God gives me leave, and opportunity permits) to proceed to what remains yet to be considered." But in June 1648 he was deprived of his canonry and professorship by the Parliamentary Committee; and, though he was reinstated at the Restoration, the lectures were never resumed. They were published during 1660 and went through several editions before the end of the century. The first English translation, by Robert Codrington, appeared in the same year as the original Latin.

The brief outlines attempted above cannot hope even to hint at the richness of the originals, and they are given simply to make plain the extent of the ground covered by Sanderson. They may, however, also make it easier for us to appreciate several characteristics of his work which belong, in fact, to the reformed casuistry as a whole.

(a) Perhaps the most obvious is its fragmentary or piecemeal nature, and about this there is nothing surprising. The English casuists were well aware that the task which they had set themselves was beyond the capacity of any one man to complete. They were concerned to lay what they believed would be safe foundations upon which they hoped (vainly, as it proved) others would continue to build. Some, like Taylor and Baxter[28] for example, made commendable efforts to be as comprehensive as they could; others, of whom Sanderson was one, chose just one section of the whole field and tried to deal with it thoroughly.

(b) Hardly less obvious is the fact that Sanderson had in mind a much wider body of readers than had been presupposed by the Roman casuists whom he would help to displace. The English writers obviously had the pastoral needs of the clergy especially in mind but, unlike their medieval predecessors and

[28] *A Christian Directory*, 1673.

Roman contemporaries, their works were not compiled *entirely* for the benefit of the clergy nor for *exclusive* use in the confessional; they wrote, mainly in English, for *all* reasonable and devout Christian men who were willing to hear or read. The fact that Sanderson's lectures were delivered in Latin at the university provides no exception to this; for the Divinity School at Oxford was hardly an exact parallel with a Roman seminary, and in any case his contributions were rapidly translated and welcomed by educated lay men.

(c) By denying that casuistry is entirely a priestly prerogative, the Reformed casuists were then compelled to present the subject in a different way. The change could be expressed by saying that the new emphasis was not upon " cases " but upon " conscience."[29] The more typical works of seventeenth century English casuistry are elaborate discussions of general principles and methods of procedure, with particular cases introduced mainly by way of illustration and not as of first importance. What Dr. Barlow said of Sanderson's writings is in varying degrees true of all the English casuists: " His two Tracts or Prelections *De Obligatione Conscientiae,* and *De Juramento,* are of great use and excellence; for in those Prelections he has so plainly explain'd, and prov'd many Propositions concerning *Oaths* and *Conscience* in Thesi, and in general, that he who seriously reads them, and remembers what he reads, may determine and resolve many other cases, which are not mentioned by Dr. Sanderson."[30]

(d) With this different approach there went an equally pronounced change in tone. When making any particular ruling the English casuist, unlike his Roman counterpart, could not

[29] This point was recognized by William Whewell in the first of his *Lectures on The History of Moral Philosophy,* Cambridge, 1862, p. 29,—" In the title of his work [*Cases of Conscience*], the attention had hitherto been bestowed mainly on the former word; it was now transferred to the latter. The determination of Cases was replaced by the discipline of the Conscience."

[30] *Directions for the Choice of Books* etc., pp. 41-42. There is a similarly worded comment, on the *De Obligatione Conscientiae* alone, in Barlow's *Letter* to Walton, p. 424.

cite a precedent from his manual, pass judgement and rest secure; his answer derived whatever authority it possessed not from any external source but from its intrinsic merit. The English casuists are impressively modest in their demands for general assent to their particular conclusions. They offer their judgements convinced that they are grounded upon right reason, but allow that if any man can improve upon them they will welcome his criticisms and amendments. So it was that, in the " Case of the Sabbath " referred to earlier, Sanderson remarked: " By what I presently send, you may sufficiently see what my opinion is; which I shall be as ready to alter when any man shall instruct me better, if he bring good evidence either of Reason, or of Scripture-Text for what he affirmeth."[31]

Important as these characteristic differences are, however, it would be a mistake to stress them unduly. Indeed, when examining Sanderson's actual teaching, as distinct from his manner of approach and method of presentation, one cannot fail to be impressed by the very considerable extent to which he (in common with all the English casuists) adopted the general principles, terminology, categories and distinctions which had been laid down by the medieval moralists. His knowledge of and respect for the Schoolmen were by no means slight (it is worth recalling that in the second appendix to his *Logic*[32] he gave a list of twenty-three of them); and Aquinas stood with Hooker among his favourite authors.[33] How closely Sanderson followed the traditional moral teaching to which St. Thomas had given classic expression, will at once become obvious if (to

[31] This, the First of the *Eight Cases of Conscience* etc., is dated March 28, 1634. Cf. Case III. *Of Unlawful Love*: " In all this Discourse, I take not upon me to write Edicts, but to give my advice, that is to say, not to prescribe to the judgment of others, if any, shall see cause to dissent, but to deliver my own opinion ", p. 58; and Case IV. *Of The Military Life*, which he treats " with reservation of Place for second thoughts, and submission to other Judgments ", p. 60.

[32] *The Art of Logic*, First Edition 1615 (anonymously). Went into eleven editions.

[33] For references see George Lewis's *Robert Sanderson*, (*English Theologians* Series), S.P.C.K., 1924, pp. 10-11.

cite only three instances) one compares his exposition of the nature and functions of Conscience, the nature and authority and due promulgation of Law in all its forms, and the essentials of a Just War, with the treatment of the same themes in the *Prima Secundae* and *Secunda Secundae* of the *Summa Theologica.* It is only a small but a very enlightening exercise, for example, to collect Sanderson's observations on the Natural Law and place them in parallel columns beside St. Thomas's lengthier teaching about the same points. The kind of thing one discovers is that where Aquinas had said that Natural Law " is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is . . . nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law " (*S.T.* I. II. q. 91, art. 2); Sanderson spoke of it as " a natural impression, and as it were a copy of that original and eternal law in the Mind of God, and a part of that Divine Image, in which man at first was created by God " (*De Oblig.* Lect. IV. 24).

But even more significant than details of this kind (which are numerous and important) is the fact that Sanderson, with the English casuists generally, held to the fundamental assumption of all his medieval predecessors that Christian morals embrace, and must be applied in detail to, every human activity both at the individual and social level. Human society was viewed as a vast organism, each individual and group within it having distinctive rights and duties which the competent Christian casuist would be prepared to interpret in any given situation. As Sanderson declared in one of his sermons: " God hath made us sociable creatures, contrived us into policies and societies and commonwealths; made us fellow-members of one body and *every one another's members.* As, therefore, we are not born, so neither must we live, to and for ourselves alone; but our parents and friends, and acquaintances, nay, every man of us hath a kind of right and interest in every other man of us, and our country and the commonwealth in us all."[34] Without such a belief and all that it involves, works like the *De Obligatione Conscientiae* can have no meaning.

[34] *Works* (Ed. W. Jacobson, 1854, 6 vols.), Vol. I, p. 102.

If, however, Sanderson looked upon the teaching of his medieval predecessors with respect and sympathy, he turned from all that seemed distinctive in the teaching of his Jesuit contemporaries with unconcealed abhorrence. This is not the place to inquire into the extent to which, in this respect, the English casuists were the victims of prejudice and ignorance, or of their failure in many instances to base their criticism upon an exact scrutiny of what their opponents actually taught. This would in itself form the subject of an interesting and illuminating study; but here we can only note the fact that the moral teaching of the Society of Jesus, whether real or imaginary, is introduced into their pages for the most part only to be subjected to the severest confutation or the most impassioned abuse, and that Sanderson contributed his share of both.

Four instances may serve to illustrate this. (a) First, his insistence upon the general rule that "every man is obliged, *caeteris paribus,* and if there be no other impediment, in doubtful matters, to choose that which is safest",[35] reminds us that he shared in that emphatic rejection of *probabilism* common to all the reformed casuists and, with a severity and rigour even greater than most of them, would allow no advance beyond the older principle of *probabiliorism.* (b) He had no sympathy whatever for the use made by the Jesuits of the venerable distinction of mortal and venial sin. In the third lecture of the *De Juramenti* (Doubt IV) he refers to "that rotten distinction, of *mortal,* and *venial* sins, a Leaven with which they have foully corrupted the whole Lump of Moral Theology." (c) Even more downright is he in his condemnation of those doctrines of equivocation and mental reservation of which the Jesuits were regarded as being the most notorious purveyors. The whole matter is introduced in his sixth lecture of the *De Juramenti* (Doubt I) when discussing the "internal form" of an oath. The words of an oath may seem clear according to common usage and yet the swearer may intend another meaning with the object of deceiving the second party. This, says Sanderson,

[35] *De Juramenti Obligatione,* Lect. VI, 13, p. 225, and cf. Lect. II, 9, p. 54.

" is that *verbal Equivocation,* which amongst some other *Casuists* and *Scholasticks,* the *Jesuits* especially maintain and practice." It is " as if a *Jesuit* apprehended, should swear that he were a *Smith,* meaning that his *Name* was *Smith;* or an Apprentice commanded to tell where his Master is, should swear he died a month ago, meaning that he then *died Stockings.*" He brands it as an " Artifice of industrious Ambiguity ", and declares that " this *Jesuitical* doctrine licenseth the Lust of Lying and Perjury unto impious Men." (d) Under the same Doubt he refers to mental reservation, which he condemns as worse than equivocation and more difficult to prevent. The argument that the verbal and mental parts of a sentence are all one Sanderson calls the " Jesuitical Legerdemain " which is raised " upon the utter Ruins of *Faith,* in all humane Judgements, Contracts, and Promises." God may be able to see into our hearts, but men cannot, therefore " the Truth of a Speech is to be judged only by the *words pronounced,* and not by mental Reservation."

Sanderson's casuistical writings have not escaped that neglect, as puzzling as it is regrettable, which, since the very early years of the eighteenth century, has been the fate of all similar works produced by his English contemporaries. All three books referred to in this essay were of course included in Jacobson's collected edition of Sanderson's works in 1854; but, otherwise, only his *De Obligatione Conscientiae* has been published in what can even remotely be called " modern " editions, and then only twice. The first came in 1851 when William Whewell edited the Latin text, adding an abridged translation and brief notes.[36] The second was that of Bishop Christopher Wordsworth in 1877, with the title *Bishop Sanderson's Lectures*

[36] See note 20 above. After observing that " Bishop Sanderson is generally considered, and with great justice, as one of the ablest and soundest of our Theological Moralists ", Whewell gave his opinion, with reference to the *De Obligatione Conscientiae,* that: " Even now, it would be difficult to mention any better example of the Ethical school which preceded the influence of Hobbes and Des Cartes ", (Preface, p. iii) and " it would be difficult to discuss most of the moral questions which form the latter part of the work, in a more satisfactory manner than is here done." (p. v).

on Conscience and Human Law. Its Preface is worth noting. There Wordsworth explained that "Nearly nine years ago, on my promotion to the See of Lincoln, I specified among the books selected by me as subjects for Examination of Candidates for Holy Orders in this Diocese, 'Bishop Sanderson's Lectures on Conscience'." In providing this new English version of them, based upon an earlier one made by a Mr. Lewis as far back as 1722, he anticipated the excuse that copies of the lectures were not easily obtainable or that their Latin made them hard to study.

It may be that the good bishop cherished the hope that the book he had provided primarily to assist his own ordinands would also help towards a renewed study of moral theology beyond the confines of his own diocese. But, if so, he was to be disappointed. Despite the vast improvements in the Anglican training for the ministry since his time, this vital part has long continued to be generally neglected. And the consequence has been something like a return to that situation which, as we have noted, existed before Sanderson and the rest began their work. That is, in the absence of any distinctively Anglican training in the subject, many have inevitably turned to Roman manuals even though these are, in many respects, ill-fitted to supply Anglican needs—once again it has been "either Roman casuistry or none at all."

Of more recent years, however, important attempts have been made to remedy the situation, notably by the distinguished work of the present Bishop of Oxford. But, as in the seventeenth century so now, the production of a sound and authoritative moral theology commensurate with the pastoral needs of our own Church, is not the work of a day or even a decade. A tradition once neglected is not easily recovered. So it was that, despite the remarkable range and depth of his own contributions, Dr. Kirk once remarked upon "the vast extent of the questions which must be covered and discussed before anything approaching a systematic Anglican text-book on moral theology can be produced."[37] Since those words were written, twenty

[37] *Conscience and its Problems,* First Edition 1927, Preface, p. XX.

years ago, considerable progress has been made, and if at the moment zeal sometimes outruns knowledge there can surely be detected, and not least among the younger clergy, an ever growing appreciation of the importance of the subject and of its rightful place in a full historic Anglicanism. Therefore, to return to the subject of this essay, it can only be regarded as a very happy circumstance that the Regius Professor of Moral and Pastoral Theology at Sanderson's own university has recently published a volume on *The Elements of Moral Theology,* written with the express purpose of meeting the needs of the younger clergy and ordinands, and with the explicit hope " that it may cause discussion and work which will lead to the compilation of an Anglican manual."[38] The tercentenary of Sanderson's lectures *De Obligatione Conscientiae* could not have been more appropriately marked than by the appearance of a book with such a purpose; nor could we pay a more acceptable tribute to the memory of that great casuist than by contributing, if only through discussion, to that more ambitious enterprise towards which Canon Mortimer's volume points us.[39]

[38] *op. cit.,* **Preface, p. vi.**

[39] This was written *before* my article " An Anglican Manual ", ***C.Q.R.,*** **No. 292, Vol. CXLVI.**

JAMES, THE LORD'S BROTHER

By T. NICKLIN and R. O. P. TAYLOR

LIGHTFOOT, in the exhaustive monograph on St. Paul and the Three, which he appended to his Commentary on Galatians, closed, for students of the last sixty years, all discussion of the life of James, the Lord's brother. The air, when Lightfoot wrote, was full of sceptical suspicion of primitive writers. Neander, Grote, Ihne and Paley, in different fields exhibited this attitude of distrust towards early tradition: the scientific sifting of historical material, it was contended, was of comparatively modern date: oral tradition was discredited, and all ages before the nineteenth century were regarded as uncritical and therefore untrustworthy. Sane and sober though Lightfoot was, he could not escape the influence of this critical environment, and, as we shall show, this led him to treat the important testimony of Hegesippus in regard to James with less care than he usually exhibited. Since his day, archaeology and papyrology have changed the scene, and the recovery from the excesses of physical science has also reacted upon our entire mental outlook. Mr. Bernard Shaw's recantation in public of Tyndall's materialism and his appreciation of St. Thomas of Aquinum is an index of the transvaluation which has taken place in our stock of ideas. So it may be thought not unjustifiable to re-examine Lightfoot's conclusions on the subject of the life of James, the Lord's brother.

It will be convenient to quote, in the first place, the most significant sentences of Lightfoot's monograph. "There is much", he writes (p. 366, ed. 1881), "in this [Hegesippus'] account [of James] which cannot be true: the assigning to him a privilege which was confined to the high-priest alone, while it is entangled with the rest of the narrative, is plainly false, and

can only have been started when a new generation had grown up which knew nothing of the Temple services. Moreover, the account of his testimony and death, which follows, not only contradicts the brief contemporary notice of Josephus, but is in itself so melodramatic and so full of high improbabilities, that it must throw discredit on the whole context".

How utterly indefensible these judgements are, will immediately appear when we examine Hegesippus's actual statements. These are found in Eusebius H.E.II, 23, who writes as follows:

> "The most accurate account of the manner of James' death is given by Hegesippus, who lived[1] in the time of the immediate successors of the Apostles. In the fifth book of his Memoirs he writes, 'Along with the Apostles, there succeeded to the charge of the church, the brother of the Lord, James. He has been called *the Just* by all from the Lord's time to our own day,[2] because many others were called James. This James was consecrated from his mother's womb. He did not drink wine or any fermented liquor. He did not eat animal food. No razor ever touched his head. He never anointed himself with oil. He never used the public baths. He and he alone[3] was permitted to enter the Holy Place, for—and this is congruous to such a privilege—he did not wear woollen but fine linen, and, further, he used to go by himself into the Sanctuary. He would be found there crouched upon his knees and, on behalf of the People, begging forgiveness. His knees had become hard like a camel's, because he was always kneeling, as he worshipped God and begged for forgiveness for the people. At any rate, it was on account of the extraordinary lengths to which he carried his observance of the Law that he used to be called Zedek and Obleas, that is, in Greek Dikaios (Just) and Perioche (Fence) of the People,

[1] Or, possibly, *was born.*

[2] James, therefore, was still a well remembered person in Hegesippus's day.

[3] Or, perhaps, *by himself* as in a following sentence.

as the prophets plainly say of him. Some of the seven religious groups that there were among the people . . . kept asking him, What does this "door of Jesus" mean? And he continually answered, He is the Saviour.[4] From this answer some were led to believe Jesus to be the Christ. But the groups, as a whole, did not believe in any resurrection or in anyone coming to give to every man according to his doings. But those who did believe, did so because of the weight they attached to James' authority. Many even of the ruling class were believers. Consequently there arose a disturbance among those Scribes and Pharisees who were not Christians. They said that there was a danger of all the people becoming restive, if they hung in expectation of Jesus' return as the Messiah. So they came in a body and said to James, "We appeal to you: stop the people from remaining under the delusion that Jesus was the Messiah. We appeal to you to set right about Jesus all who come here for the Passover. For all of us listen to any dictum of yours. For we ourselves and all the People can testify of you that no exception can be taken to you, and that you never allow yourself to be influenced by anyone. So persuade the mob not to be under any delusion about Jesus. For all the people, no less than we, depend on you to keep us right. So go and stand on the pediment of the sanctuary, so that you may be seen up there, and your words may be easily audible to all the people. For all the tribes, as well as the Gentiles, have assembled here because of the Passover." So the Scribes and Pharisees set him on the pediment of the sanctuary, and called out to him, "Zedek,[5] whose dicta it is our duty to accept, since the People mistakenly follow the Jesus who was crucified, say something which will explain to us the meaning of this 'Door of Jesus'." And he answered in a loud voice: "Why do you question me about Jesus, the Son of Man? It is he who is now sitting in Heaven on the right hand of

[4] Or *Liberator*.
[5] i.e. *Righteous* or *Just*.

the Great Power, and he is going to come on the clouds of heaven." Many were convinced and, after James' testimony, began to say, "Hosanna to the Son of David." Thereupon these same Scribes and Pharisees said to one another: "We have made a blunder in affording an opportunity for such testimony to the claims of Jesus. Let us go up and throw him down, so that they may be intimidated into not crediting him." They shouted, "Oh, Oh, Even our Zedek has gone wrong." And thus they fulfilled that passage in Isaiah[6]: Let us away with the Just, for he is a nuisance to us: therefore shall they eat the fruit of their doings. So they went up and threw Zedek down. Then they said to one another, "Let us stone James the Just." And they began to stone him, for the fall had not killed him, but he turned over and knelt in prayer, saying, I implore Thee, O Lord, O God, O Father, forgive them, for they do not know what they are doing. They were thus stoning him to death, when a priest, who was one of the Sons of Rechab,[7] cried out and said, Stop. What are you doing? Zedek is praying for you. Then from among his assailants, one who was a fuller, took the beetle with which he was beating the clothes, and brought it down on Zedek's head. He[8] died, giving, to the Jews and Gentiles alike, veracious testimony[9] that Jesus is the Messiah. He

[6] III, 10, LXX.

[7] i.e. a follower of Rechab, and therefore sympathizing with the ascetic James.

[8] It is possible, though not indispensable, to emend οὗτος into οὕτως in which case we should translate "thus he died". This conjecture is confirmed by Epiphanius in his version of the martyrdom, Haer. 78/14, where he writes καὶ οὕτως γέγονε.

[9] Or *evidential proof*. This word and its cognate feminine formation were acquiring, when Hegesippus wrote, the added sense of "martyrdom", a development observable also in the record of St. Polycarp's death. Perhaps the perfect tense carries the further sense, which may be expressed by adding the words "as even yet is acknowledged". The use in Epiphanius quoted above is against this stricter interpretation, but that in the Johannine prologue, where aorist and perfect are clearly distinguished, may be taken to support it.

was buried in the temple yard, close to the sanctuary, and his gravestone still remains there close to the sanctuary. And, soon after, Vespasian invested the city'."

It will be of advantage to reserve for a moment the consideration of this history and to interpose a few comments on some points of detail. (1) The use of oil went with festivity (Psalm civ, 5), its disuse went with fasting (Daniel x, 3, Matthew vi, 17). James's disuse of oil, therefore, was a sign of a perpetual fast from flesh and wine. (2) These public baths were also places of recreation and essentially associated with the amenities of Hellenic civilization. The Mosaic Law which James scrupulously observed, prescribed bathing on many occasions. Christ says at the Last Supper, "He that has bathed, needs not save to wash his feet". This implies that the Twelve would have bathed before coming to the meal. James may also have feared ceremonial uncleanness, as in the baths it would not be running water. In any case he was more rigid than St. John who, it is said, entered the baths but presently fled out, when he discovered that he would there be under the same roof with Cerinthus. (3) Woollen was worn by ordinary men of wealth: fine linen was used in the Temple ministry. (4) The allusion to the Prophets seems to show that Messianic texts were applied to James. One such prophecy may perhaps be seen in Matthew ii, 23, "He came and dwelt in a city called Nazareth: that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophets, He shall be called a Nazoraean". It may be that this text has been there introduced by the Evangelist to negative its quondam application to James, and to justify its reference to our Lord. (5) James's answer, "He is the Saviour", would appear to be an echo of the family tradition given in Matthew i, 21, "it is he that shall save his people from their sins". (6) In Hegesippus's narrative as in the Fourth Gospel the "Jews" are the hostile Jews. (7) The nomenclature "Son of Man" is noteworthy. The title was also used by St. Stephen at his trial, but apart from that its use here is the one solitary instance of its occurrence, except as it fell from our Lord's own lips. The use of this uncommon

phrase vastly intensifies the improbability of invention. As related to the issue of the moment, it negatived any nationalistic limitation of the Liberator's mission. To this day Jewish theology recoils from the doctrine that Humanity can be associated or conjoined with Diety. Luke shows that it was because of our Lord's assertion of this that the Council of Elders condemned him to be handed over to Pilate, designing to alarm or inveigle him into pronouncing sentence of crucifixion. It was because of his proclamation of this doctrine that St. Stephen was tumultuously hurried to execution. James is similarly adjudged guilty of blasphemy. (8) A volley of missiles from a distance was in primitive practice a means of execution which avoided the possibility of any individual being or appearing to be responsible for the culprit's death. For the Jews, therefore, it evaded any breach of the fifth commandment. Accordingly for blasphemy, among other offences, death by stoning was the legal penalty, but here the stoning may be no more than a burst of ill-temper. (9) As we know, there was a supply of water near by, so that fulling could be done there. This would account for the presence of a fuller with his beetle in his hand, and, we may add, it would be convenient to have the Temple linen washed on the spot. (10) The burial in the Temple yard is noteworthy in view of the fact that the Kings from David to Ahaz (II Kings xvi, 20, II Chronicles xxviii, 27) are stated to have been buried in "the City of David", and Hezekiah in the "ascent of the sepulchres of the sons of David" (II Chronicles xxxii, 33). The close proximity of the royal sepulchres to the Temple is further attested by Ezekiel xliii, 7, 8. "According to the Mishna", says C. R. Conder in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible* s.v. Jerusalem, "the only tombs in Jerusalem were those of the family of David and of the prophetess Huldah". cf. C. W. Wilson in *H.D.B.* s.v. Zion and Acts ii, 29, II Chronicles xxvi, 23, and Nehemiah iii, 15, 16; xii, 37; ii, 14. (11) The almost bizarre expression "the door of Jesus"[10] is assuredly too un-

[10] We should compare, however, John x, 9; i, 51; Revelations iv, 1.

expected for it to have been the invention of a romance writer.

But it is time to return to the capital issue. It is clear from the stricter translation given above of Hegesippus's words, that Lightfoot has inadvertently been betrayed into too hasty a rejection of that author's evidence. In particular we must notice how unfounded are some of the bishop's criticisms.

His argument from James's supposed frequenting of the Holy of Holies, is seen to rest upon a mistranslation. The Naos was made up of two parts, the Holy Place (*τὰ ἅγια*) and the Holy of Holies (*τὰ ἅγια τῶν ἁγίων*). The distinction between these two is clearly drawn in Hebrews ix, 2. Admittedly the latter of the two parts was entered only by the high-priest and that only once a year. Hegesippus's statement is that James was allowed in *τὰ ἅγια*, the Holy Place. The bishop, in contrast with Hebrews, illicitly assumes that *τὰ ἅγια* was the Holy of Holies: otherwise his argument crumbles away. Worse still, J. B. Mayor actually commits himself to the translation, Holy of Holies for *τὰ ἅγια*. The error is not new. Both Josephus (Ant. XIV. 4) and Epiphanius disregarded the distinction between *τὰ ἅγια* and *τὰ ἅγια των ἁγίων*. Nevertheless, the perpetuation of the error is surprising, since it was pointed out by no less a person than Petavius, in dealing with this very incident, in his edition of Epiphanius, in such an obvious and accessible a position as Migne's Patrologia.[11] It is curious, too, that any reader should overlook Hegesippus's speaking of the place as one where James was continually found. Into the Holy Place (*τὰ ἅγια*) the priests, as a matter of routine, did constantly enter.[12] Thus James might be seen there, as Hegesippus asserts. In the Holy of Holies he would not be seen, since it was in perpetual darkness. Hegesippus's narrative is thus found to be self-consistent on this point. Lightfoot's objection is manifestly built upon his own misunderstanding of it, and is, therefore, valueless as an argument against Hegesippus's credibility.

[11] XLI, 1045.

[12] Cf. Luke i, 9, 22, where *ναὸς* is used, and also I Maccabees vii, 33, *καὶ ἐξῆλθαν ἀπὸ τῶν ἱερέων ἐκ τῶν ἁγίων*

The same inattention to detail, and, in consequence, hasty scepticism is responsible for Lightfoot's disparagement of the story as melodramatic. He supposes Hegesippus to assert that James stood on the top of a tower at the south-eastern angle of the Temple. But, as the reason given for James's being sent up was that he might easily be audible to all the people, the top of a tall tower is ruled out. In any case, this interpretation of *τὸ πτερύγιον* has been conclusively overthrown by Edersheim, who, in dealing with the Temptation of our Lord, writes:[13] "It cannot be regarded as certain that the *πτερύγιον τοῦ ἱεροῦ* was, as commentators generally suppose, the Tower at the south-eastern angle of the Temple Cloisters, where the Royal (southern) and Solomon's (the eastern) Porch met, and whence the view into the Kedron vale was to the stupendous depth of 450 feet. Would this angle be called a wing (*πτερύγιον*)? Nor can I agree with Delitzch that it was the 'roof' of the Sanctuary, where indeed there would scarcely be standing-room. It certainly formed the watch-post of the Priest. Possibly it may have been the extreme corner[14] of the wing-like porch or *ulam* which led into the Sanctuary. *Thence a Priest could easily have communicated with his brethren in the court beneath.*"[15] Edersheim adds: "To this there is however one objection that in that case it should have been *τοῦ ναοῦ*." But, the reader will observe, *τοῦ ναοῦ* is the very way in which Hegesippus describes it. Accordingly, following Edersheim, we find that the fantastic idea of James making himself heard from the Tower Roof disappears. Hegesippus, it is to be remarked, states expressly that the priests called to James from where they stood. When the height of the Naos is remembered, this is neither fantastic nor melodramatic. Moreover, the fact that James was not killed by the fall agrees with this more careful understanding of Hegesippus. With Lightfoot's mistaken interpretation James's fall into the Kidron valley must have been fatal and the bishop, not unnaturally, could not credit

[13] *Life and Times*, Bk. 3, ch. 1, footnote p. 303, ed. 1907.
[14] We should prefer to say "end".
[15] Italics ours.

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the story, because he himself had distorted it into something more stupendous than Hegesippus's words described. Finally, to bring to a point the difference in the reading of Hegesippus's story, we may say that, if "the pinnacle" was a feature in the Sanctuary, it is intelligible that an author might write loosely, as we suppose Matthew to have done, and as Epiphanius *ibid.* has, though writing with Hegesippus before him "the pinnacle of the Temple", whilst, if it had been a point in the Temple battlements overlooking the Kidron abyss, it is incredible that Hegesippus should have spoken of it as "the pinnacle of the Sanctuary."

Equally noteworthy as carrying immediate conviction of Hegesippus's fidelity to fact is another detail, the introduction of the fuller's beetle for the finishing off of the brutal tragedy. We have remarked that this is a natural possibility, fitting into our picture of the scene. But by what stroke of freakish imagination could it be supposed that Hegesippus added this touch to his story, if it was an invention?

It would be superfluous and idle to follow the subsequent course of the bishop's argument. Having unwarrantably read into Hegesippus's story a number of prodigious exaggerations and marvels, he goes on to write (p. 367): "The points of resemblance with the portion of the Recognitions[16] conjectured to be taken from the Ascents of James are striking, and recent writers have called attention to these as showing how the narrative of Hegesippus was derived from a similar source. May we not go a step farther and hazard the conjecture that the story of the martyrdom, to which Hegesippus was indebted was the grand *finale* of these Ascents of which the earlier portions are preserved in the Recognitions? The Recognitions record how James, with the Twelve, refuted the Jewish sects, the account of Hegesippus makes the conversion of certain of these sects the starting point of the persecution which led to his martyrdom. In the Recognitions he is thrown down the flight

[16] This work lays much stress on baptisms and washings: Hegesippus, it has been remarked, is without anything of this kind.

of steps and is left as dead by his persecutors, but is taken up alive by the brethren: in Hegesippus he is hurled from the still loftier station, and this time his death is made sure. Thus the narrative of Hegesippus seems[17] to preserve the consummation of his testimony and sufferings, as treated in this romance, the last of a series of Ascents, the first of these being embodied in the Recognitions." But, as we have seen, one of Lightfoot's premisses—that Hegesippus has written romance—is unsubstantiated, and with that the whole fabric of the case he has built up crumbles away. It is more rational to reverse the dependence of the stories. Hegesippus is solid history, the Ascent is the romance. It ought to be added, moreover, that Clement of Alexandria, in two passages, confirms the story of the Pterugion and the fuller's beetle.

Lightfoot also cavilled at Hegesippus's attribution to James of an observance of many practices not prescribed by the "Mosaic ritual." It will be seen, however, that what Hegesippus mentions is mainly what the Law required in a Nazirite, and anything beyond this is what might be expected in a Jew who was strongly opposed to the kind of Hellenic influence against which the Maccabees had fought.

It remains to consider one further objection offered by Lightfoot to our acceptance[18] of Hegesippus's record. He argues that there is a discrepancy between it and the statement of Josephus, which latter he thinks to be a better authority. We must therefore scrutinize that author's actual words. Eusebius first quotes Josephus as saying: "These events happened to the Jews as a retribution for James the Just, who was a brother of

[17] The reader will observe that Lightfoot himself does not venture to assert that this is a necessary conclusion.

[18] Westtcott in his *Commentary on Hebrews* page xxxviii shows the same hesitation, when he writes: "The very remarkable account which Hegesippus has given of the death of James the Just (*c.* A.D. 63) preserved by Eusebius supplies, with all its strange and exaggerated details, a commentary both on the Jewish feeling towards Christians, and on the Christian feeling towards Jews in Jerusalem about this time."

the Jesus who is called Christ. For, although he was of exemplary piety, the Jews killed him."

This concise statement, the reference for which is unknown, is entirely in harmony with Hegesippus's detailed narrative. Eusebius then adds a quotation from Josephus's *Antiquities* (XX, 9, 1.). There is no connexion between the two quotations, which are to be read independently of one another. It would appear that it has been usual to take the second and longer quotation as a fuller and more detailed account of what had been summarized in the first. In consequence the plain statement made in the first that James was murdered has precipitately been read into the second.

The second quotation reads: "The Emperor, on learning of the death of Festus, sent Albinus to Judaea to the procurator there. The younger Ananus, who, as we have stated above, had assumed the high-priesthood, was of a daring disposition and extraordinarily bold. He belonged to the party of the Sadducees, who are more ruthless than all others in their judicial proceedings, as we have already shown. Accordingly, Ananus, being a man of this kind and thinking that it was a convenient moment for his purpose, since Festus was dead and Albinus was still on his way to the province, arranged for a judicial session of the Sanhedrim. He brought before it the brother of the Jesus who is called Christ (his name was James) and some others. He charged them with having broken the law, and delivered[19] them to the court[20] (hoping that) they would be sen-

[19] *παρέδωκε λευσθησομένους*. This turn of phrase must not be equated with such as is to be seen in Matthew xxvii, 26, which implies that it was determined to crucify our Lord. The verb is continually used for handing over to a court for trial, cf. Matthew xxvii, 2, John xix, 11, where our Lord is delivered to Pilate, not as the executioner to carry out the Sanhedrim's sentence but as the supreme judicial authority, free to decide as he would. The phrase in the text may be legitimately taken as meaning that Ananus handed them over for trial: it does not necessarily mean that he handed them over for the court merely to carry out his order for stoning. It follows that the words do not state that his purpose was achieved. The two

tenced to death by stoning. But all those who were considered the most liberal-minded members of the civil administration and were scrupulous for the correctness of legal proceedings were indignant at this, and sent a secret message to the king,[21] urging him to send orders to Ananus not to continue such violent proceedings. They protested that he had acted irregularly from the first. Some of them also went and met Albinus, as he was on his way from Alexandria, and explained to him that it had not been competent for Ananus to hold a session of the Sanhedrim without the governor's assent. These representations induced Albinus to send an angry letter to Ananus threatening to make him pay for his presumptuous action. Moreover, Agrippa, the king, because of these irregularities, deprived him of the high-priesthood, when he had held it three months only, and appointed Jesus, son of Dammeus."

It will be seen that, in point of fact, Josephus does not say that Ananus succeeded in getting James put to death at this time. It is true that Eusebius carelessly expresses himself as if he thought that our second and longer quotation from Josephus gives an account of James's death, but he shows himself to be unconscious of any contradiction between this account of Josephus and that of Hegesippus: for he quotes them both, and, indeed, commends Hegesippus as the more accurate. The conclusion is inescapable that Eusebius's words are consequent on a perfunctory citation of the second passage, as if it were an enlargement of the former, when it is actually from another work of Josephus. Lightfoot and some later readers have been misled by Eusebius's introductory words, and have failed to notice that he quotes two independent pas-

senses of the verb are to be seen together in the single verse Matthew v, 25, "lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer."

[20] Perhaps we should understand that he first empanelled a bench of judges and then later committed the accused for trial before the whole Sanhedrim.

[21] Dr. Kirsopp Lake chooses to translate "the Emperor". Josephus's usage, however, is to speak of the Emperor as Caesar. Whiston translates it correctly as "King" (Agrippa).

sages, which have no direct relation to one another.[22] As a result they have seen in the second what is not there, viz., an account of James's death.

Furthermore, it must be insisted that since Eusebius accepts Hegesippus and his narrative, it follows that Lightfoot's charge against Hegesippus of ignorance respecting the Mosaic Law about the Holy of Holies and other matters cannot be sustained: Eusebius would have detected the ignorance and rejected the story.

Here three points merit brief consideration. (1) Those who, like Lightfoot, have identified James's prosecution by Ananus with his martyrdom have dated this in A.D. 63.[23] This has always made the Jews' conviction, attested by Josephus, that the Fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70 was a divine visitation on account of James's murder, somewhat surprising in view of the seven years' interval between the two events. When we dis-

[22] Whiston *ibid.* more than confirms the view we have taken. He writes: "Of this condemnation of James the Just and its causes, as also that he did not die till long afterwards, see *Primitive Christianity Revived*, vol. III, chap. 43-46. The Sanhedrim condemned our Saviour but could not put him to death without the approbation of the Roman procurator: nor could, therefore, Ananus and his Sanhedrim do more here, since they never had Albinus's approbation for the putting of this James to death."

[23] "*Eusebius in 'Chronico' Jacobum scribit anno Neronis VII lapidibus obrutum fuisse: quod et Hieronymus in 'Catalago' sequitur, qui XXX annis illum sedisse refert.*" (Petavius note p. 722, vol. II.) This date, A.D. 60-61, is an erroneous computation for Ananus's prosecution after Festus's death and before Albinus's arrival. The thirty years for James's episcopate have been then calculated as from the wrong date of the Ascension: from the true date, A.D. 33, it would have been 27 years. This is assuredly the true length of that episcopate, though James neither died in A.D. 61 nor became bishop in 33. Epiphanius (III, 2. 1046 and 1040) has 24 years, a copyist's error for 27 (ΠΙΙ being misread as IIII). The 27 years, ending in the spring of A.D. 70 will have commenced in A.D. 42, after the apostles dispersed (Acts xii, 17) subsequently to Herod's killing of James the son of Zebedee. Our three authorities can thus be made to contribute something to our final conclusion, which reconciles and explains them all.

tinguish the prosecution and the martyrdom, we are left free to arrive at a different date for the martyrdom. For reasons presently to be stated we may place the martyrdom just before the Passover in A.D. 70. The Investment of Jerusalem a few weeks after the martyrdom and its capture a few months later would be exactly in accord, it will be noticed, with Hegesippus's words. (2) Epiphanius states that at his death James was aged 96 years. With our figures this would make him to have been born in 27 B.C.: with Lightfoot's date for the martyrdom this would have been 34, and with Jerome's even earlier. James cannot therefore have been, as Glover and others have supposed, a younger brother of the Saviour, born to the Blessed Virgin. (3) *The Gospel according to the Hebrews* recorded that James made a vow not to eat till he saw the Risen Lord and that Jesus appeared to him. St. Paul (I Corinthians xv, 5, 7) confirms the fact of this appearance, and it deserves to be noticed that when the apostle, after his conversion, returned to Jerusalem he made contact with St. Peter and with James, the two others to whom alone besides himself our Lord accorded an individual appearance (Galatians i, 18, 19).

Accepting Hegesippus as a trustworthy authority on the subject of James's character and death, we are led to read again with new eyes certain parts of the Gospel story. We may then perhaps understand why Josephus attached so great importance to James as to believe that the destruction of Jerusalem was divine retribution for his murder: why so preeminent a position[24] in the Christian Church at Jerusalem was conceded to one who, in our Lord's lifetime, was an unbeliever: why the mere mention of James's name carried such weight at Antioch:

[24] A caveat should, however, here be uttered against the common notion that James presided as a Primate at the Council at Jerusalem. This idea seems to spring from a misunderstanding of the word γνώμη put into his mouth in St. Luke's account of his speech (Acts xv, 19). The English translation "sentence" suggests that James gave a ruling on the issue. It is, however, merely an Englishing of the Latin *setentia*, itself a good equivalent of the Greek, both meaning "opinion" or "proposal". What James said was "I move" or "I propose", and his proposal was carried.

why the Jewish authorities were so urgently anxious to secure from James a pronouncement on the Christian claim that Jesus was the Christ: and why James wrote his Epistle as if he were the oecumenical patriarch of the Diaspora. For the reader's convenience it will be simplest to set out separately the theses to which our re-reading of the history seems to lead.

1. St. Joseph was the legal Davidic heir. The Angel's address in Matthew i, 20, should be understood to imply this.[25] Josephus's account of his own family lineage acquaints us with the apposite information that a priestly registry at Jerusalem did for the Jews what Heralds College and Somerset House do for us. The common vague idea that St. Joseph was one out of many descendants of David blurs what a more careful reading of the Gospels shows to be a much more precise and definite position held by him among the Jews. When Jesus was acknowledged by him as his putative son and legal heir he succeeded to this position as "The Son of David". Until this time James was the heir presumptive or apparent. It has been disputed whether he was physically the son of St. Joseph by a former wife and so heir apparent or was his presumptive heir, being physically the son of Clopas, St. Joseph's brother. This second view must be held to be correct since otherwise the birth of our Lord would not have invalidated James's claim to be the heir. For a score of years, then, James held this position without challenge or dispute: this and this only will explain the special privileges which Hegesippus shows were accorded to James by the authorities. This explains also the jealous disbelief shewn by our Lord's Brethren and the attitude of the priests, who continued, it would appear, to respect James as the true Davidic heir. Further, it lends fresh significance to our Lord's challenging question, how is Christ then David's son, with which it is natural and pertinent to associate the words "thou art a priest for ever, after the order of Melchizedek". The authorities reverenced James as the Priest-King, allowing

[25] In the same way should be understood Bartimaeus's cry (Mark x, 47), the Syro-phenician's (Matthew xv, 22) and the converts' in Hegesippus's story (p. 49 above).

entrance into the Sanctuary as it had been allowed to Solomon. Moreover, if this psalm was applied to James we find in it perhaps what was thought additional warrant for the title Zedek.

Nor is this all. While it would be out of place to discuss here how this revaluation of the Davidic title throws fresh light on some aspects of the Gospel story, it is proper to point out how it illumines the story of James. After the Crucifixion James became indisputably the legal heir to the Davidic claim. Accordingly we can well understand that he should have been respected and venerated in the way that Hegesippus describes both by the Jews who rejected Christianity and by the Jewish Church. Hence, although like his brothers he had held aloof from our Lord's evangelism, it is intelligible that St. Peter, when on the point of quitting Jerusalem as the other Apostles had done, designated James to be the President of the Church there, and that after his own martyrdom his brother Simeon is chosen by that Church to hold the same position. Still more important is the fact, ordinarily accepted with but little attention, that in Domitian's reign the then living representatives of the family were informed against as possible pretenders to the throne. This is less intelligible if St. Joseph had been no more than an undistinguished individual among many descendants of David. The gravamen of the charge was not the putative affinity to Jesus whom his disciples had accepted as the Christ, but the fact of closest relationship to St. Joseph and to James.

2. From Epiphanius we gather that St. Joseph, James and our Lord were all Nazoraeans.[26] It follows that the Messianic text which declared, as Matthew quotes it, that he shall be called a Nazoraean, will have been regarded in the first instance as fulfilled in James. This lends point to Matthew's finding in our Lord's residence at Nazareth a more satisfying interpretation of the prophecy, so that Jesus and not James was the true anti-type of the promise. (No evidence is forthcoming to substantiate the common notion that "the Brethren of the

[26] See *Church Quarterly Review* Vol. CXL, No. 280, pp. 194 ff.

Lord" and in particular James, lived at Nazareth as inmates of St. Joseph's house.) This correction of what had been a current interpretation is in harmony with Matthew's careful recording of our Lord's benediction of St. Peter upon the Apostle's acknowledgement of him as the Christ. It has often been observed that this benediction of St. Peter is intended as an antidote to the Jewish Christians' reverence for James as if he were the supreme authority in the Church. It may even be thought that the words about the rock on which the Church is to be built, against which the gates of Hell should not prevail, is a counterpart to the popular title given to James of Obleas.

3. Finally something must be said about the Epistle of James[27] which after some hesitation has been included in the New Testament Canon. The judgement of Eusebius may be taken to condense for us the general estimate made of the epistle by Christians down to his day. He says that, being regarded as spurious or as adulterated—we cannot say positively which meaning he intended to convey by the word he used—there had not been many writers who had mentioned it or, perhaps he means, had quoted it. If we are to suppose it to be adulterated, we may pay some attention to a suggestion that the section castigating the rich is an addition to an authentic writing of James. This would relieve us of what has been felt to be a difficulty, that James known to all of his compatriots as "The Righteous or Just", should write (v, 6), "ye have condemned and killed the Righteous or Just."[28] There is not, however, any evidence to warrant or encourage us to disjoin or dispart sections of the Epistle and we are led to hazard another explan-

[27] Throughout this article the title of Saint has been withheld from James to emphasize the fact that the English Church in its Calendar has not appointed a day for his commemoration. Some writers have sought to achieve his canonization by identifying him with St. James the Less, a proceeding which nullifies all that is reported to us of their respective histories.

[28] If the passage is not from the pen of James, and the anonymous author is speaking of him as "the Just", it has been pointed out that it would seem to distinguish the condemnation by Ananus and the murder.

ation of Eusebius's words. The root idea of the verb he uses is a bastard born to a free man by a slave woman. Remembering St. Paul's insistence that the Christian Church is born of Sarah, the free woman, whilst Judaism is sprung from Hagar, the slave, we may ask whether the point is that the Epistle has little or nothing of the Gospel freedom about it but smacks rather of Judaic bondage to the letter although this is not by any means a fair statement of the case. While we cannot forget Luther's verdict—" an epistle of straw "—because he did not find clear evidence that it was building on the foundation of an Atonement and while it is clear that there is no unambiguous proclamation of a " saving " faith, yet it must be said that this is in agreement with the pattern of James's teaching as Hegesippus represents it. James sees the Church as still essentially Israel true born but with outsiders introduced by God's grace. Perhaps we have here the reason that the Latin and African Churches were most hesitant about its acceptance into the Canon because they had no large original nucleus of Jewish born believers. Further, if we may rest in this view of the matter, we can claim that James confesses that our Lord was righteous with a righteousness exceeding that of the Scribes and Pharisees, such as his own had been. Failure to understand this cryptic reference to the Crucifixion will have given ground for the suspicion that the Epistle was spurious. Read in this way, the Epistle confirms the impression we have gained from other writers as to James's beliefs and conduct.

One further illustration of James's religious faith is detailed by Epiphanius (*ibid.*). He tells us that during a drought James prayed with hands upraised to heaven and rain was vouchsafed. We are reminded of the reference in the Epistle to Elijah's prayer, as the effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man.

RELIGION AND SCIENCE

By O. T. OWEN

"If at some period in the course of civilization we seriously find that our science and our religion are antagonistic, then there must be something wrong either with our science or with our religion. Perhaps not seldom there may be something wrong with both. For if the natural impulses which normally work best together are separated and specialized in different persons we may expect to find a concomitant state of atrophy and hypertrophy, both alike morbid."[1]

In forthright fashion, Havelock Ellis attempted to dispose of the popular antagonism between religion and science. The attempt was unsuccessful, not through any fault of his, but because it is always easy to read antagonism between dictionary definitions. Attention is thus diverted from the *behaving individual* to the behaviour *of* the individual and what, in reality, is a co-ordinated whole becomes, in the abstractions of thought, a mass of irreconcilable opposites. If dictionary definitions are ignored in favour of considering the religious person and the scientist in action, antagonism becomes more difficult to maintain because everyone is, more or less, religious and scientific.

Comparing religion with science is valid only if there is implied a comparison of religious with scientific procedure. When this is the case, religion and science are revealed as activities of humanity, closely linked in regard to principle but differing in regard to detail. What is the essence of these activities?

[1] "The Art of Religion" in *Selected Essays,* Dent, Everyman's Library, 1936.

Looking out on the world, the scientist sees a predominance of disorder in which he can glimpse a mere suspicion of order. He then makes a number of small but important acts of faith which are none the less real though he is frequently unconscious of them. His first is the conviction that neither the disorder nor the order is a figment of his imagination. This conviction is almost immediately modified and the scientist begins to doubt that the disorder is real. Then follows the belief that order is the real clue to the situation and that the apparent disorder may be reduced, by the mind of man, to orderly terms. This involves the third act of faith: that between the world and the human mind there is some kind of correspondence by which the human mind is enabled to achieve an understanding of the world.

Rarely does the scientist give explicit assent to these articles of belief. Most often, his reliance on them has to be unravelled from an investigation of his scientific behaviour and, by endeavouring to reduce disorder to order through the use of reason, the scientific life continually tests this implicit faith. Even at this stage, reason is an activity far from sharply defined. Thus phenomena are presented for reasonable consideration in an apparently haphazard manner. Once the scientist has been confronted with the confusion of events, he begins to select what he conceives are significant phenomena in accordance with his notion of order. The significant phenomena having been selected, the rest are neglected in the faith and hope that they, too, will gradually be involved, group by group, among significant phenomena presented for the comprehension of a scheme of order.

Of course the process, even in principle, is much more complicated than appears here. Reasoning never becomes a simple activity that can be discussed in isolation but is always bound up with some reference beyond itself; with some intuitive recognition of pattern or of appropriateness, so that, A and B having been given, the succession of C can be reasonably forecast. As with the selection of significant phenomena and the indication of axioms, so with the ultimate connexion between

the steps in a process of reasoning: all depends on a direct insight into the fitness of things. Especially is this displayed in the conclusion to an argument. Agreement is reached between opponents by one party recognizing spontaneously the fitness of that conclusion for which the other has been contending. This brings to memory the old jingle:

> "He that complies against his will,
> Is of his own opinion still."[2]

An argument is vain unless it can induce in an opponent a recognition of self-evidence when, with safety, the argument itself can be forgotten. Sudden comprehension of this sort is indefinable. By discovering whether or not a particular reasonable forecast is to be fulfilled, scientific experiment tests both the process of reasoning and the direct insight on which the forecast depends.

However, the process is still further complicated for, as a department of science develops, it both lessens and increases its scope. Scope is lessened in relation to the rest of the universe as the specified science becomes more and more specialized. But scope is correspondingly increased, in depth of detail, as the science becomes more integrated as a department of knowledge. What were initial schemes of order are now treated as unitary phenomena and are themselves incorporated into more comprehensive schemes of order. Thus there evolves a kind of scientific hierarchy comprising a descending scale of ordered schemes in which the higher are composed of the lower. At this stage, myths are invented to effect grand unifications of scientific fragments. Schemes of order are embryo myths that never reach adult status because they are engendered by a continuous reciprocal movement between facts and human intellect. In this way, the schemes of order are always altering slightly in composition and never achieve even that transient fixity necessary for a mythology.

By contrast, the fully developed scientific myths (or

[2] Samuel Butler: *Hudibras,* pt. iii, c. 3.

theories as they are more commonly called) are constructions of varying elasticity which can serve without modification for relatively long periods, although, in the present situation of high pressure scientific work, the unrestricted life span of any myth can rarely be placed at longer than ten years. So much for the essence of scientific activity; and now to seek a comparison with religious activity!

Like the scientist, the religious person looks out on the world and sees that identical chaos in which he, too, can discern a faint sign of order. All this he accepts, making the same three initial acts of faith as are made by the scientist. He believes that neither the disorder nor the order is a figment of the imagination and then modifies this conviction in the belief that the real clue to the situation is order, through which the human mind is empowered to reach an understanding of the world. Divergence between scientific and religious activity becomes apparent only in the treatment of phenomena when an act of judgement is involved. The scientist selects what he believes are significant phenomena in accordance with his own more or less systematized experience (his notion of order). But the religious person tends to be much more passive. He accepts as significant only those phenomena which, commending themselves to the whole of his individual experience, form points of focus for self-transcendence. These phenomena become invested with an eternal significance. Through them, there is a recurrence and a strengthening of the belief in order, as a clue to disorder. Henceforward, the whole of the individual's experience must be orientated in accordance with the new focal points. (To the Christian, for example, some significant phenomena would be: the Life of Christ, the happening at Pentecost, and the spiritual experience of the faithful.)

Further divergence develops between the two activities in the treatment accorded to significant phenomena. Having selected the latter, the scientist looks forward to a time when temporarily neglected phenomena will be included in the schemes of order in a state of perfect equality. For the religious person there can be no equality in a scheme of order because

the vast majority of phenomena must be subordinated to that order which emanates from the few significant phenomena. To the scientist, all possible phenomena share a potentially equal significance but must make a common submission to the yoke of order. To the religious person, even order must be submissive to the few phenomena of paramount significance. Again, as a specified scientific activity develops, its scope lessens in relation to the rest of the universe but increases in depth of detail. Almost the exact opposite is true of religious activity. In relation to the universe, religion might enjoy infinite expansion in scope while its depth of detail, although not decreasing, remains approximately stable and centres around the significant events "once delivered unto the saints".

Both activities are alike, however, in the final stage of their development when myths are invented for the explication of phenomena already related together in schemes of order. Scientific myths are of transitory duration and are liable to modification and to actual supersession. Religious myths usually endure as long as the religion that has engendered them and are very rarely superseded. For, having been constructed as a rationale of significant and minor phenomena, religious myths are wholly dependent on the significant events "once delivered". Since a change in the latter is hardly possible, religious myths soon acquire the status of dogma.

Religion and science, then, are much more than "natural impulses which normally work best together." They are natural complements of each other. Science cannot be prosecuted without faith nor can religion be sustained without a constant appeal to reason. Neither faith nor reason can supply the data for its own interpretation and the consideration of one evokes support from the other. Even more is implied by what has been said. These apparently contrasted activities are mere facets of the human organism's whole behaviour pattern. But the phenomena of religious significance form points of focus for self-transcendence and have an eternal reference. Therefore it follows that religious activity is a more important facet of human behaviour than scientific activity which aims

at subduing the world to human categories of order. None the less, since both spring from an identical source, an integrated individual is one in whom each activity has unfettered scope. When the specifically religious activity is abortive, there is found the type of unimaginative but devoted scientific worker. When the scientific activity is denied exercise, there is produced the extreme of superstitious credulity to which God is thought to speak by way of anything from an upturned teacup to a Bible opened at random.

Far more common, however, is the type of mind produced by a sort of alternation between an exclusively religious and an exclusively scientific mode of behaviour. In consequence, there develops a type of mental process that is neither consistently religious nor consistently scientific but is a syncretistic formation from parts of the two processes. Phenomena are selected scientifically in accordance with an idea of order and are then used religiously as focal points of experience. Thus the scientific myths, when they are constructed, are endowed with a religious sanction they have no right to claim. By arrogating to its utterances an unscientific dogmatism, this "scientific attitude" has become a debased religion and, what is more, a debased science.

In the foregoing brief analysis, religion and science are represented not as entities of independent existence but as inter-related parts of that behaviour pattern which is the human organism in the world. To assert that there is any real antagonism between religion and science is therefore as silly as to suppose that manual and mental work are incompatible. No matter how slavish the manual labour, it needs the direction of the human mind. No matter how abstruse the philosophy, it depends on some manual dexterity in turning pages and in writing. So with religion and science—the one type of activity is indispensable to the other. Nobody should now suppose that the religious fanatic or the whole time scientific specialist is leading a full human life. Yet an almost greater danger than exclusiveness derives from ignoring the difference between the religious and the scientific activity. The crucial

point of difference lies in the selection of phenomena. In the fully developed personality, both types of selection are necessary; this truth cannot be too often repeated. It is necessary that the scientific activity should select significant phenomena in accordance with a notion of order. It is necessary that, in religious activity, only those phenomena should be accepted as significant which commend themselves to the whole being and form points of focus for self-transcendence. As already indicated, the danger is that phenomena selected scientifically should be accepted religiously as focal points of experience. This complication in the human behaviour pattern is the genesis of scientific humanism. Once generated, the latter has strong allies in the educational system and in the general organization of society. The contemporary conflict is not between religion and atheism but between Christianity and the false religion of scientific humanism. When so many are being educated (trained) for jobs in a society depending more and more, for amusement and for information, on scientific gadgets, it is very tempting to chant enthusiastically, " Science is my shepherd, I shall not want . . . "

As always, to be fore-warned is, to a certain extent, to be fore-armed. By indicating the common origin but later divergence of religion and science, this article has endeavoured to sound a warning against treating these activities as isolated departments of human thought. Their integration in the complete pattern of human life is a problem for the Christian educationist—which means ultimately, every Christian who can see the problem as urgent as it really is.

HUMAN EXISTENCE AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION

By R. H. DAUBNEY

Charles Duell Kean is a priest of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States, and is at present Rector of Grace Church, Kirkwood, Missouri. He has already published an interesting volume entitled *Christianity and the Cultural Crisis*,[1] and has contributed a number of articles to Reinhold Niebuhr's journal, *Christianity and Society*,[2] as well as a chapter to the recent symposium on *Christianity and Property*.[3] *The Meaning of Existence*[4] is his first book to be published in this country, and is the occasion of this article which may help to introduce his thought to English readers. Mr. Kean is an American, and therefore his language will prove a barrier to some; Søren Kierkegaard, Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich appear to be predominant influences in his thinking, and he will probably be described as an existentialist which, in view of the varying connotations of that term, may prove a barrier to others. He has nevertheless made an attempt to get "back behind the detailed questions raised by the political and economic uncer-

[1] C. D. Kean: *Christianity and the Cultural Crisis* (New York: Association Press. 1945.).

[2] C. D. Kean: "Culture and Civilization" in *Christianity and Society*, Summer 1945; "The Role of Religion in Cultural Dislocation" *ibid.*, Summer 1946; "Death and Decision" *ibid.*, Spring 1947.

[3] J. F. Fletcher (Editor): *Christianity and Property*: Essay 7 on "The Significance of Capitalism" by C. D. Kean (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. 1947.).

[4] C. D. Kean: *The Meaning of Existence* (London: Latimer House. 1947.).

tainty of our times" and to face the "fundamental questions concerning the human situation itself." If his attempt cannot be judged entirely successful, it was nevertheless well worth making, and marks him out as one of the younger thinkers whose subsequent work should be watched with interest.

I

After the convulsions of the modern period of history we are faced with the task of fundamental reconstruction which requires both action and a clarification of the bases of all action, "a profound interpretation of the meaning of man's experience," since our time is a moment "when men cannot act creatively unless they face life's ultimate questions in both their individual and group experience" (p. 17). Mr. Kean defines the problem of post-war reconstruction as the development of "a civilization and a culture which will offer to most men and women minimum satisfaction on several levels" (p. 20): namely, the levels of history, intellect and existence; and thus there is also need for reconstruction on the level of religion "because it is man's religion that gives him his sense of relationship to life as he knows it . . . , that gives him his perspective, his appreciation of meaning for his own life, and his sense of vital participation" (p. 26). Reconstruction of one kind or another will take place in any case, but the real problem is whether or not it will be adequate to the essential character of the human situation. The test of its adequacy cannot be merely academic, but must reveal the meaningful character of human existence "which is able to face realistically the ambiguities between historical and intellectual experience" (p. 27).

Before proceeding to analyse "The Meaning of Human Experience" and "The Christian Basis for Reconstruction" in the second and third parts of the book respectively, Mr. Kean devotes an interesting chapter to a discussion of the distinction between culture and civilization which "are used primarily as categories describing the background and setting of human activity" (p. 30). The distinction and use of these terms is

notoriously ambiguous and difficult, and any adequate definition requires an estimate of human nature in its institutional and ideological setting as well as in its historical and intellectual activities. The following quotation has been telescoped a good deal but gives the essentials of the distinction:

> "The total historical aspect of institutional relationships—the cumulative political, economic, sociological and psychological effect of history upon man's associations, such as the family, the school, the church, the nation, the state, etc.—is what we mean by the term 'civilization'. The prevailing intellectual interpretation of the same institutions is what we mean by the term 'culture' . . . Civilization, in other words, is the total complex of human institutions at any given moment with all their background, with all their alleged and actual functions, with all their methods and technics, in all their interrelatedness, seen under the heading of history. Civilization is man's economic, political and social environment as it affects his life, and as it relates him, through the institutional settings into which he enters, with the lives of other people . . . Culture is not concerned with the thought-forms as such, but with the intellectual interpretation of man's social institutions . . . Culture is the climate of opinion about the nature, function and, primarily, about the value of the institutions to which he finds himself related . . . Culture comprises the whole hierarchy of ideas and attitudes and understandings with which man appraises his institutional relationships. Culture is the prevailing epistemology, ontology and ideology, together with the thought-forms that connect these fundamental aspects of thinking to the institutions in which he lives" (p. 32-33).

On the basis of this distinction an analysis is made of modern culture, revealing both the complexity of institutional patterns with their wide variety of competing thought-forms, and the pursuit of objectivity which tends to separate man from the world of his concern. The distinction serves further to

elucidate the difference between a crisis in civilization and a crisis in culture.[5] The former is "the dislocation of traditional political and economic and social institutions through the impairment of their historical functions, with the form of their evolving successors, obscured by social chaos." The latter "is primarily the loss, or threatened loss of validity of traditional thought-forms, including the prevailing epistemology, ontology and ideology" (p. 35). Thus, it is possible that a crisis in civilization may come about without an accompanying crisis in culture, although the counterpart is not true, since a crisis in culture which reflects serious confusion about the meaning of existence must bring about a corresponding crisis in civilization. Therefore "the problem of an adequate epistemology, ontology and ideology that will permit man to know himself, to understand his situation, and to take part freely in a number of varied institutional relationships, is the cultural issue of the present day. The kind of answer given to it will determine the nature, not of the post-war civilization, but of civilization itself" (p. 37).

II

Mr. Kean now embarks upon an analysis of the meaning of experience on its three levels of history, intellect and existence. This is perhaps the most difficult part of his task, since it involves a simultaneous description of human activities in the dimension of depth in various areas of experience. History is the level of event, and includes man's relationship to nature and the forms of human community: nature includes man, and yet man transcends nature, just as community includes man, and yet man transcends community. Thus history includes sub-categories of politics, or relation to community, and economics, or relation to nature. But the understanding of history requires an appreciation of the relatedness of events, and certain definite etiological processes can be distinguished, such as the laws (in a derivative sense) of inertia in political

[5] Compare V. A. Demant: "The Aims and Assumptions of our Culture" in *Our Culture: Its Christian Roots and Present Crisis.*

economy, and institutional obsolescence, which pertain to the rise and decay of human institutions which become increasingly concerned with their own survival rather than with the needs which brought them into existence. This means that historical change is " the result of a profound social struggle affecting not only the institutional life but also the mythology of peoples " so that " in the struggle for change, the opposition tends to be a coalition of dissimilar elements united chiefly by the desire for change and with overt or latent issues between themselves " (p. 58).

Awareness of historical change includes an understanding of the cumulative problem of history and leads to the question of fate, which rests partly on the givenness of the past, tending to circumscribe the decisions of the present, and indicating potentialities of the future. Thus the tendencies in modern history which confront man are manifested in an increasing collectivization: this is seen partly in the expanding range of technology in the economic sphere and in the expanding range of bureaucracy in the political sphere.

It will be clear, however, that the description of history as the level of event is only a partial description, since history already involves the activity of the intellect in interpreting events and tracing processes. There is the encounter with events as well as their evaluation, and this implies man's transcendence of history and therefore his capacity to make history. This capacity for transcendence is revealed in the powers of memory and anticipation, as well as in critical judgement and creativity, which are descriptions of man's experience on the intellectual or ethical level. Thus man has a twofold relationship to history and its temporal process: he exists within history, and history exists within him; he can transcend history and yet he can never extricate himself from it completely, the one manifesting itself in concepts of law and justice, and the other in ideological limitation. " Law is the association of those ethical discriminations in systematic form with the concept of being, so that moral standards assume a transcendent and changeless form . . . But his intellectual exper-

ience is coloured by his historical situation and this is particularly true when he attempts to transfer elements of his intellectual life back to history . . . Ideology is the result of this process. It is the utilization of man's capacity to transcend history in order to justify his actions on the level of history" (pp. 78, 82). It is here that the problem of contradiction arises between the intellectual and historical levels of experience, and becomes of practical importance in the task of reconstruction when it has to solve political and economic issues.

The term *existence* has already been used in the description of the historical and intellectual levels of experience. The problem of existence is the most intimate and immediate of all levels of human experience on which man comes to grips with the problem of his own meaningfulness (p. 91). We have noted the polar aspect of man's historical existence, that each individual, concrete human being exists in history, and at the same time history exists in him; and this finds its counterpart in the intellectual category, since man exists in an intellectual world which is also located in him. Thus, existentially, man knows that he is not the only subject. He knows himself as an I which confronts the Thou. "Existence can be the ground of a meaningful polarity because Existence deals with concrete, individual men where they are now—that is, as social animals and as single thinkers" (p. 97). Further, "the polarity of immanence in history and transcendence over history is within personality" (p. 99). The meaning of personality, from the point of view of existence, brings to light the problem of tragedy and anxiety, the former involved in the recognition that contradiction between history and intellect is not merely external to the self, and the latter involved in the awareness that the drives for security, status and achievement are threatened, either on the level of history by some form of insecurity or on the level of intellect by some form of doubt.

Thus it is in Religion that man seeks an answer to the ultimate problems of existence and to make sense of his encounter with tragedy and anxiety. This reconciliation cannot be achieved either on the purely rational or on the purely

ethical level. Religion must therefore employ myth, lying behind creed, cult and conduct. "The function of mythology is to provide by means of a story a dialectical frame of reference within which the historical and intellectual levels of experience remain in tension; but the opposition, instead of being destructive, becomes creative. Religion is the channel through which mythology becomes an agent in life. The three elements of religious practice are forms of carrying out this relationship. Creed is the acceptance of mythology. Cult is the dramatic interpretation of mythology. Conduct is the implication of mythology in terms of actual situations" (p. 115). We have here a re-working of the specialized concept of myth which has increasingly been employed in contemporary theological writing by such thinkers as Berdyaev, Niebuhr and Tillich. It is a concept which some minds find difficult to accept because the term still carries the association of a folk-tale which is not necessarily true to historical fact. Indeed, as Mr. Kean immediately observes, "the danger of all mythology is that it will be literalized in the direction of history and so made to be an account of simple historical events, or rationalized in the direction of intellect and so made to be the premise of an ontological approach to the scheme of things" (p. 115). Nevertheless, religion uses this concept in the attempt to deal with tragedy and anxiety which are closely connected with the problem of evil. If this problem is externalized a demonic element becomes involved in religion; while if it is internalized it raises the question of idolatry. But the extent to which religion is rooted in man's existence does not eradicate tragedy and anxiety, although it meets man in terms of freedom and faith, as against the specious or illusory forms of freedom offered by the demonic or idolatrous elements. The task of religion in reconstruction is, therefore, of fundamental importance, since it must set the political and economic systems which emerge cesses on the intellectual level, within the framework of existence unless they are to result in the intensification of tragedy and in history, and the moral standards and interpretation of pro- anxiety.

III.

The third part of the book is devoted to an analysis of "The Christian Basis for Reconstruction". This takes as its point of departure the assertion that "Christianity is an interpretation of the life and teachings of Jesus, and of the experience of a few key figures in the apostolic age, which speaks to men in terms of their own Existence in such a way as to reveal the meaning of their own personalities and to free them from tragedy and anxiety" (p. 152). As such it presupposes the mythological character of the content of the Gospel and a winnowing process which rejects biblical fundamentalism, the claims of a sacrosanct institution, a distinction between the gospel and ethical formulations attached to it, and the denial that Christianity can be regarded primarily as a basis for anthropological or psychological studies. The gospel centres in the acceptance of Jesus as the Christ, the meaning of which is determined by the two related myths of the Cross and the Resurrection. Thus "every decision man makes contains the Cross and Resurrection in microcosm" (p. 171); and further, "man's encounter with the Christian Gospel, on the level of Existence, transforms his relationship to the other levels of experience, and thus clarifies the human situation" (p. 181). By this encounter Mr. Kean means what is commonly called Revelation, which he describes as the discovery of an I-Thou relationship with God, and this results in the elimination of externalizing factors in human relationships, at the same time widening the range of existential concern which has a profound effect on man's ethical outlook.

After devoting three chapters to the meaning and content of the gospel and the clarification of existence in relation to the levels of history and the intellect brought about by encounter with it, Mr. Kean sums up his position as follows: "The purpose of this book has been to present the Christian Religion, interpreted as a creative mythology, as a basis upon which men may find what they need in the modern world. Hence Christianity, interpreted as Religion, rather than as ethical code or official institution, is presented as the basis for reconstruction"

(p. 198). But he has to admit "that the clarification of Existence is only achieved in principle," adopting Niebuhr's phrase.

IV.

It has seemed worth while to give this summary of Mr. Kean's book because it does represent a courageous attempt to set out the Christian version of a philosophy much in vogue at the present time; and this Christian version requires careful discrimination from the nihilistic types of existentialism. A great deal of hard thinking has clearly gone into the making of the book, and yet it is not merely an academic exercise, but the work of a parish priest. Its chief value lies in its attempt to state the human situation in the dimension of depth which has to be taken into account in all areas of living, and it recognizes that this can only be stated in terms of mythology which shall do justice to its complexity. Modern man has tried one mythology after another as he has attempted to explain his existence in terms of one or other of its dimensions in abstraction from the whole. It is true that the recovery of the Christian mythology can alone reintegrate human existence as a whole, and thus clarify man's situation in its ultimate references. But while the book recognizes that redemption is the correlative of the revelation given in Jesus, it has failed to work out the reality of the redemptive action as it is mediated in the Church and the Sacraments. In short, we require not only the mythology that will clarify existence, but also the symbols which will perpetually embody and express that clarification, as well as the tradition and pattern of a divine-human community in which it is preserved.

Christian existentialism, by its very nature, tends towards subjectivism and individualism, and its relevance appears most clearly in limited areas of living where encounters between persons are most acute. But the intensity of encounter gradually diminishes as the area of community-life expands, and therefore the recovery of symbolism and liturgical tradition are equally necessary if the clarification of existence which the creative Christian mythology has achieved is not to spend itself in secular surroundings.

PAUL AND RABBINIC JUDAISM

By DAVID DAUBE

THIRTY years ago, Paul was widely looked upon as an exponent of Hellenistic theology; and it was claimed that what little smattering of Rabbinic Judaism he possessed he used only for combating the latter, his object being to remodel primitive Christianity on the mystery religions of his age. This theory, however, was never whole-heartedly approved of by English scholars. Moreover, for some time past, a strong reaction against it has been noticeable even on the continent. There are three chief reasons for the change. First, our knowledge of the Rabbinic sources has greatly increased since the days of Bousset and Reitzenstein, and it is still increasing. In consequence, many notions formerly classed as foreign to Judaism have been discovered in the Talmud, Midrash, Apocrypha or allied literature. Secondly, the methods applied to the material have been improved. For example, the presence of Hellenistic terminology in a statement by Paul is no longer regarded as absolutely decisive. One has learnt to distinguish between dress and body, and it is considered possible that, particularly in addressing Gentiles, a Stoic expression might be employed without any intention of diverging from orthodox Judaism. Thirdly, there is little doubt that, if modern authorities tend to make Paul more Jewish, this is partly because they wish him to be so. Liberalism is at a discount. In the search for a different and firmer basis for Christian teaching, the idea of a real continuity between the old Israel and the new and a fundamental revaluation of the legalistic element in religion play an important part.

A book recently published in this country[1] is representative of this fresh approach and, indeed, the first to try it out over a wide range of Pauline thought. It should become the starting-point for all further discussion on the subject. In a field notoriously vast and bristling with difficulties, the author displays thorough familiarity with the sources and the literature. He possesses the gift of concentrating on the essential, while never neglecting such details as contribute to the atmosphere of the whole. Above all, though definitely opposing the Hellenistic school, he makes full use of the data it has brought to light; his is not a one-track mind, and he would be the last to maintain that Bousset and Reitzenstein have laboured in vain. As a result, his conclusions are important, original and sound.

Professor Davies contends that it is wrong to interpret Paul's theology as the antithesis of Rabbinic Judaism, and, more particularly, as a non-Jewish, Hellenistic theology. Essentially, he holds, Paul remained a Pharisee throughout his life; he never ceased to proceed from Pharisaic concepts and emotions. Only he was a Pharisee who acknowledged Jesus as the Messiah. Wherever he differed from the Rabbis, it was because of this one point and its implications—not because of any ideas fundamentally alien to Judaism. Any contemporary Rabbi—Johanan ben Zaccai, for example—had he recognized Jesus as the Messiah, might have reached a position similar to Paul's.

In order to establish his thesis, Professor Davies starts by questioning the assumption, still widely made, of a sharp distinction in New Testament times between Palestinian and Diaspora Judaism. He then goes on to investigate some basic aspects of Pauline thought: his conception of sin, derived (the author shows) from the Jewish doctrine of the evil impulse and good impulse; his conception of the First and Last Adam, influenced by Jewish speculations about the creation, the Fall

[1] *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*, by W. D. Davies, pp. 376+x. (S.P.C.K.) 27s. 6d.

and Adam as a symbol of the unity of mankind; his Jewish nationalism, never quite given up; his conception of redemption, reflecting Rabbinic notions concerning the exodus; his emphasis on ethical instruction, and the Torah, the Law, supplied by the words of Jesus; his conception of Jesus as a New Torah and as the creative Wisdom of God, to be explained by reference to the Jewish identification of the Torah with Wisdom; his doctrine of the Spirit, radically differing from Hellenistic parallels in stressing the communal nature of the Spirit over against its individualistic nature in Hellenism, but perfectly in line with Rabbinic expectations of the Age to Come; his conception of the death of Jesus, best understood in the light of the then prevalent Rabbinic attitude to sacrifice, martyrdom and vicarious merit (and it should be noted that, very possibly, the figure of a Suffering Messiah was familiar to pre-Christian Judaism); and finally, his eschatology, reminiscent of the twofold rôle of the Age to Come in Rabbinic thought, namely, as a future event in time and as an eternal reality.

The author has certainly made out his case. Future research will add or take away a point here and there; and it may reveal entirely new aspects. But that Paul "remained, as far as possible, a Hebrew of the Hebrews, and baptized his Rabbinic heritage into Christ" must now be regarded as established. This result may well have a bearing on the future relationship between Church and Synagogue. There is no reason, if Professor Davies is right, why they should not learn to appreciate one another's language. On the other hand, by proving that Paul's conflict with Pharisaism was not about any secondary matters, the author has automatically made manifest in its full gravity the main point of disagreement, as vital now as in Paul's age: the Christian affirmation and the Jewish denial of Jesus's Messiahship and divinity.

Of course, Professor Davies does admit Hellenistic elements in Paul. But, as indicated, he is aware of two factors often overlooked. First, an argument may be Hellenistic in form, without contradicting Pharisaic doctrine. Romans i, 20 sounds Stoic, but the Rabbis also taught that the creation testifies to the existence of the Creator. Secondly, certain Hellenistic ideas

had crept into Judaism long before Paul and, by his time, were quite orthodox. The belief in the immortality of the soul, superimposed on the earlier one in resurrection, affords an illustration.

Professor Davies is very cautious, and occasionally perhaps too much so. Thus he does not accept T. W. Manson's view that Romans i-iii is inspired by the confession of sin in the liturgy of the Day of Atonement. But his objections are hardly conclusive. Reflections on the inexcusability of sinfulness such as we find in i, 18f. are not out of place in a confession, especially if Deuteronomy xxix, 28 (29)—"The secret things belong unto the Lord our God, but those things which are revealed belong unto us . . . that we may do all the words of this law"—was early brought into connexion with this part of the ritual. Nor is ii, 1 too argumentative, seeing that there is a prayer "We are not so impertinent and stiff-necked as to say before thee . . ., We are righteous and we have not sinned, but we have sinned"; and it may be significant that in an old Talmudic anecdote (Bab. Shabbath 127b) the rule that we should judge all men favourably, and the notion that God will apply the same measure to us as we do to others, are associated with the Day of Atonement. Finally, Romans iii, 1ff. is indeed tortuous enough. But may it not have been started off by prayers like "We have turned aside . . . but thou hast acted truthfully" or quotations like Ecclesiastes iii, 19, "So that a man hath no preeminence above a beast"? These particular passages may not have been introduced into the service before the Middle Ages. But no doubt there were similar ones in New Testament times.

However, this only means that the author's main propositions carry all the more conviction. He has produced a great work, and an excellent example of writing which is objective and passionate at the same time.

REVIEWS

THE SECULAR AND THE SACRED: An Enquiry into the Principles of a Christian Civilization. By P. A. MICKLEM. The Bampton Lectures for 1946. (Hodder and Stoughton.) 10s. 6d.

THE volume under review contains the text of the Bampton Lectures for 1946 as delivered in the University Church at Oxford. The two years which have elapsed between delivery and publication are a comment on the delays in book production, and is not due to the expansion, elaboration and documentation which have made some classic examples of these lectures landmarks in English theology.

The present series set forth a familiar argument. A Christian civilization is defined as "an order of human life and society, potentially world-wide in extent, accepting and conformed to a common law, a Word given from on high, redemptive and transfiguring in power and effect, once for all uttered in Christ, by the submission to which of the secular world, and to the degree to which it submits, the kingdom of God comes on earth" (p. 35). The writer then maintains, quite correctly, that "the conditions of a Christian order of civilization are fulfilled in so far as, on the one hand, the secular realm is vindicated in its own right, as possessing a worth and dignity and a relative autonomy of its own, yet also stands under the supremacy of the sacred as representing a moral standard of final and unqualified validity, and, on the other hand, in so far as the sacred realm itself does not stand isolated and aloof, but, while remaining true to its essential quality of transcendence, permeates and subdues, redeems and transfigures the secular" (p. 36). After indicating the dangers of false relations between the two realms, in which the secular may tend to absorb the sacred or vice versa, it offers the following definition of terms, which must be judged inadequate, and which are by no means strictly adhered to: "The term secular may be taken as including all human activities and institutions concerned with this world, and which are products of man's own creative capacity. And, in distinction from the secular, the term sacred may be said to apply to that which has, or claims to have, about it a transcendent quality, which is invested with a status and an

authority deriving from above and not from below, from God and not from man" (p. 41-42).

The following lectures then describe the biblical pattern of the relation between the two realms, their uneasy tension in Medieval Christendom, and the disintegration brought about by the Reformation and the Renaissance. The rising tide of secularism in the modern period is traced, with an appended discussion of the problem in Soviet Russia. The concluding lectures consider the relation between the Church and the World, and the prospects for a Renewed Christendom which may take adequate account of the complex factors in the contemporary technical civilization.

So much for a brief indication of the contents and structure. It must be judged a disappointing book. It is written in a curiously involved and pompous style which fails to harmonize the oratory of the pulpit with the stability of the written word. But, more important than this, the following criticisms must be brought against its presuppositions and method:

(a) It is described as an essay in "applied theology, with theology in its application to human history and human society." It is very difficult to know precisely what such a phrase as this is intended to mean. It implies that theology is some kind of a substance which can be applied to another, as whitewash is applied to a wall. But it does in fact raise fundamental issues about the nature and task of theology as a mediating activity between the finite and the infinite in which man as a finite existing being is confronted with infinite and unconditional demands embodied in finite structures. A review, however, is not the place for an essay on theological method, although it is a question which must be faced in a book such as this because it has got to be related to the more empirical methods and tasks of history and sociology. In actual fact, the book contains very much less theology than a reading of certain factors in history; and the perspective from which the author reads them governs the meaning which he assigns to his basic terms secular and sacred.

(b) The sub-title of the book describes it as "an enquiry into the principles of a Christian civilization," but this enquiry goes no further than reiterating a particular view of the relation between the secular and the sacred. Now, it seems impossible, to the present reviewer at any rate, to undertake such an enquiry after the work of contemporary Christian anthropologists and sociologists without discussing the distinction between culture and civilization. It is admittedly a difficult distinction to make because the meanings of the two words overlap to some extent; and it is a still more difficult distinction to use

because the two words may coincide in certain contexts. In fact the area of meaning of culture and civilization contract and expand as they are brought into relation with one another, so that at one moment culture can embrace civilization as a subordinate element, while at another moment civilization can embrace culture, as in periods of disintegration. But if culture is conceived as the pattern of life of a whole community which expresses in its artefacts the relation between the material and the spiritual, between the temporal and the eternal; and civilization is conceived as the technical means of human activity, we then have a working definition to go on. Culture is then the inner soul of civilization, giving it form and purpose, so that the real problem to be raised is that of a Christian culture and not that of a Christian civilization. We do not have Christian automobiles, but automobiles may take Christian people to church or they may help criminals to escape capture. This is again too large an issue to be dealt with here, but it does in fact lie behind the problem of a book such as this, and therefore ought to be faced. In particular, it is going to make all the difference as to whether or not the problem is to be handled theologically or merely historically.

(c) It was maintained a moment ago that the definition of terms, quoted above, is inadequate and their use is inconsistent. Consider, for example, the case of marriage and family life. It is a human creative activity and an institution concerned with this world, and as such belongs to the secular realm. It can equally be invested with a transcendent quality and authority deriving from God and relating human activity and destiny to the eternal, and as such belongs to the sacred realm. In actual fact it is an ambivalent reality and cannot be regarded as belonging wholly to the one or the other. It is a creative activity, and therefore involves human freedom and rationality and capacity for transcendence and spirituality. As such it is a human social form open to the eternal, a theonomous form, as Tillich would say, in which the eternal can be enshrined along with the absolute demands which the eternal makes upon man. But it equally involves human finiteness and limitation, which means that it can never confine the eternal within its form and can never claim absolute validity. It seems that some such analysis of the forms of human culture as this is required to be made of social structures, as well as political, economic and artistic activities, if we are to understand the way in which culture emerges through the exercise of human freedom in inciting nature to assume forms which it would not assume by itself; so that if man conceives his freedom as lying open to the eternal while his finiteness

is unable to comprehend it, his cultural creations are truly theonomous, escaping the heteronomy of the sacred and the autonomy of the secular: that is, the sacred finds embodiment in the secular, which in turn becomes the vehicle for its expression.

But Dr. Micklem does not appear to understand this, although it may lie behind what he has tried to describe in his reading of history. He regards the sacred and the secular as two realms in opposition to one another, the one infinite and transcendent and holy, the other finite, immanent and profane. At one moment the secular can be equated with the created world, "the natural basis of life" (p. 31); at another it can be a "secular institution set on the pursuit of secular ends" (p. 36). But what he is really writing about, in theological and philosophical terms, is the problem of the relation between the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal, the human and the divine; and the simple equation of these with the secular and the sacred confuses the issue.

The identification of the secular and the sacred as two realms may be a useful tool for the reading of history, but it does not serve to elucidate the *principles* of a Christian civilization (or, culture, as we should prefer) by quoting historical examples of their interaction. Nor does the identification of the secular with the natural, and the sacred with the transcendent order, carry us any further in this enquiry. The equation of the sacred with the transcendent carries with it both metaphysical and ethical corollaries for the Christian theologian which have to be worked out in detail if the principles of a Christian culture are to be revealed. The created natural order possesses its *reality* by its *relation* to the transcendent, and therefore participates analogically in the attributes of the transcendent. This is true for every level of created being; and the real problem, therefore, concerns the way in which the natural order, and the realities which belong to it essentially, can come to be regarded as secular. If the doctrine of relation, which is the reality of the creature, is taken seriously, the problem can only be stated in terms of violation of that relation; and a glimpse of its solution can only be gained by some such distinction of theonomy from heteronomy and autonomy, as Tillich has made (Cf. Paul Tillich, "Religion and Secular Culture" in *The Journal of Religion,* vol. 26, no. 2, 1946). If the created world ceases to be the mirror of the infinite, and its forms of life and structure become enclosed in its own finitude, which is the dominant theme of modern culture, then the autonomy of the secular is complete. If, on the other hand, the realities of the natural order are totally subordinated to the transcendent, heteronomy reigns supreme. In

contrast, " Theonomy has been defined as a culture in which the ultimate meaning of existence shines through all finite forms of thought and action ; the culture is transparent, and its creations are vessels of a spiritual content."

R. H. DAUBNEY.

THE TRIUMPH OF GOD. A series of Essays edited by MAX WARREN, General Secretary of the Church Missionary Society. pp. 377. (Longmans.) 15s.

THIS composite work is both interesting and valuable; interesting because it expresses the theological position of a group of Evangelical Churchmen and valuable because it seeks to adjust missionary strategy to present-day tendencies. The work is clearly the result of co-operative thought, and is one more proof of the steady effect which honest membership in the Anglican Communion produces on people open to thought and the challenge of new situations. Such a book would hardly have been possible 30 years ago. It is natural that the essays are uneven, but there is a basic theological point which keeps cropping up, viz., the necessity for something more than " realized eschatology in a new age beyond history." The writers seeks to maintain that the doctrine of the Parousia must also contain an element of the return of the Lord within history. As people actively engaged in or concerned with foreign missions, the writers are concerned that the Church should not lose her New Testament dynamism and urgency. Now this is an important reminder, especially as it comes from the Evangelical school of thought ; but I wonder if the writers realize that, by this very teaching of theirs, they are involved in an approach to the Church in history and to her world strategy, which is not generally recognized in their school of thought. There is much teaching about the Spiritual Fellowship, but one wonders whether the demands of a new missionary strategy (p. 353) do not demand something more decisive in their doctrine of the Church in the world.

The most interesting part of the book is in Part One, which contains six essays on various theological aspects. The two contributions of Bishop S. C. Neill are outstanding. The first essay on the " Everlasting Gospel " is full of good things. I wish that he had not used the word " annihilation " (p. 26) of human self. He rightly emphasizes the need for personal apprehension, but an annihilated self will never apprehend anything. In other pas-

sages he corrects this, by using the New Testament words " Death and Resurrection " and certainly, on the Christian understanding, death is just not annihilation but the road to resurrection.

With regard to the Church, Perfectionism and Puritanism are sanely criticized (p. 30), yet the peril of assimilation by the world is recognized (p. 33). The Kingdom of God is a greater reality than the Church, for the Church waits for the manifestation of the Kingdom (p. 36), yet the visible Church is the People of God through whom he wills to bring about the sanctification of man. In his second essay, " The Worship of God," Bishop Neill connects the growth of Individualism with the rejection of traditional religion (p. 117), and he insists on the corporate nature of the Church (p. 118). It is man's need of fellowship to-day which makes him accessible to the Gospel (p. 119), and worship must help towards this end. Now worship must be the activity of the whole man if its relevance is to be re-established, and this means that both the conscious and rational side of man's nature must be united with the sub-conscious and instinctive aspect (p. 121). One-sidedness in medieval and modern times is due to a failure to combine these two (pp. 123-4). Again, the principle of Order is admitted despite its dangers (p. 127). It is well said that sacrament and priesthood must be determined by the mind of Christ and not by any Old Testament parallels; but the Reformation emphasis on the word of God was not intended to decry the central importance of the sacrament (p. 129) The able writer ends his essay by two pleas, both of which are important and timely; we must re-establish the integral connexion of the Holy Communion with common life (p. 134), and we should make more of the continuing fellowship of the Church with the beloved dead (p. 137). This essay is of first-rate importance.

Canon Fison's essay on " The Spirit of Victory " deals with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. He begins by saying that we must not try to by-pass the natural (p. 41), but in practice he seems to make too much of the idea of " surprise " in the work of the Spirit (p. 60). Any opposition of the individual to the organized and the social leads to confusion and to the oddness of the crank; the Spirit of God in nature and history is a God of order, and we should expect the same to be manifested in the Church.

But the writer stresses the mystery of all vocation from baptism onwards (p. 43), and he is wise in suggesting that people should not be content in saying that they receive the Spirit in Baptism and Confirmation, the measure of our confidence on that score had best be measured by the responsibilities we undertake as members of the Body of Christ (p. 44). There is always a

proportion between the revelation received and the receptivity of the receiver, and the trouble is that man tends to set up a false antithesis and say "Either we must infallibilize the interpretation or we shall lose the revelation" (p. 47). Yet protest against these infallibilities can lead to the loss of the revelation. We had therefore better start with baptism as the Sacrament of the Spirit (which leads on to the Holy Communion as the Sacrament of the Son). In baptism both the individual and the social aspects exist in the midst of much mystery (p. 50). We have to be baptized into Christ before we can love or decide for him, and this indentification with Christ involves the dereliction of the Cross in order to reach Pentecost. Then the Temptation of our Lord is treated in a suggestive way. We have in the three temptations, first the condemnation of any short cuts towards a true relation with men; secondly, with God; and, thirdly, a true relationship between God and Man. The temptation is to ignore the Holy Spirit and replace him by some more tangible security of our own devising (p. 54). Then this is applied with varying degrees of adequacy to the doctrine of man (p. 53), the Sacraments (p. 55), the Ministry (p. 55), all Infallibilities (p. 57), and religious experience (p. 57). There are many good points in this essay, but it seems to miss something in total effect. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the Church should always be based upon a doctrine of the Spirit in nature and history; but this would need a natural theology, which this book lacks.

The fourth doctrinal essay on "The Hope set before us" is by Dr. F. W. Dillistone. This essay is an attempt to deal with the meaning of New Testament eschatology. In what sense has the Day of the Lord happened and in what sense is it still a hope set before us? I hardly think that the problem is much clarified. It is well expressed by Pascal's words, "Thou wouldst not have sought Me, hadst not thou already found Me", and a discussion of the Christian understanding of the relation of time to Eternity is called for but not provided. Incidentally, this is a weakness of much current biblical theology.

There is an excellent quotation from Dr. Edwyn Bevan about the Fatalism of Babylonian Astrology and its conquest by the Gospel. The contest between the Church and Gnosticism is touched on but the Logos Doctrine and Teleology in Greek thought cannot be dealt with by a few phrases. Most of all, one must question the readiness to set up antithesis unnecessarily. We have had more than enough of Sabatier's *Religions of Authority and Religions of the Spirit*, but this idea is brought in here by the suggestion that systems of thought and careful organization arise from a lack of spirituality. If the relative

victories of Time are part of Christian eschatology, then the Church will always need systems of thought and organization both to conserve what has been won and to prepare the way for future advance. It is not surprising that Church history, both in Roman Catholicism and the great Churches of the Reformation, is written down and certain Protestant sects (with their reliance on "bitter conflict" (p. 84)) and the later Pietists are placed in the centre of the picture.

The essay on "The People of God", by the Rev. J. P. Hickinbotham, is one of the best essays in the book and will repay careful reading. "There can be no Messiah without a People" (p. 91), but is it true to say that the Church is built on faith in Jesus as the Christ? Fideism is what we all wish to avoid. Is not the Messiah himself the rock on which the Church is built? The Church is not built on anyone's faith. Faith springs out of the fact that we are made members of the Church by the action of the Messiah on us. The author then makes clear that the Kingdom which Christ comes to bring is the Fellowship which is not marred by sin, sorrow, and death, and this is accomplished by both redemption and revelation by the Word of God (p. 95). The revelation enables us to interpret the redemption aright, and this process takes two forms, viz, oral witness and the acted-word of Sacraments, and both these forms are explained as "instruments" (p. 96) through which the Spirit reveals God in Christ. I am not sure that this idea of instrumental causation of the grace-faith relationship is really maintained (p. 97). When the writer says that the Church, as united with Christ, shares his victory over evil (p. 99), it is not always clear if he is referring to the ideal New Testament Church or whether he recognizes degrees of union with Christ in the Church in history. He does recognize degrees of the manifestation of Christ's victory and degrees of the fulfilment of the divine purpose (p. 100). But he deserts this point of view when he takes up the cult of paradox ("The Church is the Redeemed Community but the Community is not Redeemed", p. 100). With regard to the question of the divided Church, his viewpoint is too vague ("The Fellowship can be taken to exist when the message is declared and results in a community which professes Faith" (p. 105)). What message? and What degree of faith? We have no right to cut *didache* away from the New Testament *kerugma*, and a growing body must have some pattern, which provides the element of sameness along with the newness of growth. The author's view of tradition is contrary to the statement made in the book that the Spirit makes Christ our contemporary; he seems to think that the older a tradition is the more corrupt it must be (p. 105). Also

if the message includes interpretation (and it must do so), it does not help much to say, "The Message must be preserved inviolate" (p. 106), for there is genuine growth in the power of interpretation even in the New Testament itself. Our old friend "*Esse* and *Bene Esse*" also turns up. It seems clear, however, that anything less than *Bene Esse* would be treachery to our Lord.

I must pass over the essay of the Rev. L. W. Brown on "The Knowledge of God", but I must commend in general the essays on missionary strategy: they are very good indeed and should be amplified and published in a separate book. The Rev. J. S. Trimingham deals with the World of Islam; the Rev. C. S. Milford wth India; the Rev. R. R. Young with Tribal Religion; and the Rev. G. H. G. Hewitt writes well on the crucial importance of literature. The Rev. H. G. G. Herklots writes about the Ecumenical Movement; he breaks no new ground but what he says may be of value in telling those who ought to know the facts what they are. Miss P. L. Garlick writes on "The Church in the Community."

Finally, last but not least, we must draw attention to the two essays by the editor, Dr. Max Warren. His essay on "Church and State" is most interesting and will do good despite the fact that it is indecisive. He begins with a too negative statement: "The problem is how to avert Anarchy without sacrificing Freedom" (p. 197). He tends to overstress the metaphor of the marriage of Church and State and then just says that it has come to an end; clearly mutual influence has not ceased and they are still in relation. Then he contrasts the individual and the social aspects of justice in too sharp a way (p. 198).

Contrary to our great Anglican tradition, e.g., in Hooker, he neglects the idea of Natural Law and seeks an account of the State from the Bible alone (p. 199), but he does not synthesize the existence of the State as God's Ordinance (p. 204) with that of the Church. Moreover, in handling the biblical evidence, he does not really combine the moral individual, on the one hand, and the emphasis on human solidarity in the Bible on the other (p. 202). When he says that the individual does not exist for society because both individual and society exist for God, there is an incomplete argument; for this would also prove that the society does not exist for the individual. Of course St. Paul's conception of the Church combines both individual and society in a mutually creative relationship. There are good criticisms of Communalisms based on various religions; of the Liberal State and of the Social Service State (pp. 205-210) but he has difficulty in handling Gladstone's theory because to him "the functions of State and Church are just disparate" (p. 213).

If this were absolutely true, there would be no problem of the relation of Church and State. Again, it is quite insufficient simply to contrast "man's here and now relations with man's ultimate destiny" (p. 213). If these antitheses are final, there seems no chance to establish the "prophetic destiny of the Church" (p. 214). The Church must recognize the State's existence before she can proceed to "prophecy, purify and prepare" (p. 213). He wants to establish the laudable idea that the Church has a consecrating function towards the State (p. 214) and even to produce a unity (p. 217), but he leaves us with the world's institutions which are unchristian and a Church in history which "is not yet but wholly hopes to be" (p. 217). We are not even to hope that the world might become gradually Christian (p. 221). Yet we are to hope for the triumph of God in a future event (p. 221). Apparently only in the consummation of all things can the two really come into any relationship; at present "between the Church and the State there can be no real meeting" (p. 223). Yet our author has been dealing with the deepest and most perplexing subject, and the whole essay will repay reading.

We must finally thank the editor for his effort and each and everyone of the essayists for their contributions. We hope that their fellowship as a group may be blessed and may still grow in both clarity and depth of apprehension.

H. K. Archdall.

A Dictionary of English Church History. Edited by S. L. Ollard, D.Litt., F.S.A., Gordon Crosse, M.A., Maurice Bond, M.A., F.S.A. New (Third) Edition. Revised and reset throughout. Pp. xx + 698. (London and Oxford: A. R. Mowbray and Co. Ltd., 1948.) 25s. net.

"*Il faut de l'Art, aussi bien que du Travail, pour faire un bon Dictionaire*": so wrote Guy Miege, Gent., in an entertaining work half-French, half-English, printed by John Redmayne, for Thomas Basset, at the George near St. Dunstan's Church in Fleet Street, in 1688. And the achievement of a third edition may fairly be a subject for congratulation, more especially in the case of a work as to which habitual users must necessarily form a more or less definite judgement. An attractively printed volume of more than seven hundred pages at the price of twenty-five shillings also bespeaks attention in days when the advancement

of learning is so heavily penalized. Dr. Ollard and his colleagues feel able to claim that "since its original publication in 1912 the Dictionary has established itself as a standard work of reference not only for the churchman and general reader for whom it was originally designed, but also for historians seeking a succinct account of subjects beyond their own field of specialisation." It has undoubtedly served a useful purpose for more than a generation, and even those who may be inclined to wonder if English Church history is always quite correctly viewed in the penumbra of the Oxford Movement will not allow themselves to be blind to the high merit of many of the articles and will wish it a further career of prosperity.

Certainly neither Art nor Labour have been wanting in the production of the book. From the outset it challenged notice by the distinction of the contributors whose help the editors had been fortunate enough to enlist. Dr. Brightman, Mr. H. W. C. Davis, Dr. Figgis, Dr. Frere, Dr. James Gairdner, Dr. W. Hunt, Dr. M. R. James, Professor Oman, Dr. Darwell Stone, Professor Hamilton Thompson, Dr. E. W. Watson, Dr. C. C. J. Webb, Dr. J. P. Whitney, Bishop John Wordsworth were scholars whose utterances commanded, and still command, attention from professional students. Nor were there wanting others whose "popular" handling of the topics entrusted to them would at least ensure readers for what they wrote. The former class, though not always the latter, exhibited a certain detachment. With their articles it was no case of "see ladling butter from alternate tubs, Stubbs butters Freeman, Freeman butters Stubbs", nor of the equally profane alternative version "where, ladling butter from a large tureen, See Blustering Freeman butter blundering Green." It is true that in the index to his reminiscences Sir Charles Oman was to insert a line, "Green, J. R., historian, my dislike for, 161", with a notice in the text "What a pity that Green did not live to see 1914—or 1939!" And yet, if the more sober and responsible articles were free from this kind of thing, a passing regret can scarcely fail to make itself felt that of the three historians satirized, all of whom made material contributions to English Church history, Stubbs alone is allowed in the new edition an article to himself, while the others fare even less well than Bishop John Wordsworth and Dean Armitage Robinson. The tribute paid to the former in the introduction awakens expectations unhappily unsatisfied, and the reference to the latter in the ten columns on Westminster Abbey perhaps necessarily leaves unmentioned the achievements for which he will be chiefly remembered. Even under "Salisbury" there is no allusion to

that majestic monument of English scholarship, the *Novum Testamentum Latine* of Wordsworth and White, the publication of which is now at last nearing completion under the editorial superintendence of Professor H. F. D. Sparks and his assistants.

The large number of articles on themes of varying degrees of importance for which the two original editors, Dr. Ollard and Mr. Crosse, made themselves responsible—in the former case 37, in the latter 50 in number—did much to set the tone of the dictionary, and the third editor, Mr. M. F. Bond, F.S.A., Clerk of the Records in the House of Lords, has another 17 to his credit. If some of Dr. Ollard's, *e.g.*, on the Oxford Movement, Church (High, Low, Broad), Jerusalem (Bishopric in) seem to suffer rather badly from undue compression, they are supplemented, if not always confirmed, by others to whom he has been more liberal in allowing space. Mr. Crosse's long series have a special importance of a somewhat different kind since they comprise nearly all those concerned with legal questions as well as several of a more literary flavour. They are "full of learning", if scarcely in Sir William Anson's phrase "put lightly, like powder in jam", and undoubtedly useful for purposes of reference, even if they excite regret that the article on Sir Robert Phillimore should not be balanced by one on Roundell Palmer or Lord Coleridge or Lord Penzance, and that Sir Edward Coke, William Prynne and above all John Selden find no more place than Ayliffe or John Godolphin or Richard Burn. The historical student of the future will perhaps be at pains to reconcile Dr. Ollard (*s.v.* Brightman) and Mr. Russell (*s.v.* Temple, F.) in regard to the *Responsio* of the two English Archbishops to the Papal Bull *Apostolicae Curae*. There is no corresponding article on Maclagan to serve as a check, but comparison will naturally be made with the article "Ordinations, Anglican", which appears in the new edition over the initials F. E. B[rightman] and D. R. D[endy]. In regard to this as in respect to an earlier series of articles on Nonconformity a very delicate question is raised of the ethics of editing. Editorial "improvements" or prunings or modifications of the work of a living contributor have no doubt a semblance of justification, whatever the contributor's view of the result which appears over his initials. And it may not seem to be a matter of very great moment if the late Dr. Gee's sections on the history of the English Bible (which survive as a pendant to Professor Margaret Deanesly's most admirable summary of the early versions) end now with a striking encomium of the quite recent version by Mgr. Knox. Again the article by Mr. H. W. C. Davis on St. Edmund of Abingdon states in its

penultimate sentence that "His name is perpetuated by St. Edmund Hall at Oxford, the chapel of which was dedicated in his honour by Bishop Fell (*q.v.*) in 1682"—a statement which we can imagine a Principal of that illustrious foundation viewing with a certain ruefulness, especially since there is no article on Universities to afford a supplementary account. But it is impossible to repress a rather wry smile when we find among the appended list of books "A. B. Emden, *An Oxford Hall in the Middle Ages,* 1927", without any indication that the present Principal of St. Edmund Hall finds himself able to go a good deal further than Mr. Davis. But is the position the same when the subject is one of first rate importance, and the contributor, once an authority of eminence and still so regarded by many, is now dead? If it is argued that a dictionary of this kind is in the same position as a legal or medical text book which is being "brought up to date", there is also a very strong case for the contention that if authority is still to be claimed the additions or alterations made should, wherever possible, be indicated, or the modification necessary introduced in a separate and additional section as has been done in some cases in regard to other articles in this volume. The original contributor is then clearly responsible only for what he wrote and not for what it is presumed rightly or wrongly that he might have written had his life been prolonged. It is not merely a question of what in his notable article on "Architecture" Professor Hamilton Thompson calls in another connexion "academic standards of mere precision and correctness", nor of the convenience of the student, but of the preservation of a judgement framed with careful attention to every word by a man with unusual knowledge of the facts which it is unlikely that the reviser can share; nor will the latter really suffer if his own meritorious additions are indicated by square brackets. The other case may awaken even more serious questioning at least for anyone who has long been accustomed to refer students to the sections headed "Nonconformity" in the dictionary as of outstanding interest, whatever view they might take of the historical judgements expressed. They were the work of the late Dr. E. W. Watson and now appear without indication of changes over the initials E. W. W. and T. F. G[lasson] with a valuable appendix of over nineteen columns by Dr. Glasson himself, who in the list of Contributors and Articles is credited with the sole authorship of the whole, to the exclusion of Dr. Watson, while in the preface the articles are included among those "re-written in accordance with the results of recent research."

In some respects, though hardly in this, criticism may seem at once otiose and superfluous since it may be argued that it

merely indicates difference of opinion on matters properly belonging to editorial discretion, particularly in cases where the decision has to be made for inclusion or exclusion, for ample length or brevity deemed unavoidable, for separate treatment or merely incidental reference. No one is likely to regret the inclusion of articles like that on Nicholas Ferrar by Mr. A. R. Maycock [signed A. L. M.] or on St. William of Norwich by Dr. M. R. James, or Mr. C. L. Marson's "Glastonbury" or Mr. W. M. Wright's "Shaftesbury Abbey" or Mr. A. L. Poole's "St. Albans (Abbey)", though compared with many others they may seem somewhat out of proportion and the last three make the reader yearn for similar treatment of some others included in Dr. Hilda Johnstone's magistral article of over 14 columns on "Religious Orders. I. Mediaeval." In such cases, however, the reader accepts with thankfulness what he is given and, in regard to the very difficult problem of separate articles, is ready to recognize that an editor may feel hardly used if grateful recognition of the inclusion of separate studies of Arminianism, Calvinism, Erastianism and Puritanism by Dr. Figgis be accompanied by the observation that Lutheranism, Erasmus, Presbyterianism, Independents are not given similar treatment, especially since reference to the quite excellent index at the end of the book will show where reference to them may be found. Nor is it otherwise perhaps in regard to method of treatment of the subjects when chosen—a topic about which much indeed might be written. How shall a man write best on Charles I or Charles Gore or Queen Elizabeth or the Elizabethan Settlement? And readers of the several articles can promise themselves a good deal of interest and even quiet amusement.

An erudite lawyer, who also played a part in the wider field of education, once wrote:—

> "To an essay you strive some attraction to lend,
> You arrange your ideas and your sentences mend,
> Till it has a beginning, a middle, an end,
> Clear, neat, and becoming a lawyer",

and Sir William Anson's ballad may be capped from a more recent work which has given equal pleasure to author and readers, though not always, it may be, for the same reasons. In his *Memories of Victorian Oxford* (Methuen, 1941), already quoted, Sir Charles Oman prints an amusing comment from the autobiography of one of his pupils: "I shall always remember the first essay that I ever took to Professor Oman, and the devastating criticism that it evoked. He had told me to write an estimate of Cicero . . . . 'Marcus Tullius Cicero', I began, 'was

born at Arpinum on January 3rd, B.C. 106.' 'No, never', cried my tutor, 'under any circumstances, begin an essay like that.' And he started me off on half-a-dozen different tracks. What did Cicero stand for? Was he a genuine politician? Was he a trimmer? Did he do good for the State or evil? 'Begin with an epigram, begin with a paradox, or begin with a demonstrably false premise and demolish it. But never, never, start off with such a dry and helpless statement as that "Marcus Tullius Cicero was born at Arpinum on January 3rd, B.C. 106."'" "The whole of Oxford teaching", the pupil added, "was in that condemnation — ideas not facts, judgement not an index, life not death." Some may think none the less that in an estimate of Cicero the facts that he was an Arpinate and a *novus homo* and was born in B.C. 106 are of primary importance. But the other is undeniably the Oxford manner, not always with very happy results, and we may rejoice that Dr. E. F. Jacob, in his admirable study of Archbishop Chichele for the new edition has no more felt bound by it than did Sir Charles Oman himself in his three articles on Gloucester, Swithun (St.), and Winchester. In the case of St. Swithun a judicious vagueness was anyhow obligatory as also in that of St. Frideswide, where reference should be made to Sir F. M. Stenton's delightful study of the ascertainable facts in *Oxoniensia*. And Dr. Ollard himself, a good Oxford man, in his eight columns devoted to Henry VIII, if he violates the Omanic canon in his beginning, ends in the accepted fashion with an epigram: "the justest estimate of his private life is that of Pollard: 'Every inch a king, Henry VIII never attained to the stature of a gentleman'". With this we may couple his own intermediate remark that "Henry had been brought up in a good home, and the married life of his parents was a model of happiness and fidelity," which sends us fruitlessly to the index for a reference to Henry VII or to his mother, the Lady Margaret. But at least we have been given a thumbnail sketch to set beside Archdeacon C. P. S. Clarke's portrait of Titus Oates: "In person he was hideous. He was short, bull-necked, and bow-legged. His forehead was low, his eyes small and very deep-set. His face was very large and red, and his chin so long that the mouth seemed to come in the middle of the face."

The interest of a new article on "Relics" by Mr. Bond, one of the editors, throws in relief the absence of a section on all pilgrimages save the "Pilgrimage of Grace" (by James Gairdner) as well as of one on Miracles. It is surely not a case in which "our graver business frowns at this levity", for pilgrimages and

miracles and the places with which they were associated have quite an important place in English Church history. Mr. Bond's three columns are all too short and the bibliography jejune, but he is the author also of a section of about the same length on English Mediaeval Mystics, of which it may at any rate be said that it is less ruthlessly compressed than Miss Eleanor Gregory's otherwise attractive pendant on "Mystics, Modern." Attention is also due to Mr. Bond's articles on Duns Scotus (*Doctor subtilis*) and on William of Ockham (*Doctor invincibilis*), even if they suggest wonder why Thomas Bradwardine (*Doctor profundus*) receives, except in the list of Archbishops of Canterbury, no more notice than the Black Death which exercised so potent an influence on English Church life as well as his own.

The field of biography is one which an editor must necessarily find difficulty in weeding, and it is also one in regard to which personal preferences can hardly be excluded in retention or removal. And the treatment accorded is noticeably important because of the resultant impression of the standpoint of the book as a whole left upon the reader's mind. Probably the strong and weak points in the original selection are by now sufficiently well known to make it unnecessary to do more than express regret that some writers were allowed so free a hand in inserting *obiter dicta* of their own which gave a partisan appearance to the volume. The late Mr. G. W. E. Russell in particular was seldom reluctant to express personal opinions in which some not unnaturally saw prejudice writ large. He was a most entertaining *raconteur* who could sometimes claim to be in advance of his times, as when he tells us in one of his own volumes that in the *Nineteenth Century* for June, 1883, he "gave . . . reasons for thinking that now-a-days there is very little danger of hasty and ill-considered legislation" and "pointed out that, when this danger disappears, the reason for a Second Chamber disappears with it. But", he added, "granting for the sake of argument that something of this danger still survives, would it not be fully met by limiting the power of the Lords to a veto for a year on a measure passed by the Commons?" But readers do not go to dictionary articles for party judgements on religious or social questions nor even for reported sayings of Mr. Gladstone, some of which need checking from other sources, and Mr. Russell's twenty articles not only reveal the writer as a tireless "snapper up of unconsidered trifles" of political and religious gossip, but as author of many judgements which rankle in the remembrance and are seldom supported by the evidence desired.

Opportunity has been taken in the new edition to add biographies of Archbishops Davidson, Lang and William Temple, of Bishops Frere, Gore, Henson and Winnington-Ingram, and of Dr. Brightman. To others Chavasse, Talbot, Wilkinson and, as has been said above, John Wordsworth, might seem to justify inclusion, and if a wider range were allowed Alcock, Harold Browne, Bull, Cox, William Grey, Joseph Hall, Sanderson, Van Mildert, and among those whom King James called "the inferior clergy", Aitken, Richard Bentley, Body, Lacey and Darwell Stone. So far as the bishops are concerned it should, however, in fairness be added that at least their dates and sometimes a few details of their careers will be found in the appropriate section under the name of their sees—a series which has been and remains for reference purposes one of the most useful features of the book. It may be observed with interest, if not perhaps with universal agreement, that Dr. Fisher is reckoned the ninety-ninth Archbishop of Canterbury, and that on the ground that "the scope of the book is confined to the Provinces of Canterbury and York the separate articles on the four Welsh dioceses . . . have not been continued beyond the formation of the Province of Wales" —a rather melancholy commentary on a recent and most admirably tempered article by the Bishop of Swansea and Brecon. There are some forms of logical consistency which are really not worth while, and the addition of an article on "Wales, Disestablishment of the Church in," is a poor compensation, though useful so far as it goes. The exclusive reference in it to Lord Sankey in regard to his new constitution does less than justice to the labours of Sir John Eldon Bankes, Bishop John Owen, and Mr. Frank Morgan, the invaluable secretary to the Representative Body, who was also, it may be noted in passing, contributor of five valuable articles to this volume, including vigorous studies of Giraldus Cambrensis and Lyndwood and a longer account of Abbeys (Welsh) which, like Professor Hamilton Thompson's initial article on Abbeys (English) puts the reader in good heart for the rest of the book and includes a good many other more or less relevant matters.

What, indeed, is "relevant" in a dictionary of this kind? The question almost inevitably suggests itself when Gunpowder, Treason and Plot, Campion, Persons, Garnet and the Archpriest Controversy are all excluded from separate treatment, while yet the Popish Plot receives a quite disproportionate allowance of space, and the article "Roman Catholics", which is a combination of Dr. Frere and Mr. Crosse, ill redresses the balance, once more useful as it is. Again Mr. Crosse's sketch of the history

of "Drama in the English Church" is a more novel feature than Dr. Brightman's elaborate study of "Dress of the Clergy" with its many characteristic touches, e.g., "the red wristband now worn with the red chimere is, unless the prelate be an Oxford D.C.L., a mere folly, perhaps instituted by Wilberforce." Most students would be sorry to lose either of these articles, but many would sacrifice both to make room for an article or series of articles on the "sources" of English Church History—Chroniclers and the like—the absence of which is a real defect. Even if the treatment raised as many highly controversial issues as Mr. S. L. Bethell's thirteen columns on "Poetry in the English Church", which ends by saluting Mr. T. S. Eliot as "the greatest living English poet", the risk would certainly have been at least equally well worth taking. Again the various and very useful articles on "Societies" and "Missions" (the latter a new and notable contribution by Dr. McLeod Campbell) and the twenty-three columns on Reunion by Dr. Ollard and Mr. Bond, comprehensive and valuable as they are, throw into relief the absence of adequate treatment of such men as Archbishops Tenison and Secker, Christian Schwartz, the seventh Earl of Shaftesbury or the second Viscount Halifax. Like the quite inadequate treatment of the Universities in the late Mr. A. F. Leach's article on Education, which is an additional reason for regretting the absence of a section on Dr. Rashdall, such omissions are no doubt explicable on one ground or another in the same way as the allotment of more space to Sydney Smith than to Archbishop Sheldon or the two Sherlocks together, and the exclusion of Edward the Confessor, Henry VI or Oliver Cromwell (except *s.v.* Baxter, Toleration, Ussher!).

The technical production of the volume reflects the highest credit on all concerned and not least on the Printer's Reader, to whom, when really efficient, writers and editors owe a debt which they do not always remember and can seldom adequately repay. The number of misprints in this book is singularly few. Mr. Crosse (*s.v.* Phillpotts) is once credited with the apostrophe appropriate to the "singular brother of Worcester", and Dr. Brightman can hardly be supposed to have intended to refer (*s.v.* Ordinations) to a Pope *Julian* III, while the Cardinal intended by Dr. Ollard on p. 524 is not "Himsley" but "Hinsley." On some minor points of a different kind it may be noted that Orme's edition of Baxter's works was not in thirty but in twenty-three volumes, and that Dr. Hutton is equally inaccurate in his statement as to the Maitland-Stubbs controversy by confining himself to the second instead of the third edition of the celebrated lec-

tures on Mediaeval and Modern History. Bishop Winnington-Ingram, though he died indeed " in his native Worcestershire ", spent his closing years at Bournemouth. The article " Parliament, Clergy in ", needs a cross-reference to " Wales, Disestablishment ", and the Act 4-5 Geo. V, c. 91. The notable tribute paid by Dr. Owst in his only too short article on " Preaching " to F. W. Robertson of Brighton, might seem to entitle him at least to a reference in the Index even if Chillingworth, Goodwin, Owen and Howe are as characteristically omitted as William Perkins and John Robinson. Dr. Ollard's article on " Peculiars " needs to be co-related with Dr. Watson's on " Rural Deans ", and both would benefit by a reference to Dr. I. J. Churchill's *magnum opus* on *Canterbury Administration* as " Benefit of Clergy " would by another to Dr. Leona C. Gabel's Harvard dissertations on the subject. And finally it may be submitted that the reference to Dr. Frere's *History of the Book of Common Prayer* should not have omitted the name of Procter, especially in view of his own humorous habitual account of Mr. Procter's attitude to it as a specimen of editorial revision.

CLAUDE JENKINS.

CANONIZATION AND AUTHORITY IN THE WESTERN CHURCH. By ERIC WALDRAM KEMP. (Oxford Historical Series.) (Oxford University Press.) 12s. 6d.

THERE has been hitherto, so far as the writer knows, no historical study in English of the process of canonization, though the late Professor T. F. Tout used to desire one, on the ground that he would like to know why the demand for the formal canonization of certain English holy men succeeded, while that for others failed. He would have delighted in Mr. Kemp's book: in its scholarship, clarity and comprehensiveness, and in the light shed on the canonization of certain English saints: Augustine of Canterbury, Edward the Martyr, Edward the Confessor, Wulfstan, Anselm, Thomas à Becket, Osmund of Sarum and Edmund of Abingdon; and no less in the reason why the popular veneration for Simon de Montfort and Thomas of Lancaster, for Bishop Grosseteste and Archbishop Winchelsea did not lead to canonization. Mr. Kemp has, in fact, produced an excellent study in canon law, marked by fairness of judgement and a strong historical sense.

Mr. Kemp traces the whole history of the *cultus* of the saints from the veneration of the bodies of the martyrs to the new *Codex Juris Canonici* of 1919, which lays down in Canon 1999 the rules now operative for the beatification and canonization of saints. Canonization in the age of the martyrs was the spontaneous act of the local community, operating automatically: the faithful buried the martyr's body in the cemetery or even by the wayside, and met to celebrate his anniversary, his *dies natalicia*, into heaven. The Smyrnaeans wrote of the martyrdom of Polycarp:

> "We afterwards took up his bones, and laid them in a suitable place: where the Lord will permit us to gather ourselves together, in gladness and joy, and to celebrate the birthday of his martyrdom."

The action was purely popular: for the martyr's heroic death was known to all and no inquiry was needed.

It was in the African Church, widely extended, and divided by schism, that legislation about canonization, involving inquiry and authorization, begins. The first Council of Carthage condemned those who venerated the relics of uncertain martyrs, and the fifth Council of Carthage, 401, enacted that authority for dealing with the veneration of relics rested with the diocesan bishop, and that some investigation must be made as to the identity of the supposed martyr's body, and the cause for which he had died: dreams and vain revelations must not be accepted as evidence. The Church was not hostile to the cult of the martyrs, but Roman gravity demanded to be assured that it was in fact the body of a martyr that was venerated: and that he died for Christ in the Catholic faith, and not as a schismatic. Another African Canon laid the foundation of the future office of the martyr in the words: "Let it be lawful to read the passions of the martyrs when their anniversary days are celebrated."

Before the Peace of the Church, two more classes of saints were added to those whom the faithful might venerate: confessors, tormented in the persecution but not killed: and those who practised heroic virtue, as, for instance, ministering to the sick in the plague, "seeming in no respect to come behind martyrdom." Later, new types of Christian virtue called for veneration: the ascetic, the defender of the faith, and the great bishop. For all these, no formal authorization of veneration was needed, though bishops, as in the case of martyrs, sometimes investigated and gave decisions.

The barbarian invasions of the fifth century were responsible for many translations of the saints' relics, for security, and for a breaking down of the stricter Roman discipline about veneration. The practice began of "elevating" a saint's relics from the ground without the church, or a humble position within, to some altar tomb or position above the altar: all this with solemnity and a bishop's blessing. By the end of the ninth century the actual translation of a saint may be regarded as a formal act of canonization; the diocesan synod sometimes discussed beforehand the proposed translation. This became necessary in the later Merovingian period, when, at a time of church building and missionary efforts, financial advantage was found to follow the discovery of the relics of some hitherto unknown martyr; the bishops investigated, but usually with a hopeful mind!

The Carolingian reform of the Church brought with it a revival of the older Roman discipline. As one of Charlemagne's capitularies, of 805 or 806, tersely put it:

> "About churches: or saints newly found without authority (*sine auctoritate inventis*): they shall by no means be venerated without the bishop's authority."

You shall not, that is, discover saints in the vicinity of the church you have just built or propose to build! The Council of Mainz, in 813, summed up the requirements for the authorization of translation as, the advice of the prince, and the leave of the sacred synod of bishops. Before the publication of Gratian's *Decretum* in 1140, and, indeed, in the *Decretum* itself, canonization was still regulated by the local bishop, his synod, and the synod of the metropolitan.

While early cases of papal canonization can be found in the cases of Severinus (+482), Kilian, and Ulric of Augsburg (+973), etc., and while requests for papal canonization become frequent from the pontificate of Urban II (1088-1099), papal control of canonization only became normal in the period of Alexander III and Innocent III. The latter clearly claimed the exclusive right to canonize, and laid down the requirements for canonization: evidence of a good pious life, miracles performed after death, and sworn witnesses of miracles, some attending at Rome itself.

Mr. Kemp further deals with theory and practice in the later middle ages, with the controversy about canonization from the sixteenth century and its bearing on the subject of papal infallibility.

M. D.

THREE BYZANTINE SAINTS. Contemporary Biographies translated from the Greek. By ELIZABETH DAWES and NORMAN H. BAYNES. (Basil Blackwell.) 21s.

THE first Life here translated is that of St. Daniel the Stylite, a disciple of the more famous Simeon, whose pillar was set up in a suburb of Constantinople in the fifth century. It is the work of an anonymous disciple and eye-witness. The second Life is that of St. Theodore of Sikeon, a monk and bishop in Galatia in the sixth century. It also is the work of an anonymous disciple. The third is a Life of St. John the Almoner, Patriarch of Alexandria shortly before the Moslem Conquest. The opening chapters have been taken by a compiler from a Life by John Moschus and Sophronius. The rest is the Life written by Bishop Leontius.

These three authentic Lives throw a flood of light on early Byzantine Christianity. And it reveals a world strange even to those whose religious creed is substantially the same as that believed in that world. We feel, it is true, this sense of strangeness, far less when we read John the Almoner's life than when we read the other two. For the asceticism practised by the patriarch does not exceed, if indeed it equals, that practised by many saints and holy people in recent or even contemporary periods. And the sole miracles recorded are a series of special providences supplying the funds required by his unremittent and lavish charity.

But the two former saints are altogether alien. Daniel, on his pillar where he lived for thirty-three years, and Theodore, in the cage in which he spent long periods every year, were Christian fakirs whose self-torture repels us. And the miracles ascribed to them strain credibility, not least the amazing number of exorcisms, demons cast out from local habitation in particular limbs of the sick or confined once more in some hole or pagan sepulchre from which an accidental disturbance had released them to vex and possess the unfortunate inhabitants of the neighbourhood.

As regards our first difficulty, the fakir-like self-torture, we must remember that this kind of asceticism made a most powerful impression on the people. It gave the ascete a power to influence and help souls which he could not otherwise have acquired. If the use made of this influence was beneficent, to lead men to the loving service of God, induce them to lead lives of Christian virtue and defend the poor and weak, the means by which it was obtained were, under the given conditions, fully justified. It is certain that this was the case. The first Stylite (Simeon) was so far from being wrapped up in a purely selfish devotion that he advised and helped vast crowds and was able to instruct a remote Egyptian village which sent to consult him to ration justly the

water for irrigation. Daniel and Theodore, as these Lives show, were an active source of spiritual and moral light and ever ready to give spiritual and temporal help to those in distress. The influence they obtained, Daniel in particular, with the Emperor and his entourage was exercised for the benefit of ruler and subject. It is a pity that modern rulers are not so accessible to Christian influences. Even the fierce Phocas, though too hardened to listen to Theodore, dared not punish his bold rebuke.

Moreover these ascetics felt a powerful attraction and vocation to these austerities and found in their practice the peace of spirit and interior happiness of men united with the will of God. Nor even did they fall victim to the disease and premature decay humanly to be expected. Simeon Stylites reached the age of 68, Daniel 84, and though Theodore's age is not known, he evidently did not die in youth. We must therefore conclude that this fakirism was a form of Christian life and apostolate adapted to the mentality of those among whom it was practised, and remember our Lord's words when he contrasted the Baptist's austerity with his own eating and drinking, that wisdom is justified of all her children.

The miracles, and in particular the exorcisms, are a far more difficult problem to which the reviewer at least must confess himself unable to find a satisfactory answer. It is incredible that evil spirits should be confined in tombs or hollows or locally inhabit particular members of the body, or that diabolic possession should be almost the order of the day in fifth and sixth century Constantinople or Galatia yet be practically unknown to-day. Indeed there is no mention of it in the Life of the almost contemporary Alexandrian patriarch. On the other hand, the evidence for these exorcisms is to a very large extent the account of an honest eye-witness. One must, I think, conclude that the cures were authentic if the diagnosis was often faulty.

What emerges most strikingly from this vivid picture of the early Byzantine world is that it was dominated by religious and Christian belief. We do not mean that conduct, individual or social, was predominantly such as Christian morals require. But everything that was healthy and morally good was Christian. Rulers who otherwise would have pursued courses wholly amoral and brutal were influenced by holy men as no ruler to-day is influenced. Whatever the shortcomings of the man in the street he cared, and cared very much for the purity of Catholic faith. Whereas the heart of the contemporary world is empty or filled by such idols as Communism, the heart of that Byzantine world was a solid conviction of Christian truth. No one deified

humanity or expected man to produce by his unaided powers an earthly paradise. Union with God for all eternity was recognized as his vocation, and large numbers from every social rank sold all they possessed to win this pearl of great price. That is to say the accepted order of values was right. Ours in the main is perverse or wanting altogether, the former leading to idolatry, the latter producing a void frivolous or despairing. Therefore, despite its unscientific credulities, we should do well to learn from this remote world its wisdom in an order which transcends science, the science of the saints.

E. I. Watkin.

The Reach of the Mind. By J. B. Rhine. (Faber and Faber.) 188 pp. 10s. 6d.

Professor Rhine is the distinguished leader of a group of research workers in experimental parapsychology (psychical research) at Duke University of North Carolina. This book is an attempt to give the intelligent reader an idea of the present position of this subject as it appears to a laboratory worker. A great deal has been accomplished during the past sixty years towards the understanding of the odd facts of psychical research both in the Duke laboratory and in other centres of study such as the British Society for Psychical Research. Much of the work is of too detailed and technical a character to appeal to any but specialists, but its main outlines are of very general interest. It is on these main outlines that Professor Rhine focusses attention.

At the beginning of the present century, the materialist view of the world seemed safely established as scientific orthodoxy. This view was felt by many people to be the main obstacle to the acceptance of a spiritual view of the universe. Before Einstein questioned the adequacy of that theory as the foundation of theoretical physics, it was already being undermined by the demonstration of the reality of telepathy. The communication of knowledge from one mind to another without physical communication through the senses ought not, on the materialist view, to take place. It was demonstrated that it did take place.

The early researchers remained doubtful whether similar knowledge of an event without physical mediation through the senses was possible if it was not known to another mind. It is a notable achievement of Professor Rhine's department that they have shown by an ingeniously devised experiment that such paranormal knowledge (clairvoyance) was also possible.

Rhine is no doubt right in seeing in such experiments a serious challenge to the materialist view of the mind as a mere function of the physical organism. A finding even more unexpected on the orthodox scientific view was that of direct mental action on physical objects (psychokinesis). This had been reported in very early days of psychical research (e.g., by Professor Crookes). Rhine, however, brought it from the region of occasional observation to that of laboratory demonstration by ordinary persons. This investigation gave results as clearly positive as those of the earlier work on "extra-sensory perception", and there seems no sound reason for doubting its validity.

It would, of course, be a mistake to overestimate the general and philosophical importance of these findings. They fall far short of providing evidence for the reality of the spiritual world or for the immortality of the human soul, but they do throw grave doubts on some of the grounds on which these doctrines have been rejected. Their importance lies in the fact that they open doors which Victorian science was closing.

This book is likely to arouse interest and discussion. It is to be recommended to those who want an up-to-date account of the matter. It is an accurate, sober, and cautious record of experimentally ascertained facts. We may be able to see the full implication of these facts more clearly in the future.

R. H. Thouless.

Old Diplomacy. The Reminiscences of Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, K.G. (J. Murray), 18s.

Lord Hardinge was a man of ability and charm, who held diplomatic posts nearly "all over the world" except in China and Japan. He was also Viceroy of India; his work there is not dealt with here, but in another volume. He also served for some years, before and after India, at the head of the Foreign Office, where he knew perhaps more than he could when abroad of what was going on everywhere else. So his memoirs cannot help being interesting and often picturesque. With a few small exceptions he is cautious enough to divulge less than we could have thought possible of any serious matters of history which will be new to well-informed readers. Nor is there, as his title seems to hint, any serious comparison between the independence of the old diplomatic service, and the new diplomacy at the end of a cable from Whitehall. The book is wonderfully complacent and *naïf*, to a degree that must irritate some readers. Lord Cromer, who

passed the book through the press, must have had a difficult task, and it would have been kinder to cut out, even against the author's wishes, some of the praise which he records of himself. When he says "I wrote" this or that speech for the King, he destroys an impression which is not a mere convention to the public here and to foreigners. And when he quotes so many "pats on the back" received from, say, a Secretary of State, we know well who draft such things for a S. of S. to sign (a very proper and decent custom). We except the intensely amusing quotation with which the book ends, Lord Curzon's official letter of farewell, obviously written by Lord Curzon himself, as that occasion demanded. Both men were ex-viceroys, but at the end Lord Hardinge was "under" Lord Curzon in the Foreign Office and sparks often flew from the contact of the two old friends, but here Lord Curzon recites in magniloquent phrases the chief successes of Lord Hardinge's career and quite plainly wrote exactly the letter he knew that the recipient would "swallow" with enjoyment.

What readers cannot help liking is that, until at any rate the last years, it is such a happy book. It is rare and refreshing to read of his early posts, at Constantinople, Teheran, St. Petersburg, etc., and of the ambassadors under whom he served, such as Lord Dufferin, nearly all of whom seemed to him the kindest and most stimulating of masters. And it is plain that they appreciated the attractive, enterprising young man who enjoyed hard work and sought responsibility. King Edward's insistence, likewise, on the Permanent Under-Secretary in later years accompanying him on his very important (and successful) tours to foreign courts and capitals instead of the Secretary of State, the usual minister in attendance, is easily explicable. Sir Edward Grey might have refused to allow it or been offended, but he knew his Hardinge well and trusted him to know the business and to be firm without giving offence wherever the King might not know details of our foreign policy.

There is little guidance here for the future. Balkan States, though partially united now by *force majeure*, are only temporary friends. Russia is in most ways the same as ever. Lord Hardinge was in St. Petersburg from 1898-1903 and from 1904-1906:

> "It was a perpetual struggle on the part of Great Britain to resist the aggressive and ambitious policy of Russia in Turkey, Persia, China and the East . . . Every opportunity was seized to create incidents with the Afghans . . . and by a complete disregard of all agreements made in the past. In the Near East of Europe the policy of Russia was to en-

deavour to dominate the Sultan of Turkey and to obtain a free exit to the Mediterranean through the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, while denying the same liberty of passage to the ships of all other Powers. In this they never succeeded owing to the astuteness of the Sultan Abdul Hamid."

When we come to 1919, Paris and the Peace Conference, Lord Hardinge tells us little that is new, but he writes almost fiercely of the ignorance shown in every direction by Mr. Lloyd George, and his impatience of expert Foreign Office advice which he tried to ignore with disastrous effects; President Wilson's inexperience of Europe was almost as disastrous. They were easily dominated by M. Venezelos, when he arrived, whom Lord Hardinge justly describes as "in many ways by far the cleverest man at the Peace Conference." We would have enjoyed more of the good stories of M. Clemenceau, but here is one. Lloyd George came back from Paris and mixed again in home politics and was inevitably "shot at" from every side and lost prestige. Clemenceau was more acute and quitted politics, and even France for a time; from India the witty old Tigre wrote, "*Je suis parmi les tigres, mais c'est moi qui porte le fusil.*" Elsewhere we are told a story of that stout democrat, John Burns, who, when a successor was being sought for Lord Cromer in Egypt, said "Appoint me, I will rule Egypt like a Pharaoh! You will not be disappointed."

Lord Hardinge evidently kept a diary and could consult all Foreign Office papers. So his record of events can be counted upon as correct, and his judgements at the time could be corrected if necessary. But his opinion of Lord Allenby is too harsh, and the facts seem to have been muddled on p. 256 where we read that in 1921 the French decided to occupy Dusseldorf and two other towns in Germany from the occupied Rhineland. They did (in 1920) in the absence of the British High Commissioner, who returned in haste and had every French soldier back in the Rhineland in three days. Then he reported what he had done (the old diplomacy!) Much later in the days of a weaker successor to Sir Harold Stuart the French proposed to cross the Rhine and occupy Duisburg and two other ports on the river. Lord Kilmarnock asked for instructions. In spite of Lord Curzon, Mr. Lloyd George ruled that the French must not be thwarted. So we wilfully cut away our ground for opposing later on M. Poincaré's invasion of the Ruhr Valley. That invasion caused the fall of the feeble Weimar government which might have thrived and kept Germany on an even keel. That fall gave Hitler his chance.

CASTOR.

CAROLINE NORTON. By ALICE ACLAND. (Constable.) 16s.

MEREDITH, like Henry James, was in the habit of using incidents from the lives of his friends and contemporaries as material for his novels. Thus in 1883 the picturesque career of Mrs. Norton furnished him with the plot of *Diana of the Crossways.* Caroline Norton had died in 1877 but Meredith had met her occasionally and was familiar with her story through a mutual friend, Lady Duff-Gordon. Although the situation of the book was thus borrowed, the characters soon had a very distinct life of their own, and it seems that Diana Warwick was never intended to be anything but a heroine in her own right: indeed Meredith rather cruelly remarked that having chosen Mrs. Norton as a model, he had to endow her with brains. Victorian society, not understanding this, expected a romance about a somewhat notorious beauty only recently dead, and eagerly read the book which enjoyed a larger popularity than any of the author's previous novels.

The friends and relations of Mrs. Norton were, however, much distressed. Their objection was not that the character was unsympathetically portrayed, but that fresh life was given to an old and unfounded piece of gossip—the story that Mrs. Norton, having heard, from Sydney Herbert, Peel's intention to repeal the Corn Laws, had sold the information to *The Times.* There was no truth in this old political scandal and through the intervention of Lord Dufferin, Meredith inserted a disclaimer in subsequent editions.

As in the eighties many people first became aware of Meredith through Caroline Norton, now the reverse is true so that Miss Acland in her biography has to rescue her subject from partial oblivion.

There can be no doubt that in the eyes of her contemporaries Caroline Norton was a personage, and a very fascinating woman. She had all the beauty and charm of the Sheridans (Richard Brinsley was her grandfather, her sisters were the two famous beauties who became Duchess of Somerset and Lady Dufferin respectively). She was the intimate friend of Sydney Herbert and Lord Melbourne; Abraham Haywood and Samuel Rogers found her a witty and pleasant conversationalist; Bulwer Lytton, Tom Moore, Disraeli, Trelawney, all admired her; Hartley Coleridge called her "the Byron of modern poetesses"; an unknown Frenchman declared she was "so spirituous and abandoned." Even those who disliked her had to admit she was an uncommon woman; Lady Holland sneered and Lady Eastlake

sniffed, but both had to recognize she was beautiful and gifted. The resentment of her husband sprang largely from the fact that he had once been so fascinated by her.

Charm of this sort a later age finds it particularly hard to recapture ; the fronds of sea-weed so delicate and graceful in a rock-pool look drab enough pressed between the leaves of an album, the living creature taken away from the luxurious setting, from the London drawing rooms and great country houses, seems often a little colourless in the pages of a biography. There are exceptions : Lady Waterford and Lady Canning, for instance, are still very much alive in the pious memorial volumes of Augustus Hare, due perhaps to the lavish use of letters and diaries which give the authentic sense of period. Caroline Norton does not " come over " in quite the same way, the examples of her wit given by her latest biographer are not impressive, though her undoubted shrewdness can be seen in a letter to Mary Shelley advising her how to write to Lord Melbourne : "As to petitioning, no one dislikes begging more than I do, especially when one begs for what seems mere justice ; but I have long observed that though people will resist claims (however just), they like to do favours."

Miss Acland does not altogether succeed in evoking the undoubted charm of her subject yet she gives her story with clarity and judgement. She has had access to hitherto unpublished material and to the privately printed Norton correspondence of 1836-41. The main event of Mrs. Norton's life was her disastrous marriage to the brother of Lord Grantley which coloured her whole life. She was never in love with him, but her sister had made a loveless marriage which had in the end turned out happily and Caroline believed hers would too. George Norton was very much in love, but in a few years this had turned to hatred. His wife cannot be acquitted of all blame, she was witty and sarcastic often at his expense ; she was, too, what Miss Acland calls " a mental flirt," she liked to shine in society and she must choose her own set. Then while the Nortons were by tradition Tory, Caroline was a Whig and belonged to the world of the great Whig houses of the Regency. Worst of all she made no effort to get on with her husband's family ; she laughed at them, slighted them, and won their undying enmity.

George Norton was not, however, a pleasant person, he was jealous and mean, he was brutal and not above using his wife's friendship with Melbourne to his own political and financial advantage. In 1836 the marriage had broken down and he was trying to get a divorce ; after some deliberation he brought an action for alienation of his wife's affections against the Prime

Minister, Lord Melbourne. He had two reasons for doing so, he hoped for substantial damages, and the whole affair had as its prime object the discrediting of the Government. The suit failed, Caroline's innocence was established, but the battle between the Sheridan and Norton factions had only begun. George Norton at first had all the advantages ; a married woman as the law then stood could not own property apart from her husband, he was able, therefore, to impound her possessions ; again, she had no right of access to her children, who in this squalid case were used as a bait in various financial hagglings. Mrs. Norton's persistent fight for her children had an important result, the law was changed. She used all her influence, and that of her relatives, to bring this about, she wrote to the papers and published pamphlets, and partly as a result the Custody of Infants Bill and the Bill to reform the marriage and divorce laws were approved by Parliament. The latter Bill is regarded as granting English women the first step towards legal status; Miss Acland notes that all the bishops and Gladstone voted against it, but their objections were not to the emancipation of women but to anything, as Keble said, " legalizing adultery." It is amusing, however, to reflect that much that improved the lot of married women was brought about not by a reforming feminist but by a society hostess.

Her misfortunes, however, coloured Caroline Norton's whole life. Her somewhat slender literary gifts had to be exploited to the full to bring in money, and her sentimental album verses caught the taste of the time, her novels are all about beautiful heroines suffering from their unhappy marriages. As an attractive woman separated from her husband her position in society was never very secure, and her friendship with Melbourne and later with Sydney Herbert had not helped her reputation. When at last George Norton died she married Sir William Stirling-Maxwell, but died shortly after her wedding. One piece of fortune was hers ; her story was an inspiration to Meredith and not to Ouida.

MICHAEL ETHERINGTON.

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CASSIODORUS

By L. J. MORISON

To those who are obsessed with admiration for that triumph of aggressiveness whereby the Roman Republic united the countries bordering on the Mediterranean into an Empire, and by the perfection attained by its language in the narrow period known as Classical, the picture of the fifth and sixth centuries may be saddening or even repulsive. Romulus marks the beginning of a chapter of development of an insignificant district into the mistress of Italy; Augustus, the period of expansion having passed, was content to consolidate and organize. The unhappy phantom of Romulus Augustulus marks the collapse of a degenerate and effete rule before the inroads of the vigorous and barbaric Goths. For the delineation of this period, depressing to those who identify glory with expansion but full of interest for those who find a philosophic pleasure in contemplating not only ascendancy but decadence, there is no writer on whom it is better worth while to spend a little time than Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus Senator. He was born in or about the year 480, four years after Odoacer had made himself master of Italy, and as he lived to the age of 95 he saw the succession of Gothic rulers, the campaigns of Belisarius and Narses, the sieges of Rome and even the invasion of Italy by the Lombards under Alboin. He came of a family of eastern origin, which for three generations had held high office, prominent indifferently under the transitory Emperors in the final sickness of the Western Empire and under the Gothic rulers who, whatever their defects, provided a stable government. His great-grandfather had defended Bruttii and

Sicily against the Vandals. His grandfather, a friend of Aetius, had gone on an embassy to Attila. His father was governor of Sicily and *corrector* of Bruttii and Lucania, became Praetorian Prefect, and on his retirement in 507 received the honour of the patriciate. The family had therefore established itself in a position of importance under the Gothic rulers, and since in the course of about 20 years out of ten Emperors six had been killed and the others forced to abdicate (two being consoled with bishoprics) it would have made a great demand on Roman patriotism not to have acquiesced in the *de facto* authority of Odoacer and Theodoric.

Cassiodorus profited by this distinguished official ancestry, and at an age of not much more than 23 was appointed by his father, the praetorian prefect, to the office of *consiliarius* in his court. A panegyric on Theodoric led to his elevation to the Quaestorship, where he had more important duties. It was his function to reply to petitions; to receive ambassadors and answer them verbally or in writing; and to give a final revision to the laws when they had been signed, to ensure their consistency with themselves and with other enactments: a most desirable process which unhappily cannot be adopted in a parliamentary system of legislation, as those who administer the law are daily reminded. This office he held until 512. Two years later he became Consul, and, probably on the termination of this office, received the dignity of patrician, an unusual achievement for a man not yet forty years old. After what appears to be a break of some years he is found in the high position of Master of the Offices, and finally, after the death of Theodoric, he was appointed Praetorian Prefect by Theodoric's daughter, the Queen Regent Amalasuentha.

To this period of civil service, extending to about forty years, are to be attributed the twelve books of *Variae*, a collection of official documents drafted by him; but, except those which he himself issued as Praetorian Prefect, signed by the Gothic rulers. The modern civil servant survives changes of government and is presumed to serve with equal loyalty whatever minister may be in power. Cassiodorus survived greater

and more violent changes. Theodoric's daughter outlived her miserable son Athalaric, and was murdered in 535 at the instigation of her cousin Theodabad, whom she had associated with herself as partner of the throne. In a short space he was deposed, and his successor Witigis ordered his execution. Changes in the government were then as violent and almost as frequent as in the case of the last years of the Western Emperors: but Cassiodorus remained in office, writing despatches in the name of each successive Goth, and announcing with undiminished eloquence and piety, in the name of Witigis, that the Goths by divine guidance had raised upon their shields, amid the blare of trumpets and within a fence of unsheathed swords, a warlike king. So the tenth book ends: the eleventh and twelfth comprise letters issued in his own name as Praetorian Prefect.

The extraordinary variety of subjects with which these documents deal is evidence of the extreme centralization of the government and of the watchful care with which it sought to control its local officials. Some of them are concerned with purely public matters, the relations with Justinian and Theodora at Constantinople, the equipment and passage of armies, the restoration of cities and aqueducts. But those dealing with the welfare of individuals are more illustrative of the paternal character of the government. Permission is given to the patrician Decius to drain the marsh of Decennonium, after two senators have marked out the limits, and have possession of the reclaimed land, with the proviso that if others join in the enterprise they are to share the benefit. A stone-worker with whose skill Theodoric is greatly pleased, is to be allowed the power of distributing the funereal *arcae* at Ravenna. Persons who have wrongfully seized property are commanded to restore it to its owners. A priest has been accused of violating graves in search of treasure. If the fact be proved, the gold is to be confiscated, though the offence "*pro sacerdotali honore*" is to remain unpunished, at any rate in this world. The erection of barriers in a navigable river for the catching of fish is prohibited, but nets are to be allowed: "let it suffice man's need

to seek dainties by the accustomed methods, and not by rustic artifice to impede the freedom of the river." Sentences of death are commuted: in one case to three months exile and a fine of three pounds of gold; in another to perpetual banishment to Volcano; the offence was the abduction of a young woman. The synagogue at Milan is to be protected from the violence of ecclesiastics, and in another case permission is given to the Jews to restore the roof, but without enlargement of the building; for *religionem imperare non possumus, quia nemo cogitur ut credat invitus.* Boethius is asked to choose a lyre-player for Clovis of France, in a letter which develops into an essay on music from the times of Orpheus and Amphion. This contains a fair specimen of the etymology of the age; the chord is so-called *quod facile corda movet.* A severe epistle is written to the Senate on the allegation that senators have evaded taxation, and payment is to be required. Money intended for the repair of buildings in Rome, which has been retained by officials, is to be recovered. Taxation is to be remitted to districts which suffer from poverty.

This is but a meagre selection, to illustrate the multiplicity of subjects with which the central government had to deal; one can but hope, but without great assurance, that abuses and corruption were checked. An English version of the substance of the letters may be found in Hodgkin's *Letters of Cassiodorus*; but Hodgkin has summarized them from the point of view of the historian, and the excision of what was in this sense irrelevant reduced their bulk to about one half of the original. It is, however, the excluded passages which are more important for a true picture of Cassiodorus himself. Roman education was based on rhetoric; and the style marks the zenith, or, some may say, the nadir of rhetorical writing. Trajan's replies to Pliny have the compact brevity of collects: to Cassiodorus brevity was evidently abhorrent. Every letter demands an elaborate introduction, setting forth a general principle, as it were the major premiss of a syllogism. An instruction that the execution of a legal decision must not be delayed begins: "It is not seemly that decided lawsuits should be dragged on intermin-

ably. For what peace will be given to the litigants if they do not acquiesce in lawful judgements? For among the storms of human life there is one harbour prepared, which if men in the fervour of their wilfulness pass by, they will be for ever wandering in the waves of conflict." An order that workers in marble should be sent from Rome to Ravenna has an exordium that it is seemly for a prince to raise magnificent buildings: "be it far from us to yield to the adornment of the ancients, for we are equally blessed with them in the prosperity of our times." An exhortation to the Duke of the Raetians begins: "It becomes you to exhibit in your conduct the honour which you have in name", and directs the return of certain slaves by the Breones, "men used to military duties are said to have oppressed the civil population with armed force." An injunction against the overworking of the public post-horses for private purposes begins with the somewhat obvious statement that what is exposed to continuous use must be refreshed with assiduous care. Commissioners are sent to Spain to repress extortion by tax-collectors and other abuses "for life is truly that of humanity when it is restrained by the ordinance of law: it is the usage of beasts to live under the rule of chance—*quae dum rapiendi ambitu feruntur improvisa temeritate succumbunt.*"

But it is not only in the preambles to the letters that we find this richness of verbosity. An occupier of land is bidden to root up wild vegetation which is choking a watercourse: for shrubs may become trees, and what can now easily be uprooted will later on hardly yield to the stroke of the axe. If this be done the baths will have a seemly appearance: there will be water that will cleanse and not defile: *ad potandum unda suavis influxerit*; no food can be pleasant for human sustenance in the absence of the clearness of sweet water. An order from a modern sanitary authority would certainly not be enriched by these literary graces. Official jargon is apt to be clumsy, debased and even obscure, but it does not suffer from an excess of ornamentation.

It is to these expansions, which may be harshly called

irrelevancies, that the letters owe their curious charm. By not keeping to the point Cassiodorus has embodied not only a vast amount of general information on the condition of his period, but a picture of the mind of a cultivated gentleman, pedantic, artificial and pompous but withal attractive and entertaining. One feature that manifests itself is his great interest in the habits of animals and birds. An order for an audit of the money assigned to the beautification of Rome's public buildings, where there was evidently suspicion of embezzlement, encourages patriotism by this analogy: "The very birds which roam through the air love their nests: wandering beasts hasten to their lairs in the thickets; *voluptuosi pisces* [for an adequate English version here seems to be unattainable] *campos liquidos transeuntes cavernas suas studiosa indagatione requirunt.* What, then, should we say of Rome, which even more deserves the love of her children ?"

A release from exile of a man who has killed his wife's paramour is justified on the ground that in wild beasts there is implanted the instinct to defend their females. We see the bull guarding his cow *cornuali concertatione*: rams grow savage even to the death on behalf of their ewes: horses vindicate *colaphis* (a curious use of the word) *et morsibus* the mares belonging to them. Thus do creatures which are not affected by a sense of *verecundia* lay down their lives for those of their consorts. An order for the restoration of some brazen elephant on the Via Sacra is illustrated by a disquisition on the nature of the animal: it lives for over a thousand years: it has no joints in its feet, and so cannot rise unaided: for all its bulk it is inferior to the tiny ant: but as it exceeds all quadrupeds in intelligence it does not hesitate to adore him whom it understands to be the Ruler of all; and will pay to a good prince a reverence which it refuses to a tyrant.

There is no English translation of the *Variae;* Hodgkin, in his *Letters of Cassiodorus* prunes them vigorously, leaving out most of the preambles and shortening the illustrations. As an historian he preserves what is necessary for the historical student. But it is doubtful whether any English, even that of Dr. Johnson or Sir Thomas Browne, could do justice to the

polysyllabic rotundity of Cassiodorus. An American scholar, Sister Mary Josephine Suelzer, has analysed his *clausulae*: a fair example is that at the end of an announcement of the appointment to the office of Count of the Sacred Largesses; "*Aestimate, reverendissimi patres, quid de vestro ordine censeremus; quando eos, quos vobis aggregandos credimus, multiplici allegatione praedicamus.*"

With a naive self-satisfaction, strange and even shocking to modern habits of thought, but not without parallel in Cicero and even in Horace, Cassiodorus includes in his collection compositions addressed to or dealing with himself. The document which, under the signature of Athalaric, promoted him to the office of Praetorian Prefect is a perfect masterpiece of laudatory rhetoric; his youthful learning, his eloquence, his integrity, the charms of his erudite conversation are described with no sparing use of superlatives: and amid these clouds of eloquence is the blunt reflexion on official morality that when the hand is closed justice is not often open. The companion piece, announcing the appointment to the Senate is a similar laudation of Cassiodorus' career, and especial reference is made to his lost work, the Gothic History, which survives only in the version of Jornandes. By following the prevalent mistake of identifying the Goths with the Getae, Cassiodorus drew a satisfactory picture of the antiquity of the nation which was then in control of Italy, and in particular traced the descent of the Amali for seventeen generations. To what extent Jornandes compressed the verbosity of Cassiodorus we cannot say. He set out as he says, by request, to catch little fishes from the ponds of his predecessors and reduce the twelve books of Cassiodorus into one short one, conscious that he had but a poor supply of breath for so magnificent a trumpet. One may be a little incredulous of his statement that after a three-days' loan of Cassiodorus' work he remembered the substance, though not the words. But, in the regrettable absence of the original, Jornandes' version is invaluable.

The Commentary on the Psalms marks the beginning of a new chapter in the life of Cassiodorus. At the age of about 60

he was released from the duties of public service, fortunate in the occasion of his retirement. For the ensuing years were years of turbulence, when Italy suffered untold horrors in the struggle between the Goths and the imperial forces which professed to be liberating her. Amid this turmoil he was living apparently in quietude in his native province of Bruttii. The Commentary shows the direction of his interests. It is of great dimensions, but has little originality; he confesses that he studied to "direct the ocean of Augustine's exposition into shallow rivulets." Messianic interpretation is pressed to its extreme; and in the Psalter are discovered not only refutations of every heresy, but examples of every rhetorical figure to which the Grammarians had given a name. Numbers have a mystic meaning; a Psalm with twelve verses symbolizes the twelve apostles; Psalm XXV (XXVI in the Prayer-book) represents the square of Solomon's porches. The first seventy psalms represent the sacred number seven: the remaining eighty commemorate the Resurrection on the eighth day. To modern readers it seems to be a monument of misguided ingenuity, but it is interesting as a picture of the thought of the age.

A short discourse, theologico-philosophical, on the soul is to be attributed to about the same period; and this work marks the transition of Cassiodorus to a religious life. He proceeded to found, at his birthplace, Scyllacium, a double monastery, one branch for coenobites and the other for the souls more sublimely purified who choose the anchorite's life. The charms of the situation had been described at length in the *Variae*, in a direction to the Cancellarius of Lucania and Bruttii that the inhabitants should be spared from undue burden and in particular that visiting officials should be restricted to three days' free rations. The City, said to have been founded by Ulysses, lay on the eastern shore of Bruttii, looking at the rising sun, and hanging upon the hills like a cluster of grapes, the very fatherland of the sun; life is without sorrow since there is no fear of inclement seasons. (Virgil's *navifragum Scylacaeum* seems to have been forgotten.) It enjoyed a profusion of the delicacies of the sea, for Cassiodorus had constructed salt-water fishponds

to receive into the excavations of the bowels of the rock the waves of Nereus' flood, where a troop of fishes played in free captivity. They run greedily to the hand of man, and before they become his food seek morsels from him. There were plentiful vineyards, threshing-floors of rich produce, an aspect of flourishing olives; and to these attractions baths for the sick were added where there was a supply of limpid water.

In this desirable spot Cassiodorus planted his double monastery. Whether he became formally a monk himself is disputed. A succession of writers call him without hesitation "monachus" and even "abbas" but they merely follow the earliest: Bede styles him merely a "Doctor of the Church", and the word *conversio,* which Cassiodorus used of himself, though often equivalent to becoming a monk, may perhaps indicate merely a transfer of interest from secular affairs to religion. There is no conclusive evidence on either side, and we are left to balance probabilities. But at any rate Cassiodorus, whether he was monk and even abbot or merely founder, has left an elaborate guide for those whom he calls "*monachi mei*", in his two-fold work, the Institution of Divine Letters, and the Arts and Disciplines of Liberal Letters. Here the English reader is not confronted with such difficulties as meet him in procuring the other works of Cassiodorus, for he can avail himself not only of the critical edition of Professor Mynors (Oxford, 1937) but also of a translation by Mr. L. W. Jones, recently published by the Columbia University Press of New York,[1] a valuable work which should do much to encourage interest in Cassiodorus.

There has been much discussion on the question whether the Benedictine rule was adopted in these monasteries. The seventeenth-century editor, Garet, himself a Benedictine, argues in the affirmative against Cardinal Baronius, and has been

[1] *An Introduction to Divine and Human Readings* by Cassiodorus Senator; translated with introduction and notes by L. W. Jones: Columbia University Press: G. Cumberlege, Oxford University Press.

followed in modern times by Dom Chapman in *Saint Benedict and the Sixth Century*. The question is again one where we have no conclusive evidence, and can only weigh probabilities. Hodgkin went so far as to say that St. Benedict, or at any rate his immediate successors, were Cassiodorians. Cassiodorus makes no reference to St. Benedict, and although parallels may be found between his rule and the instructions of Cassiodorus, it is at least possible that both adopted or adapted practices already general; for St. Benedict was not the inventor of monasticism, and Cassiodorus certainly was influenced by Cassian, who lived more than a hundred years before him, and the careful study of whom he recommends, but with a warning against his semi-Pelagian tendency. The Institutions are not a formal rule designed to regulate the daily routine of the monastery; they are a guide to the monks in the use of the extensive library that was provided for them. Nine codices contained the Holy Scriptures, apparently with annotations, and there was a comprehensive collection of the Latin fathers. A general knowledge of Greek was not assumed; but Cassiodorus procured through his friends Dionysius, Exiguus, Epiphanius Scholasticus, Bellator, and others, translations of many Greek authors; the Stromata of Clement of Alexandria, the Antiquities of Josephus, and a combination, in the "Tripartite History", of Eusebius, Socrates and Theodoret. Of Origen he was a little dubious, but he included copies of his works, at any rate of those of which there were Latin translations; but he gives a warning (as he does with Clement), that they must be read with caution, so that, with the *succos saluberrimos*, we may not at the same time absorb the poison of his perfidy; dangerous passages were marked *ἄχρηστον*.

But Cassiodorus expected his monks not only to study but to transcribe manuscripts. He provided for their night-watches self-filling lamps which should long maintain *uberrimi luminis abundantissimam claritatem* besides a sundial and a water-clock, so that the soldiers of Christ might be warned by the most definite signs to the pursuit of their divine work, as it were by the blare of trumpets.

In contrast to Cassian and to Gregory the Great, Cassiodorus was deeply impressed with the importance of general learning. He shows, indeed, no great interest in secular authors, and apart from occasional quotations from Virgil manifests little acquaintance with them. But for the proper transcription of manuscripts the liberal arts must be studied. On correct spelling he lays great emphasis; but great caution is to be shown in applying the rules of secular grammar to the Scriptures. At times it is expedient to ignore the formulas of human speech and to preserve the standard of the divine utterance. Learning, in short, is to be the handmaid of religion.

The first part of the treatise contains thirty-three chapters, symbolical of the age of our Lord; the second part, on the Arts and Disciplines of Liberal Letters, is limited to seven, the number of the days of the week. Much of the matter is lifted from earlier writers, and was in turn by successors of Cassiodorus, especially Isidore and Rabanus Maurus. It supplies an interesting picture of the seven liberal arts. It is a compendium of the erudition of the age, synthetized as a propaedeutic to the vision of God. For Cassiodorus learning was an integrated whole, and the distinction between religious and secular was transcended. Hereafter, as he wrote in his treatise on the soul, the *quadrivium* will be fully known to us; number (*quantus est numerus*), the discrimination of lines, the theory of music, the motions of the stars will be clearly seen; supernal truth will be apprehended by vision.

Of the remainder of Cassiodorus' life, prolonged to the age of 95, we have no definite information. The effective rule of the Gothic monarchy had come to an end, and the attempts of Justinian to restore Italy to a part of the empire reduced the unhappy country to a state of warfare and bloodshed; Rome, alternately besieged by the Imperial troops and by the Goths, was reduced to misery and ruin. The creation of an united nation of Goths and Italians, the ideal of Theodoric, collapsed under his less efficient successors, and a new wave of invasion was threatening. Cassiodorus vanishes from the political scene. Presumably he contrived in the remoteness of Bruttii to enjoy

a tranquil old age. When he was 93 he wrote in response to the clamour of his monks—*mei monachi,* a phrase which suggests that whether he was titular head of the monasteries or not, he had not contented himself with the achievement of founding them, but maintained a lively and watchful interest to the end of his life—a treatise on Orthography, expanding largely his chapter in the Institutions.

How long the monasteries survived after his death is unknown: so too is the fate of his library. Scholars have made the most of such fragments of evidence as survive, and it is fairly well established that it is represented by the *Codex Amiatinus,* once in the possession of Bede, and now in the Laurentian Library. As for Cassiodorus himself, it is comforting to suppose that before the new convulsions in Italy he found in his old age a safe lodging and peace at the last.

A REINTERPRETATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION

By PAUL TILLICH

I

THE doctrine of the Incarnation concerns an event which *has* happened, and is independent of any interpretation of it. The doctrine presupposes the event and tries to interpret it. The event is the prius of the interpretation, just as nature is the prius of natural science. This excludes the view that the idea of the Incarnation is a product of our religious experience, or of a present interpretation of our existence, something that could be discovered by a thorough analysis of our human situation or of the structure of our world. Neither is Incarnation a universal concept, a truth of reason as the Enlightenment understood it, nor is it an idea describing essential human nature as classical German philosophy interpreted it. On the one hand, it is an event with all the characteristics of an "event in time and space": namely, occurring "but once", unrepeatable, possible only in a special situation and in a special, incomparable, individual form, a subject of report and not of analysis or deduction.

On the other hand, the Incarnation is an event of universal significance, concerning the whole of being, and transforming the conditions of existence generally. Therefore it must be interpreted in universal categories. Without such an interpretation it would be a stumbling-block, strange to our mind and alien to our spirit, and therefore without actual concern for us.

Perhaps it would be a combination of words with a numinous sound, to be used in liturgies together with music, lights and incense; but not something entering the centre of consciousness, uniting with it and creating a basis for thinking and acting. In many cases the praise of the "simple" Christian message, in contrast to a theological interpretation, proves to be only the praise of an outworn and popularized form of theological interpretation of fifty years ago. Theology should not be intimidated by this kind of attack upon its strict and difficult systematic task. It should remember, however, that theological interpretation does not create its subject but must be created by it.

There can be no doubt that the doctrine of the Incarnation needs a reinterpretation. I must confess that, in America, I have realized for the first time the importance of the concept of Incarnation, especially for the theology and liturgy of the Protestant Episcopal Church. But in spite of the religious and theological emphasis laid upon it, I find it difficult to find a clear and thorough interpretation of its meaning.

I became increasingly suspicious, on the other hand, that many people employed the concept of Incarnation in a mythological and superstitious manner: it implies for them the transmutation or metamorphosis of *a* divine being into *a* human being, a polytheistic myth which we find in all paganism, and incompatible with the fundamental truth of prophetic revelation. The God who creates, sustains and transcends all beings, is not himself *a* being, not even the highest. He cannot become the subject of a transmutation or a metamorphosis, and he does not possess the logical structure of a thing with qualities which could be transformed. The mythology of divine transmutation usually has a feeling for this, and establishes something above the different forms in which the divine beings exist; it establishes a really divine, above those human and divine beings which are transformed into each other. The gods who are transmuted are below something absolute, the eternal fate or the eternal one or the eternal Brahma. It follows from this that the transmuted gods have only a relative divinity, that they are half-gods, heroes or demons, as was the logos-god of Arius.

When the Christian Church rejected Arianism, it rejected at the same time the conception of the Incarnation as the transmutation of *a* divine being into *a* human being.

But, we may ask, are there not indications that the biblical writers, Paul and John, describe the significance of the historical Jesus in terms of a semi-mythological character? I believe that this cannot be denied. The pre-existent spiritual being (in Phil. ii, 5-11) who resigns his divine form and power, and takes the form of a servant, and is raised by God on high to receive a name which is above every name—this being who makes a moral decision in his pre-existent state—is certainly not God himself, but a divine being. The decision "not to snatch at equality with God but to empty himself" occurs in a supra-historical, mythological sphere; and the same is true of his elevation to the dignity of "Lord." The distinction of the three stages is mythical, using the three modes of time for the destiny of a divine being. Again, in John we read that the "Logos was with God." His function was the mediation of creation. He then entered the world which existed through him, but which did not recognize him and receive him when he came. Here the mythological element is reduced to a great extent by the categories Logos, Life and Light, symbolizing the divine self-expression through creation and within the created world; but it has not disappeared entirely. The "Logos became flesh, and tabernacled among us." The divine being, who like God is spiritual, becomes flesh, but without ceasing to be the Logos: being in the flesh is merely a transitory stage, as it were dwelling in a tent. "I came out from the Father, and am come into the world: again, I leave the world, and go unto the Father" (John xvi, 28). Here, obviously, the idea of manifestation is decisive, and not that of transformation: "the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him" (John i, 18).

The divine being of which John speaks is a divine principle in which the mythological implications of pre-existence have been overcome to such an extent that the later Logos doctrine could develop from it. It represents a definite

step beyond Paul. But in Paul himself there is an element of particular importance for my own task of reinterpreting the doctrine of the Incarnation. If it is true, as Dibelius and others maintain, that the old idea of the Original Man or Man from Above lies in the background of the christological hymn in Philippians ii, this would have a direct bearing on the doctrine of the Incarnation. But however cautiously we may judge about the idea of the Original Man in Judaism, and its influence on the idea of the "Son of Man coming on the clouds of heaven with power and great glory", and the fusion of this with the Messianic idea, we cannot overlook such Pauline passages as I Corinthians xv in which he writes: "The first man Adam became a living soul. The last Adam became a life-giving spirit. Howbeit that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; then that which is spiritual. The first man is of the earth, earthy: the second man is of heaven. As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy: and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly. As we have born the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly" (vs. 45-49). Here the stages are as follows: There is first the heavenly man who before his coming is spiritual and immortal; then the physical man, Adam, who is subject to death and brought death into the world, is followed by the heavenly man who overcomes death. The emphasis which Paul lays on the sequence of these stages in a polemic form indicates that he struggles for the historical manifestation of the Man from above after Adam's fall, an idea which did not exist and could not exist in the pagan form of the myth of the "Original Man."

It follows from this that the biblical interpretation of the Incarnation does not imply that God as such becomes man, but that a divine being, either the heavenly man, or the preexistent Christ, or the divine Logos, appears in the shape of a physical man or of a man in the flesh. The statement is not that God becomes man, but that a divine being with human characteristics, the spiritual or heavenly man, or a moral being who chooses self-humiliation, or the creative reason and word, appears

in time and space, and is subject to the law of the flesh and of sin, namely, human existence. The paradox of the Incarnation is not that God becomes man, but that a divine being who represents God and is able to reveal him in his fullness, manifests himself in a form of existence which is in radical contradiction to his divine, spiritual and heavenly form. It is not the unity of the infinite and the finite which constitutes the paradox of the Incarnation, but the manifestation of the original, heavenly man as existential man, or of the universal creative reason as individual created reason, or of the spiritual pre-existent Christ as the empirical and historical Christ. The mythological element in the biblical doctrine of the Incarnation enabled it to be understood as the self-manifestation of God in existence through a divine half-being, half-principle which belongs to God and nevertheless shows some essentially human characteristics. The subject of the Incarnation is the original God-manhood, or the spiritual God-man, or the heavenly man, or the creative reason in which man as the image of God participates and which, therefore, is able to enlighten him. There is, in a "mythological" sense, an original "pre-existent" relation between God and man. Finiteness and infinity are, however, correlated concepts: their unity is not paradoxical but, if I may use the abused term, dialectical, the one side necessarily driving towards the other in mutual interdependence. There is no idea of God in which this correlation is not implied. It appears usually as the tension between an anthropomorphic and an unconditioned element in the idea of God, in which he is conceived as the highest being, symbolized in semi-human characteristics, and at the same time as above any picture of being, even above the Highest of being and value. All such conceptions are dialectical but not paradoxical, and belong to every notion of the living God. But the idea of the Incarnation has another character. It is not dialectical. It is not demanded as the immanent side of a tension with the divine transcendence. It was the mistake of Hegel and the German classical philosophy to confuse the dialectical relation of finiteness and infinity with the paradoxical doctrine of the Incarnation. In the first

case, with respect to the conception of God, they were right, while Barth and his followers are wrong in denying the dialectical interdependence of finiteness and infinity. But in the second case, with respect to the Incarnation, the Barthians are right in stressing its paradoxical character, while German classical philosophy and its theological followers are wrong.

The insight that the paradox of the Incarnation must be distinguished from the dialectical relation of finiteness and infinity liberates Christology from the impasse into which it was thrown by the doctrine of the two natures in Christ, the divine and the human. The necessity of explaining the full humanity of Christ in terms of Kenosis, as Christ emptying himself of the infinite divine power which he possesses potentially, or as Christ hiding this power which he possesses actually, is a Christology of absurdities and shows that the very starting-point was wrong. It was falsified in the moment in which the mythological element in the biblical praise of Christ's transcendent origin was eliminated for the sake of a more rational interpretation in terms of the Logos doctrine. It was, on the other hand, impossible to avoid this attempt because the mythological elements proved to be dangerous when they were received on originally pagan soil, and the monotheistic safeguards of the Old Testament became ineffective.

The prologue of the Fourth Gospel is the first step towards such a rationalization in the attempt to defend the absolute character of Christ against pagan estimates of his relative significance. In later development, the more the *homoousios* of God and Christ was emphasized (necessarily, against the hero-cult of Arianism) the more the problem of the paradox of the Incarnation became confused with the problem of the dialectical relation of finiteness and infinity. In this, classical Greek theology foreshadowed classical German philosophy. They were both unable to understand that the Incarnation is the paradox of essential Godmanhood, manifesting itself within and under the conditions of human existence which contradicts original Godmanhood. It is probable that both forms of "classicism" were unable to see the problem in this way because of the

distance between essence and existence (between what man is in his essential, spiritual and heavenly nature and what he is in his existential, material and earthly nature) was not realized as the main problem of theology in general and of Christology in particular. Instead of this, the metaphysical problem of the relation between the finite and the infinite predominated in the doctrine of the Incarnation against the soteriological problem of essential Godmanhood appearing in existence. Athanasius is an exception, however, but he pays the price of a very unsatisfactory solution from the point of view of metaphysics.

These biblical and historical considerations suggest the possibility of a new starting-point which is free from the inescapable absurdities of the attempt to explain the Incarnation in terms of a higher chemistry between finiteness and infinity, and at the same time free from the mistake of Hegelianism which empties the paradox of the Incarnation by reducing it to a dialectical necessity.

II

The Incarnation is the manifestation of original and essential Godmanhood within and under the conditions of existence. In making this statement, may I emphasize once more that it is in line with biblical thought, while the proposition that God became man, or became flesh, is definitely not biblical. The transcendent Son of Man, the heavenly man, the spiritual man, the Logos became an immanent Son of Man, an earthly man, an historical man, flesh.

We must begin from this point, and translate the mythological, liturgical and numinous form of these statements into a rational and theological form.

In order to do this, it is necessary to deal with some of the concepts used in the general proposition. The first of these concepts is that of *existence* or *existential being,* and I propose to use the definitions which I have formulated in a course of lectures on *Existence and the Christ,* and which run as follows:

"First, existence means being, in distinction from non-being; secondly, existence means being in time and space, in distinction from essential being. Thirdly, there is the indication of an antagonism between existence and essence, and the fact of this antagonism is the problem implied in existence." In certain contemporary philosophical developments, especially under the influence of Sören Kierkegaard, the term existence has received a special colour. It implies more than the statement that something belongs to the context of the conditions of time, space, causality and the categories of finiteness. It means that no description of our essential being can grasp our real situation which is characterized precisely by the fact that it contradicts our essential being. The attempt of idealism in Germany, as well as of positivism in England and France, to give a picture of being in terms of essential necessity, misses the point of existentialism: namely, the power of being, and especially the power of human being, to break through the limitations of its essential character. Idealism has given a picture of man in which human existence, and existence in general, are the necessary realization of what man and his world are essentially: the difference is one of development and not of quality. Positivism has given a picture of man in which human existence, and existence in general, are what they are of necessity, without any distance from an essential character of man and of his world. Positivism does not acknowledge any difference between essential and existential being, not even in the restrained form adopted by idealism. Thus positivism has no criterion for actual human existence, while idealism has such a criterion in the concept of man's essential nature. But it does not perceive the depth of the contrast between essence and existence. Christianity, on the other hand, has a complete concept of man's essential nature, as well as of his existence and of the radical contrast between them. This is the reason why it is impossible to develop the doctrine of the Incarnation, and with it the Christian doctrines in general, either in idealistic or in positivistic terms, or in terms of the innumerable combinations between them. No doctrine of the Incarnation is possible without a clear

understanding of man's freedom to contradict his essential nature, and of man's fate to stand under the servitude of this contradiction. But on the basis of such an understanding, and with the help of the philosophical categories derived from it, a new interpretation of the doctrine of the Incarnation can be formulated. The Incarnation is the manifestation of essential Godmanhood within existence, and under the conditions of existence, in which it does not lose its essential character. The description of this paradox and its consequences for the transformation of existence is the task of the doctrine of the Incarnation.

It must start with an explanation of essential being in terms of essential Godmanhood. Such an explanation can be given only in a fragmentary and negative manner, because we do not know what man and his world are originally and essentially. We have no complete picture of such a world, but only partial insights, commands and judgements, which stand over against our existential situation. Conscience bears witness to another order of things, and our longing for a state beyond the tragedy of existence creates a past or future paradise, a retrospective or prospective Utopia. We know that the disrupted and antagonistic elements of existence belong essentially to a unity, a unity between the self and the world, including even the strange and remote sections of our world, such as the inorganic realm. It is a unity, moreover, of our separated and lonely individuality with the universality and community to which we belong: a unity, above all, of our finiteness with our infinity, of our transitoriness with our eternity, of our contingency with our creativity, of our melancholy with our courage, of our situation at the periphery like all beings with our situation at the centre above all beings. We know that this unity is what we are essentially. We know that even in the existential destruction of this unity, its remaining power maintains existence. We know this because it appears to us as law and command, as judgement and threat, and as promise and expectation. But it never appears as being, as New Being overcoming the contrast between essential and existential being, overcoming law and

threat and mere expectation, except in the Incarnation: more precisely, the Incarnation is its manifestation as New Being over against essence and existence.

It is New Being over against essence, because it has actual reality; it is a fact, while essential being as such is merely potential and not actual. The description of the gap beween essence and existence must not suggest that essential man or essential being has existed at sometime in the past or somewhere in the world, since it is potential and not actual. In the moment in which it becomes actual, which is not a moment in time, the existential situation is given. The transition from essence to existence, in whatever mythical terms it may be symbolized, is the transition from potentiality to actuality. The Fall of man, in Christian and non-Christian mythology, is the presupposition of existence: there is no existence before existence, and no actual reality before the Fall. We must not confuse the temporal symbols of the myth with the ontological relation of essence and existence. Our empirical world is the only existing world; but it is precisely this empirical existing world which includes within itself the strange contradiction between what it is actually and what it is essentially. The empirical, existing world has a tragic character because its very existence implies the contradictions by which it is driven to self-destruction and death. But tragic necessity is the opposite of natural necessity. It is connected with guilt, and consequently with freedom. Without freedom there can be no possible distinction between essential and existential being; and neither idealism nor positivism are able to explain the mysterious combination of freedom and necessity in the tragic character of existence. It is only the distinction between essence and existence which enables us to do this, and this alone would justify the use of these categories in theology.

The New Being created by the Incarnation is above essential being because it is actual and not merely potential; and at the same time, it is above existential being because it brings essential being or essential Godmanhood into existence.

The identification of essential being with essential God-

manhood requires some further explanation. To essential man belongs the unity of his finiteness with his infinity, and it is precisely this unity which I call Godmanhood, because it is an expression of the dialectical interdependence of finiteness and infinity. Man is the only being who possesses a genuine finiteness because he is the only being who possesses a potential infinity; for finiteness has meaning only in correlation with infinity, and *vice versa*. This does not imply, however, any combination between finiteness and infinity, since dialectical interdependence is precisely the opposite of combination. Barth is correct in stressing the statement that God is in heaven and that we are on earth, that God is the creator and that we are creatures; but he is at fault in simply putting these two statements beside one another, without inquiring into the dialectical relation between them. The thought of Barth is not dialectical in the proper sense, and he shares this defect with the liberal theology which he attacks. If, however, dialectical terms are not employed in describing the relation between God, man and the world, the way is open to the error of Barthian supernaturalism or liberal naturalism. On the other hand, it must be understood that heaven is heaven only in relation to earth, and that the creator is creator only in relation to the creature. Thus God cannot be conceived as the creator in any accidental sense, since divinity and creativity cannot be separated. If this is understood, the biblical idea of the eternal Son of Man, of the heavenly man, of the spiritual Christ, of the eternal word or reason, and our equation between essential being and essential Godmanhood, loses its surprising character. It simply indicates that divine self-objectification and essential manhood belong together, because man is essentially the divine image, and anthropomorphism contains an indestructible element of truth.

It follows that essential Godmanhood can manifest itself within existence only in a human being and as a personal life. The question raised by the scholastics whether or not the Incarnation could have taken place in any other being besides man is strictly irrelevant. Essential Godmanhood can become

manifest only in an existential man, and not in a half-god or in an animal. This is the humanistic element in the doctrine of the Incarnation. It is essential humanity, and therefore essential Godmanhood which appears as New Being, above essence and existence. A false Christology, which does not take account of the idea of essential Godmanhood, necessarily leads to a barbaric and de-humanized form of Christianity, which issues in fanaticism and conceives the God of the Incarnation as an arbitrary tyrant.

The New Being, created by the Incarnation, is above existential being, because it overcomes the cleavage between finiteness and infinity which characterizes existence, along with the other disruptions of the unity of man's essential being. The victory of the New Being over existence within, and under the structural forms of existence, is the paradox of the Incarnation. I must now indicate its real significance and characteristics in the light of these general considerations.

III

The Christian message declares that Jesus is the Christ, and as such is the place in which essential being has manifested itself in existence in the Incarnation. Essential Godmanhood has become historical Godmanhood in the man Jesus who is believed to be the Christ. The paradox of the Incarnation is the picture of Jesus as the Christ, the picture of essential Godmanhood appearing in existence and under its conditions, but without losing its essential character, and thus creating a new reality in existence which has the power to transform it.

The New Being, manifest in the picture of Jesus as the Christ, represents the essential unity between finiteness and infinity, or the undisrupted unity between man and God. It represents the essential unity between individuality and universality, or the undestroyed community of love and knowledge. It represents the essential unity between contingency and creativity, or the unhampered transition from anxiety to courage and from mortality to eternity. All this is embodied and represented in the picture of Jesus as the Christ.

It is not wise to attempt to express the character of the New Being in Christ in negative and static terms such as "lack of sin" or "lack of error." The real content of the picture is the actual maintenance of unity in all the aspects mentioned above. There is no element of despair or separation in the picture, no suggestion of the revolt of the finite against its unity with the infinite, which is the fundamental characteristic of existence, no element of concupiscence in the form of a will to power or a will to pleasure which would separate him from the unity with his world and with himself, splitting his individuality from his universality. The subordination of the finite to the infinite, and the desire to the love, is maintained in every respect.

This is the picture of the New Being which is given to us, and there is no point in attempting to go beyond it, and to ask for a photographic picture in addition to the religious picture, in the interests of theological inquiry. The photographic picture has never existed, either for Jesus himself or for his apostles. The original picture, which existed from the beginning, was of a numinous and interpreted character, and it was this which proved to have the power to conquer existence. Whatever scientific research may try, and must try to discover, the New Being incarnated in Jesus Christ manifests itself in the religious picture which was at all times the basis of the Christian message. The Incarnation is the manifestation of essential Godmanhood in the picture of Jesus as the Christ. The Incarnation is an historical event, and occurs only once in time and space. The photographic implications of the event are, from the beginning, reduced to unimportance by its interpretation as the appearance of the Christ or as the Incarnation. The event is unknown in any photographic sense, but the religious picture resulting from it has proved to be the power of transforming existence. This is our primary requirement; and in saying this, I may express the hope that one false view is excluded by everything I have tried to say: namely, the mistake of supposing that the picture of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ is the creation of existential thought or experience. If

this were the case, it would be as distorted, tragic and sinful as existence is itself, and would not be able to overcome existence. The religious picture of the New Being in Jesus is a result of a new being: it represents the victory over existence which has taken place, and thus created the picture.

There remains something to be said about the concept of the New Being in contrast to essential and existential being, since it has a number of important functions in the doctrine of the Incarnation. In the first place, it offers a new approach to the interpretation of Jesus as the Christ, since it implies that Jesus is the Christ in the totality of his being, and not merely in particular expressions of it. Neither his words as such, nor his internal and external actions as such, nor his sufferings as such, make him the Christ, but the New Being of which they are the expressions. His words alone would qualify him as prophet or teacher, his deeds alone would qualify him as saint or moral example, his sufferings alone would qualify him as martyr or religious genius; but in all these ways of interpreting him he is not understood as the New Being or as the Christ. Secondly, the term New Being indicates the reality of the transformation of existence. It has realistic implications which overcome the idea that Christ is a new law, a more refined command or a new interpretation of life, which leaves life unchanged. The New Being is a reality which neither a true philosophical theory nor an authentic religious experience can create. It is an event, although it would not be an event if there were no people who could have received it as such. Therefore the term New Being excludes idealistic as well as subjectivistic elements which have distorted the doctrine of the Incarnation in one way or the other. Thirdly, the term New Being indicates the reality of the Incarnation from the point of view of those who participate in it above the contrast between essence and existence. This refers to individual life as well as to history, since being in Christ means being a new creature, and being a Christian involves participation in the New Being who has appeared in history. This participation is possible only by receiving the New Being, and not by trying to

produce it, because any attempt to produce it accentuates the contradictory and tragic elements of existence. The term New Being is therefore of particular importance for the interpretation of the Church as the realm in which existence is overcome before any religious activity begins. It is not religious activity which creates the Church, since such activity strengthens the power of existence and consequently prevents the coming of the Church if it is done with the purpose of creating the Church. The Church is the historical embodiment of the New Being created by the Incarnation. The very term New Being therefore excludes any doctrine of the Church which conceives it to be brought into existence by religious decisions. The New Being is the prius of the Church just as it is the prius of Christian experience.

Fourthly, the term New Being has an eschatological implication. The Incarnation is an eschatological event in the sense of an event in which history has received its meaning, and therefore, in principle, its end. Thus the New Being which overcomes both essential and existential being might be called teleological or eschatological being in which fulfilment is given in principle because it is orientated towards the end. If the Incarnation is the appearance of the New Being it constitutes the centre of history, and therefore includes both its meaning and its consummation. What we are essentially has appeared in existence, thereby overcoming existence and creating the New Reality, which is not merely *something* new within existence, but *the* New overcoming existence as a whole. This eschatological aspect of the Incarnation, which is expressed in the term New Being, is correlated with the concept of the beginning of history. The New Being appears first as command and expectation, when the question about it is asked, when man understands his existential situation in which the contradiction and tragedy are manifest as the longing for salvation from it. But this appearance as command and promise is merely of a preparatory character and not the actual salvation itself. The saving appearance is the Incarnation, and nothing before and nothing after it, since the New Being is or is not.

This brings my interpretation to a close. Many problems have not been touched upon. This is the tragic fate of the systematic theologian: he must say everything in order to say anything completely. I have deliberately omitted many of the traditional terms in which Christian theology is usually expounded. It seems to me that any attempt to reinterpret a Christian doctrine must begin with concepts which do not belong to its traditional form; because otherwise it becomes mere repetition and not reinterpretation. The concepts used in this article seem to be useful for the purpose of reinterpretation, and nothing else is required of them. They are simply tools, just as the Greek terms used by the early Church were tools; and if they prove useless, they can be discarded. The reality remains which they try to interpret: the New Being in Christ, the appearance of essential Godmanhood in existence, the Incarnation.

"SO MAKE ME TO POSSESS THE MYSTERY . . . "[1]

By MAISIE SPENS

" So make me to possess the Mystery that I may not desire to understand." This should be the ceaseless, eager, yet peaceful prayer of the Church in her entirety and of each individual Christian in regard to the Mystery of the Transfiguration.

The Transfiguration is in Western Christendom indubitably the least " understood " of all the Mysteries of our Lord's incarnate life. The least understood, generally the last to be understood, quite commonly not understood at all. Paradoxically enough, this is in all probability due less to deliberate disregard than to the many over-intellectualistic attempts to understand it. Trying to probe into the *how* of this Mystery, how it could have happened—if indeed it ever did happen, some would add—and how the disciples saw it, defeats its own object. It is impossible to think or reason a way into the heart of this Mystery. *Whilst our eyes are " holden " in regard to it,* it is impossible to *read* a way into it even through Scripture itself, let alone through anything outside the inspired Word of God. Like Peter, James and John, we can only be *taken* into it by our Lord himself, and like them regardless of personal merit and for the Church's sake. It is not, however, sufficiently realized that our Lord deliberately willed to take his Church into this Mystery so that we might both corporately and individually possess it, i.e., *receive it as our own.* Yet so it was, and is.

[1] This article will appear in due course as part of a book bearing the title *Receive the Joyfulness of Your Glory,* to be published by Messrs. Hodder and Stoughton.

"Tell the vision to no man until the Son of Man be risen from the dead" (R.V. Mark ix, 9), said Jesus to Peter, James and John as they were coming down from the Mount of Transfiguration. The full force of the deliberation underlying this injunction is made patent both by Mark and Matthew. Mark lays stress upon the *expressness* of our Lord's command, Matthew pointing rather to the importance of its *contents*. This is well brought out by Weymouth in his translation of both. ". . . He very strictly forbad them to tell any one what they had seen until after the Son of Man has risen from among the dead." (Mark ix, 9). As they were descending the mountain, Jesus laid a command upon them. "Tell no one", he said, "of the sight you have seen till the Son of Man has risen from among the dead" (Matthew xvii, 9). Clearly this command is one of great import, and of *twofold* import.

The silence explicitly imposed by Jesus upon Peter, James and John "until after the Son of Man be risen from the dead" is itself his command—none the less absolute for being implicit—*to tell* "what things they had seen . . . when the Son of Man should have risen from the dead." Mark tells us that the vision is not—before the Resurrection—to be *set out in detail, recounted, described,* and Matthew that it is not even to be *announced*; and Luke tells us that Peter, James and John "held their peace [Gk.=kept silence] and told no man in those days any of the things which they had seen". An appreciable silence was necessary for Peter, James and John themselves. Vision can mature only in the cruciform silence of after-darkness. Silence until after the Resurrection was equally necessary for them and for those to be told of the Transfiguration, because the Transfiguration is a Mystery singularly impatient of words. Until there had been *eye-witnesses* of the majesty of Jesus in the glory of his Risen Body and its dominion over death, matter, time and space, there existed no analogy at all by which "the eye-witnesses of his majesty . . . when . . . with him in the holy mount" could convey to others even a hint of that Transfiguration Glory of his.

The Mystery of the Transfiguration was—and must always

be—*verbally* incommunicable. Its Glory must *in some sort* be *seen* and *experienced* analogously. Until then eyes cannot but remain "holden"—since in the Mystery of the Transfiguration, as in all else, it is life which illuminates theory as theory can never illuminate life.

From the Fathers onwards it has been traditional to speak of the Transfiguration as a preparation and strengthening for the Passion. And so it was: for our Lord, and for Peter, James and John—as later, potentially, for all the members of Christ sharing the extension of the Passion in his Mystical Body the Church. But that it was not exclusively—nor even primarily—preparation for the Passion, is evident from our Lord's confining the knowledge of it to Peter, James and John until after his Resurrection. Rather was it primarily the Blessed Trinity's preparation of the Church for our Lord's Resurrection, subsequent Ascension and Heavenly Session and for Pentecost.

For the first disciples the Resurrection must in certain respects have been even more *bewildering* than the Crucifixion. But the stringency of our Lord's command to Peter, James and John to keep silent as regards the Transfiguration "until the Son of Man be risen from the dead" ensured the impossibility of their being confronted by the *fait accompli* of his Resurrection without an instantaneous recalling of the Transfiguration. It also ensured their subsequent recognition that it had been his deliberate intention that Resurrection should never be thought of apart from Transfiguration: his, ours, and that of the Cosmos in its entirety. Their post-Resurrection release from silence was in order that this might be made known to their fellow-disciples there and then, and to the Church in perpetuity.

If it was only in the light of the Resurrection that the Transfiguration could become credible to those who had not witnessed it themselves, it is certainly not less true that only in the light of the Transfiguration could our Lord's Resurrection, Ascension and Heavenly Session, as well as his Passion, and Pentecost itself, become transparent for what they are—each an indispensable factor in *the eternal and indivisible simultaneity* of that temporally successive process of the "restitution

of all things" in Christ whose final consummation was cosmically typified and temporally anticipated in his Transfiguration on the Mount.

A most striking apprehension of this is to be seen in the Transfiguration section of Pedro Serra's 1394 retable of Pentecost in the Cathedral of Manresa (plate 9 of E. Harris's *Spanish Painting*. John Gifford, 1938). In this painting our Lord is portrayed, not on the Mount itself, but in a mandorla high above the mountain top, and—herein lies incalculable significance—he is portrayed in his Heavenly Session, both hands uplifted in blessing. He is revealed both as High Priest who "ever liveth to make intercession" for us in heaven, and as "priest upon his throne".[2] Here in the Mystery of his Transfiguration, his Kingship and High Priesthood—God-given within the Divine Filiation—visibly overarch the Cosmos. It is meet and right that this should be so. Pedro Serra's mount is not the *geographical* Mount of Transfiguration—whether Tabor or Hermon—but *Sion* which *theologically* is the Mount of Transfiguration: Sion the perfected Community. Spirit-inspired, he has but set forth the eternal truth of the Transfigured Lord: "But I have been made king by him on Sion his holy mountain, declaring the ordinance of the Lord: the Lord said to me, Thou art my Son, to-day have I begotten thee. Ask of me, and I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the ends of the earth for thy possession" (Sept. Psalm ii, 6 ff.).

This Transfiguration section is but one of twelve smaller scenes from the Creation and the New Testament which Pedro Serra has ranged round his great central panel of Pentecost. None the less for that, his juxtaposition and treatment of the Mysteries of the Transfiguration and Pentecost is in many ways an almost *aweing* anticipation of much that has been so profoundly and luminously articulated theologically—over five hundred years later—by Fr. Sergius Bulgakov in his *Le Paraclet* (t. 2 of his trilogy *La Sagesse Divine et la Théanthropie*). It is

[2] cf. Zechariah vi, 13.

highly improbable that Fr. Bulgakov ever saw any reproduction of Pedro Serra's retable of Pentecost or of its Transfiguration section, but it remains a fact that his *Le Paraclet* and Pedro Serra's painting of the Transfiguration mutually elucidate one another to such an amazing degree that—in so far as is practicable—none should read *Le Paraclet* without Pedro Serra's "Transfiguration" before their eyes, and none dwell on Pedro Serra's "Transfiguration" without recourse to Fr. Bulgakov's *Le Paraclet*. The two taken in conjunction yield incredibly more spiritually than either can do separately.

If Fr. Bulgakov says what no artist could ever paint in its entirety, Pedro Serra likewise paints in his "Transfiguration" what no writer—even a Fr. Bulgakov—could say in its entirety. This visual element is of supreme importance in view of what has been stated above, viz.: that the Glory of the Transfiguration must *in some sort* be *seen* and *experienced* analogously or else our eyes cannot but remain "holden" to it.

God can and does "open" eyes in countless ways—even without external media of any sort or kind. But for the most part he does not disdain to act through external media. One of the most potent of these is icons. Through them he has imparted his life and truth to Eastern Christians for centuries, but only comparatively recently have icons become at all widely familiar to Western Christians and begun to exercise their ministry among us.

The true icon painter would be the first to apply to himself Carlyle's words: "I fancy, he did not think that the poor image his own hands had made *was* God, but that God was emblemed by it, that God was in it in some way or other". Just so no icon of the Transfiguration can do more than *emblem* the Transfigured and Transfiguring Lord in Glory—but how much this can be. It may come from God upon the soul as a terrific IMPACT which he but intensifies year after year, so that "deep as we dive in the Profound, there is ever a new depth opens".

Every icon of the Transfiguration is as it were a "squint" —through some particular facet of this inexhaustible many-

faceted Mystery—upon "the Central Altar" of the Mystery in its totality. Through any one such "squint" we can, through the Transfigured and Transfiguring Jesus, Son of God, Son of Man, the God-Man, dive—and go on diving—into ever new depths of the Profound in God and man, and the world God made "very good" and "so loved". But through prayerful contemplation of an icon of the Transfiguration we are not only enabled by God to penetrate the fringes of this all-embracing Mystery, but also—and this is incomparably more important—he can penetrate us with the "virtue . . . gone out of" the Transfigured and Transfiguring Lord: an *eternal* "virtue . . . gone out of him", and therefore "the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever" and freshly operative in every successive moment of time as long as time shall last. This "virtue" *is* life eternal: and a knowing of "thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent" received as life in the depths of the soul and far beyond anything the brain can articulate even to itself until long after, if ever.

There now exist three icons of the Transfiguration recently painted by an Orthodox artist, Sister Joanna Reitlinger.[3] Despite variations in detail and colouring, they rightly and inevitably bear a certain traditional similarity to one another. But their diversity is greater than their similarity. Each crystallizes a quite different facet of the Mystery. Each icon is complete in itself. Each is a gateway to the heart of the Mystery in its entirety. But the three together provide what may be termed an iconic thesis, antithesis and synthesis of the life of prayer as nudely and transparently *simple* as it is all-embracingly profound.

Never humanly designed as such, these three icons none the less do in fact constitute a *pictorial* "treatise" on prayer: a "treatise" which for some souls, partially or completely baffled by *verbal* treatises on manifold "methods" or "states" of prayer, might come as a veritable and life-giving revelation.

[3] It is hoped that these icons will be reproduced in *Receive the Joyfulness of Your Glory.*

Yet it is none other than the classic purgative, illuminative, and unitive ways of prayer that these icons namelessly embody. Thus shorn of verbal technicalities, the substance of these "ways" is free to be lightened forth by the Holy Spirit upon the soul, to grip it, permeate it, and work the progressive will of God within and through it. Freed from words, the *overlapping* of these "ways" is seen with a naked clarity and immediacy beyond the power of even the most translucent verbal description of them to convey.

This very absence of any attempt to *explain* procedure in regard to purgative, illuminative or unitive prayer, may of itself prove a liberation of the soul from that self-conscious analysis of prayer-endeavour which is one of the greatest of all deterrents from true prayer. Icons such as these invite no vain speculative or merely academic attempts to understand purgative, illuminative or unitive prayer in advance of experience. Quite the contrary. Visual or memoried beholding of these icons may under God, if he so will, *happen* to any soul as actual purgation, illumination or union at any moment. Whether instantaneously or only after prolonged contemplation is immaterial. It will in either case be suddenly before ever the soul can be aware of what is happening—the risk of the soul's marring or impeding the divine initiative being thus reduced by God to a minimum.

In the Victoria and Albert Museum exhibition of Ancient Russian Icons loaned by the U.S.S.R. in 1929, there was a 16th century icon of the Transfiguration from Tver, in which St. Peter is literally knocked endways, standing on his head, both feet in the air, one shoe kicked loose, and St. James and St. John likewise bowled to the ground, crouching there full of fear. James is turned away from the Glory, and trying with one hand to shield himself from it; whilst John is by a supreme effort trying to gather himself together to dare to look back and up to the Glory in so far as he is able.

The *physical attitudes* of the three disciples in Sister Joanna's first icon of the Transfiguration although entirely different from those in the 16th century one from Tver, never-

theless convey exactly the same spiritual reality—that of the complete *bouleversement* of the disciples before the Glory of him who is transfigured before them. All alike, in Sister Joanna's icon, are smitten to the ground. St. Peter, kneeling with his back to the transfigured Lord, has one hand up in the air as though to *ward off* the weight of Glory coming upon him as a physical, mental, moral and spiritual blow. His eyes are full of mingled fear and grief. St. James, pitching headlong, his back upon the Glory, both feet in the air, is just trying to save himself with his arms, whilst one hand shields his eyes. St. John makes no attempt to save himself physically as head-foremost he hurtles backwards through the air, both hands clapped over—and completely hiding—his upturned face, less as protection of his eyes from the bedazzlement of Glory than as deliberate self-effacement before it.

There is barely time for instantaneous recognition of the *stupendousness of objective Reality and Power* which alone could have brought about *bouleversement* such as this, before the impact of that same cataclysmic Glory smites, isolates, and catches the beholder up into the Mount itself.

"The Glory of God"—"Thine is the Kingdom, the Power and the Glory": such familiar *words,* oft prayed, oft read, oft written—yet without any turning upside-down of the individual, let alone the world. Words used comfortably, alas even carelessly, because we have—and can have—no idea of the Reality and Power of Glory until God sends it as lightning to smite us to the ground like Peter, James and John. So swift the lightning of his Glory when he chooses to send it, that neither physical nor spiritual eye, nor brain discern what is seen nor how. Only the subsequent *bouleversement*—and in it his making all things new—witnesses to the seeing that caused it.

"When I saw him I fell at his feet as dead": such is for every soul the invariable first reaction of self to the humanly terrifying onset of Glory.

The degree of *bouleversement* to be seen in Peter, James and John is the measure of the power of Glory which smote upon them. It is their very bedazzlement, their abasement,

their nothingness before the Glory which serves—under God—as revelation of its absoluteness and demandingness: a demandingness seen through the eyes of Peter as humanly unfathomable. What eyes! There is in them the vivid reflection of a sudden overwhelming awareness of an enmity between sin and Glory so deadly in souls that each must inevitably kill or be killed by the other—so deadly that sin if carried to its final term *could* even put to physical death the sinless Lord of Glory. These eyes pierce through this awareness to the awful, yet now inescapable, knowledge of the *truth* of Jesu's prediction—which Peter had at first so vehemently repudiated—" that the Son of Man must suffer many things . . . and be killed . . .". These eyes, after having seen " the light of the knowledge of the Glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ ", are now filled to overflowing with a twofold horror and anguish of darkness. There is in them love's dark foretaste of the Passion of his Lord; and self's Glory-begotten initial recognition of its " how great . . . darkness " and its premonition of its own impending doom and dissolution by Glory. The long—and until completed, unremitting—process of Peter's purgation by the Glory of the Transfigured and Transfiguring Lord has begun. Penitence, fear, sorrow, and shrinking are in his eyes, but deeper than all else in them is *love*: love trying at all costs to rally to the Beloved. Though still warding off the full weight of Glory, he *is* on his knees, dumbly uniting his prayer with that of his Transfigured and Transfiguring Lord. None can do more. To do less is to die alone in our sins, instead of their and our falling " as dead " at his feet to be transfigured by him. This must needs be—for every soul—an enduring as seeing him who is invisible whilst its darkness is being brought to light by him in order that Light may eternally dispel it.

Ours is an age of *bouleversement*. There is no possibility of individual or corporate escape from it. But this is not to say there is no choice in the matter. There is. A crucial choice. Either we choose to yield to *bouleversement* by human chaos, strife and fear of ever worse and more insane physical, material, moral and spiritual destruction to come. Or else we must

choose to yield ourselves to *bouleversement* only before the Glory of God. There is no alternative choice; and lack of choice must eventually entail succumbing to *bouleversement* before the human sin-begotten chaos we have failed—or refused—to bring within the orbit of *his* transfiguring redemptive power. Deliberately to yield to *bouleversement* before the Glory of God is the only individual or corporate act still open to us whereby any major re-creative ministry can be exercised on behalf of the world. To reject his transfiguring Glory is suicide. Truly to receive it would be to begin to live as freedmen of God in a world made new by him.

Sister Joanna's—or any other traditional—"*bouleversement*" icon of the Transfiguration serves for use in prayer as a *beginner's* icon because *bouleversement* before GOD is the beginning and continuance of the way of true prayer for every soul. Self needs must be struck down by Glory again and again, day in day out, year in year out, until the Transfigured and Transfiguring Lord brings true in it: ". . . I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me" (Galatians ii, 20). But a *bouleversement* icon of the Transfiguration is also a beginner's icon in that we *deduce* the Glory of the Transfigured Lord from its visible effects upon his disciples, rather than see it at firsthand for ourselves as it is in him himself. Such is life. Our ignorance and immaturity almost always necessitate a gradual penetration towards God *through creatures*, as the preliminary to any humanly conscious *immediate contact* with him.

To see the effect of Glory in those who have been its victims—in the richest, most literal and far-reaching sense of the word—serves more often than anything else to awaken in us the awareness of Glory as *reality*. A glimpse of the Glory of God visibly imprinted—even for a moment—upon a fellow-man, woman, or child remains for ever operative. Silently but imperiously that imprint proclaims: "If such is the servant, what must the Master be. If such the reflection of Glory, what must its essence be". It begets in us the thirst for Glory: the thirst to "see him as he is"—and "every man that hath this hope in him purifieth himself even as he is pure". Thus

Glory sets in motion its twofold purgation: passive and active. The initiative throughout is entirely his. His Glory comes upon us how and when he wills, and that coming is in itself the beginning of our purification by God. It is likewise the kindling of our desire and resolve to purify ourselves. It is ever-renewed to us by him as enablement to recapture this desire after it has been let slip—perhaps countless times—and as enablement to strive afresh in our so-called "active" self-purification.

None can say of active and passive purification where one begins and the other ends. Not only are they inseparable, but there is a paradoxical sense in which each is the other. Indispensable as is and must be our continuous attempt "actively" to purify ourselves, it can of itself achieve nothing radical. Inherent in it, moreover, are the twin temptations to despair and defeatism if it seem to fail, and self-righteousness if it seem to succeed—and to succumb to either is spiritual death. It is the so-called "passive" purification, his pure act as like a ray from time to time it pierces and penetrates to the core of our being, that alone is mighty in radically saving and transfiguring action. To sustain the divine "passive" purifications demands of the soul a still activity "more moving than any motion" of human so-called "active" purification, and one as much more costly as it is more effectual.

The first of Sister Joanna's Transfiguration icons was the deliberate approach to Glory by way of the *bouleversement* of Peter, James and John before it.

The second of her Transfiguration icons was a no less deliberate *direct* approach *through the prayer of Jesus* to the Glory as such, by way of visual intimation—so far as is humanly possible—of that which underlies the Spirit-inspired words of another which specifically evoked it: "As he prayed, he knew: as he prayed it was declared: 'This *is* my Beloved Son'. The Glory shone *upon* him. The glory shone *from* him".

In both icons the disciples are in the foreground materially. In the first, it is they who rivet the eye, and dominate the

spiritual foreground as well. It is from them, and through them, that the eye travels upward toward the Transfigured Lord with "garments . . . glistering, exceeding white, so as no fuller on earth can whiten them"—"white as the light". In the second, it is the sheer *blaze of All-Glory in and through the prayer of Christ-Jesus* which rivets both visual and spiritual gaze to the virtual exclusion of all else. All is submerged beneath an inundation of the humanly fathomless infinity of the *Abba, Father* love-prayer of "the Only-Begotten Son of God, Begotten of his Father before all worlds . . . Light of Light, Very God of Very God . . . Being of one Substance with the Father", who also is "Man, of the Substance of his Mother, born in the world".

"*Comme il impose silence, le Cervin*!", said a Swiss guide before the majesty of the Matterhorn. Blessed indeed is anything that can reduce us—even momentarily—to an interior silence, for without it none can experience that nude encounter between the soul and God in which alone the soul begins radically to die to self in God and God progressively to gain "free course" in the soul for his all-embracing love, truth and life. But even in its iconic blaze of All-Glory in and through the Praying Jesus—let alone in the immediacy of the Divine Majesty there unveiled—the Mount of Transfiguration does more than *impose* silence:

"'Tis Visible Silence . . ."

revealed, encountered and communicated in him who in his Transfiguration prayer *is* Visible Silence. By way of visual symbols, which, despite their breath-taking potency, can only very faintly approximate to vision so luminous, yet short of Beatific, as that vouchsafed to Peter, James, and John, there lightens upon us an ineffable *intimation* of the gamut of All-Glory concentred in the Praying, Transfigured and Transfiguring Jesus, and of his Person, Being and Life as "Perfect God: perfect Man".

To an almost incredible degree this icon has caught Glory shining *upon* him and Glory shining *from* him. On the summit

of the Mount he stands resplendent. He himself is englobed in Glory from on high, and all-below is englobed in the Glory with which he irradiates it. Yet the Glory from on high is transparently inherent in his Very Self and he in It.

He stands against a five-pointed Star of stature commensurate with his own. This Star is the Star of the Chosen People. It symbolizes the whole *Mystery* of the Chosen People, and—inevitably in so far as the two are inseparable—it symbolizes likewise the *history* of the Chosen People in its entirety and his plenary relationship to it past, present, and future. Therein is symbolized his genealogy in the flesh back through Mary to David, back to Abraham; his love-setting his face to go toward Jerusalem which "stonest the prophets"; the natural and supernatural expediency "that one man should die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not" (John xi, 50), and of his being self-offered as that one; and his post-Resurrection and Ascension Shining in the forefront of his people for the Father's "bringing many sons unto Glory in and through him" their King. But he does more than stand against and in the forefront of this Star of the Chosen People. He, "the root and the offspring of David", *is* the Star, "the Glory of his people Israel", but he is also "a light to lighten the Gentiles". He is "the bright and morning Star" of the whole Cosmos. Yet even this Glorious "day-spring from on high" is not in itself the beginning nor the end of Glory.

Behind the iconic five-pointed Star is the all-encompassing circle which symbolizes the Divinity, the Divine Sophia, Essential Glory. In and from this circle flame chunks of scarlet, symbolizing the Fire of the Holy Spirit: Chunks of Fire. Here *chunks* is not only the *mot juste*; no other is possible. They just *are* that: chunks of Fire symbolizing the Triune "flux and reflux of love and bliss" within the Blessed Trinity. As such they hurl forth the density of the Power of the Holy Spirit operative for every creature in the measure that God wills—but always, it now appears, a measure infinitely beyond any we can humanly suspect let alone fully realize.

"As he prayed, he knew: as he prayed it was declared:

'This *is* my Beloved Son'. The Glory shone *upon* him . . .". This is as true of the Baptism of Jesus as of his Transfiguration. In both these Mysteries the Sonship of Jesus is declared by his Father as he is praying, and the Spirit of Glory descends upon him. In both is manifest the eternal truth that with Jesus prayer is Sonship: Sonship is prayer. In both Mysteries Glory shines upon him *from without*. But it was only in the Transfiguration that "Glory shone *from* him". It is this twofold shining of the Glory *from within* and the Glory *from without* which constitutes the uniqueness and—if one may so say—the substance of that Mystery which was the sole unveiling of the interior life of the Incarnate Son of God, when he who "emptied himself, taking the form of a servant . . . and being found in fashion as a man . . . humbled himself" (R.V. Philippians ii, 7-8) was openly *seen to be* that which at all times he *was* hiddenly: all-glorious within. In the Transfigured Lord the Glory within is as the Glory without and the Glory without as the Glory within. It is one Glory: the Glory of Love wholly given, wholly received, and wholly given again.

As with Glory shining *upon* him and Glory shining *from* him to the uttermost ends of the Cosmos, he stands all-glorious within, all-glorious without, it is the *body* of the Lord which is humanly seen as the confluence and corradiation of depth upon depth of Love's eternal Self-giving. This is the Lamb who is the light of a new heaven and a new earth. Love's holocaust to Love: this is the Lamb God himself has provided for a burnt-offering—the Son given by the Father to and for the redemption of the world; the Son giving himself—and in himself the entire Cosmos—a love-offering "obedient unto death" in reparation to the Father for the sin of the whole world.

Lamb "slain from the foundation of the world", his self-oblation was complete in eternity from the beginning, but it had of necessity to unfold successively in time through each phase of the Incarnate life whose entirety was an undivided self-oblation, a "Mass" in which he as High Priest of his own free-will through the eternal Spirit immolated himself to the Father as victim without blemish. The Transfiguration is the

Offertory of this High-Priestly Mass in time. The Glory shining from the Transfigured Lord is the outshining of the radiant love, joy and gladness with which as High Priest he goes unto the altar of God to lay down [Gk. = offer up] his life that he may take it again to the Glory of God and the redemption of the Cosmos. It is as he deliberately faces, accepts, wills, in union with his Father, the extremity of darkness and suffering unto death by violence ahead that he thus shines. It is the stillness, the shining, the sameness of the Host—immutably self-offered from and for all eternity—that rivets those before whom he is transfigured. The Glory shining *upon* him is the fire from heaven of the Father's acceptance of—and well-pleasedness in—this unique sacrifice of his Only-Begotten Son, and the pledge of all to be "accepted in the Beloved".

Apud te est fons vitae: et in lumine tuo videbimus lumen—"with thee is the well of life: and in thy light we shall see light" (Psalm xxxvi, 9). So runs the versicle appointed after the first lection of Pope Leo the Great's Sermon on the Transfiguration at Mattins of the Feast. It is in very truth as "the well of life" that the iconic All-Glory of the Transfigured and Transfiguring Lord of Sister Joanna's second Transfiguration icon brings him himself within visible reach as it were. Through such iconic reflection of his light can come an imageless impact of his substantial light far beyond the power of the physical eye to discern or sustain.

"There are wells of inward joy that nourish life. I live three lives—my own and theirs". These words of Balzac's Père Goriot in reference to his two daughters are but a faint unconscious echo of that which is *seen* to be wholly true and complete only in the Triune All-Glory of the Transfigured Lord, one with the Father and the Holy Spirit—each Person of the Blessed Trinity living his own life in and for the other Two: yet the life one and indivisible on earth as it is in heaven.

Before such a Mystery words must fail. The further we penetrate it, the more clearly do we experience the inexhaustibleness of this Well of Life laid open to us in the Transfigured and Transfiguring Lord, whilst at the same time ever more

certainly knowing ourselves still at its brink as yet. In dumb adoration of this Transfigured and Transfiguring Lord we assent to Stella Morton's "The unexplored depths of Silence are such a well of his Glory, aren't they?": assent with our whole being by diving ever deeper and deeper into his Silence where all is Glory because all is Love, and into his sacrificial Glory where all is Love's *silence de moi* in the Circumincession of the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity.

Glory's work of purification is to be seen in Sister Joanna's "*bouleversement*" icon by way of *abasement*. Glory at the first onset throws the beholder back upon himself. It lightens upon the soul a recognition of personal sin and of creaturely nothingness in face of the Lord of Glory. It smites the soul into a gulf of seeming separation from him in which it lies dazed by the light which shows it itself all-darkness, and in which it feels paralysed and incapable of liberating itself to unite with him who for it is Light Unapproachable. Purgation predominates over the illumination which gave rise to it. First sight of Glory seems to end in captivity to self. But the same Glory that slays is the Glory that later makes alive again.

The quickening continuity of Glory's work of purification is to be seen in Sister Joanna's "All-Glory" icon of the Transfiguration by way of *exaltation*. Here illumination seems to predominate over purgation, but the illumination is itself purificatory, and all the more so in that it induces self-forgetfulness as it rapts the soul into captivity to him who is "altogether lovely".

Thus to gaze and gaze on him in Glory might seem an end in itself—the end—the all-satisfying *ne plus ultra* of the spiritual life. But this is not—and cannot be—the case. Illumination may lead to partial union, but short of the Beatific Vision illumination is not of itself the consummation of union. "One cannot on earth both *see* and *possess* the Light at one and the same time". Whilst All-Glory dazzles the soul and paralyses it as it gazes upon the Light of Light, the soul though bathed and bathing in All-Glory remains essentially *outside* it

and All-Glory outside the soul. One is set over against the other, uncommingled.

The gulf between the soul and its Transfigured Lord is temporarily forgotten by the soul in its own self-forgetting. Yet none the less for that it still exists in fact so long as illumination remains no more than the Holy Spirit's intimation and pledge of what union might be, and so long as on the part of the soul there is as yet no definitive *union of will* with him who is Glory. Short of this, the soul is in danger of trying self-indulgently to prolong its losing sight of all save Glory, solely in order to satiate itself in All-Glory without seeking to become a fellow-worker with him, who is no less Servant and Priest of Glory than Glory's Lord and King. Indeed to the soul captivated by the transparency of All-Glory it may even seem that deification is already an enduring *fait accompli* with Glory all-in-all for itself and for the Cosmos.

For such time as the soul remains so exclusively absorbed in the descent of Glory as to perceive only the truth that "all that is done upon earth he doeth it himeslf", it cannot but be that it remains blind to the complementary truth that "deification is not", as has been justly said, "a one-sided act of God but a *συνέργεια* of man with God."[4] To see Glory too clearly on earth *for too long* would render impossible the ultimate *συνέργεια* —co-operation—of man with God absolutely necessary for him to become one with this Lord of Glory, to live by him and to live for him.

The *exaltation* icon of the Transfiguration is the antithesis of the *abasement* icon of the Transfiguration. Each marks a distinct and indispensable factor in prayer as life and life as

[4] Dom Clement Lialine: "The Theological Teaching of Gregory Palamas on the Divine Simplicity . . ." In *Eastern Churches Quarterly*, Vol. VI, No. 5, 1946. The author would appear to be following here Vladimir Lossky, to whose article "*La Théologie de la Lumière chez Saint Grégoire de Thessalonique*" in *Dieu Vivant*, No. 1, pp. 93-118, 1945, he expressly acknowledges his great indebtedness. Cf. Vladimir Lossky: *Essai sur la Théologie Mystique de l'Eglise d'Orient*, p. 193, 1944.

prayer. Yet both together—no less than each separately—these complementary and successive factors fall altogether short of the full term both of prayer and life.

Far less finished artistically, Sister Joanna's third Transfiguration icon at first glance seems in every way a poor thing in comparison with her first two. Gone seems the power both of the one and of the other. The *bouleversement* is no longer absolute. Visually All-Glory is on the wane, its zenith passed. It is as though the disciples are "coming to" again: the paralysing spiritual *bouleversement* and captivity to self and the paralysing—yet none the less quickening—rapting out of self into the vision of All-Glory alike are ended. All seems set in a lower key: an anti-climax—until everything suddenly fades before and focuses in the figure of St. John in whose ineffable pose is synthesized all that has already been, is being, and will be wrought in and by this unique Mystery of the Transfiguration.

He kneels with *cupped hands* stretching up beggarwise to "the Glory". Kneeling thus before his Lord he is the visual embodiment of "Blessed are the poor [Gk.=destitute] in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." He is in every fibre of his being a mendicant of Glory.[5] His human destitution, his spiritual nakedness, laid bare to him by Glory, is an abyss, a void which he makes silently to cry *to* the height of Glory, to cry *for* the height of Glory to descend and flood it, and let him be "clothed upon" with Glory for Glory's sake. Such silent Glory-entreating destitution and nakedness is found by Glory an irresistible magnet, and to such humility—actively desiring all that he is and has because consciously having and desiring nothing of its own—the Transfiguring Lord vouch-

[5] cf. John Burnaby: *Amor Dei*, p. 142. "Augustine tells us that when the heathen peasants of Africa sought admission to the Church, to the question 'What is it you want?' they would 'nearly all' give the same answer—an answer which was as remarkable to Augustine as it is to us. '*Dicimus eis, Quid vultis? Respondent, Nosse gloriam Dei*' (to know God's glory) [*De Spiritu et Littera*, 64]." It is Mr. E. I. Watkin who has kindly drawn attention to the appropriateness of this quotation to "a mendicant of Glory".

safes himself, and with and in himself the kingdom of a new heaven and a new earth.

As the icon of *a mendicant of Glory* it is fitting that this third Transfiguration icon should be a poorer thing outwardly. But spiritually it is the greatest of the three. Its very soberness, far from being a fade-out of Glory, gradually asserts an increase of realism from the manward side because in it exterior vision as such is seen to have become secondary to the interior receiving of the Glory previously beheld. Excessive illumination has in the wisdom and compassion of God been dimmed in order that the soul may regain its power freely and deliberately to energize the will. A chalice of silence, St. John's cupped hands unmistakably bespeak the concentred energizing of his entire will and selfhood. As one who has been abased, one who has been exalted, and now is manifestly both at one and the same time, self-emptied he waits upon the Lord of Glory as mendicant: mendicant not of Glory's outward lustre but of Glory's Very Self to become his self that in his self-oblation he may have Glory to give back to Glory in an endless interchange of unitive love.

It is this very mendicancy of Glory, iconically crystallized in the cupped hands of St. John, which is itself seen to be the soul's *συνέργεια*—joint-work—of man with God for the deification not of himself alone, but of all souls and of the Cosmos in its entirety. This mendicancy of Glory is an *opus Dei*—a one-ing with the prayer of the Praying Christ adoring his Father. It is a work of adoration, love, penitence, intercession, a ministry, an entering by faith and desire into the whole will, work and rest of God to be a fellow-worker with him in the restitution of all things in the Transfigured and Transfiguring Christ, the Lamb who stands on Mount Sion in time and for eternity.

So small and still those cupped hands patiently, strongly upstretched beggarwise to Glory. Yet theirs is the hardest and most potent of all "manual labour." Theirs is "honest toil" indeed. To the honest toil of hands such as these—needed unceasingly, needed everywhere—there is no end. Their still-

ness sings "Magnificat" to God. Their smallness receives his infinity to overflowing on the world's behalf. "*Mon âme glorifie le Seigneur et mon esprit a tressailli de joie en Dieu, mon Sauveur, parce qu'il a regardé la bassesse de son esclave.*" These hands betoken peaceful and lovingly-willed acceptance of lowliness in every realm, physical, mental, moral, spiritual and material, not only as the necessary condition and vehicle for receiving the Glory as an inundation to overflow for whomsoever he wills, but still more as oneness with him in that—incarnate—"he loved his abjection" because that abjection was all-compact of love for God and man.

Such hands are *dans le vrai*. They give the lie to man's self-sufficiency. They witness to his inability to live apart from Glory. They confess to his physical, mental, moral and spiritual bankruptcy: his suicidal, fratricidal, deicidal sin against Glory. They bespeak the prayer of the prodigal son putting repentance into action, humbly and resolutely forsaking his own self-condemned ingloriousness and betaking himself back from death-in-life to the Glory he has betrayed, in order that as servant of Glory he may be nourished and live.

Hands such as these halt the world's stampede toward the abyss of self-annihilation. They are upheld as a pivot on which the world can turn back upon its present tracks to find itself face to face with Saving Glory in the light of whose countenance alone is wholeness. At the very precipice edge these hands because—rather than in spite of—the soul's consciousness of its own sinner's empty-handedness before God and man, daily and hourly take up, in so far as they are able, the Cross of the whole world. They take it up with all its sin and suffering into the Mount of Transfiguration, there to immolate it as a burnt-offering to the Glory of God and for the deification of all creation within the one all-embracing High-Priestly Self-oblation of the Only-Begotten Son of God, Son of Man, God-Man to the Father of Glory. They hold up to the Transfigured and Transfiguring Lord all tempted, sinning, suffering, bewildered, fearful, exhausted, despairing and embittered souls in every nation, all suffering animals the world over, all nature

ravaged and impoverished by man's mis-stewardship and greed, that he may redeem and transform each and all his creatures as one within the deific Mystery of his Transfiguration.

The cupped hands of the St. John of Sister Joanna's third Transfiguration icon are an inexhaustible shewing of *communicant* life—and of the soul's progressive union with its Lord in spiritual and sacramental Communion. "Ask and ye shall receive." The soul's mendicancy of Glory within the Mystery of the Transfiguration begins as that of prodigal sonship imploring crumbs from the Master's table. Its prayer is no sooner prayed than heard, the Beloved given to it, itself accepted in and oned to the Beloved: its sonship one with his. Flesh and blood could never have asked this—could not even credit it were it not revealed by his and our Father in Heaven. "On the Feast of the Transfiguration", a priest has said, "we read in the collect"—that taken from the Roman Missal—"that the voice coming down out of the cloud foreshowed the perfect adoption of sons. We read it somewhat absentmindedly and pass on: but on going back to it, we remember that the Father's voice declared 'This is my Beloved Son'; now our Lord Jesus Christ is not Son by adoption, but by nature; it is a question then of other sons—well we know which—and yet the voice has said, in the singular: 'This is my Beloved Son.' There is only one possible solution: that with which the Mystery of the Church itself of which we are part furnishes us, that which St. Augustine has many a time expounded: the Total Christ is not the personal Christ only, but the body of Christ comprising in its unity all those whom Baptism has made partakers of his life; it is on this entire ensemble that there falls the Heavenly Father's words of well-pleasedness and love: 'This is my Beloved Son'."

This adoption of sons is from the Godward side complete in the beginning in the Father's bringing many sons to Glory and in our baptism; but from our side we must *become* that which we *are*—must progressively *appropriate* this adoption and live it out. The definitive term, the means and condition of this adoption has been luminously and aweingly set forth by Abbot Marmion: "He adopts us as his children to the point

that one day we shall share in the beatitude of his inmost life . . . In the eternal plan, we become God's children only in Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Word . . . The Father will only recognize us as his children if we bear in us the features of his Son Jesus". This can mean nothing less than such transforming union eventually that Christ in us and we in him live as one the life of All-Glory—that triune life of Love wholly given, wholly received, wholly given again, which was ineffably revealed when Glory shone upon and from him in his Transfiguration. Thus and thus only can there be fulfilment of the whole purpose of God's adoption of us as children which is "to the end that we should be unto the praise of his glory" (Ephesians i, 12).

Just as *revelation* of the life of All-Glory comes to us in the Praying and Transfigured Christ, so too by his *prayer*—his High-Priestly Prayer prayed on the eve of his Passion—will come our *participation* in it. "Father, I will that they also, whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am; that they may behold [Gk. = partake of] my glory, which thou hast given me: for thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world" (John xvii, 24).

This prayer, "seeing he ever liveth to make intercession" for us in his Heavenly Session, he now continues to pray unceasingly, that we in him may be partakers of all that underlies and constitutes that triune yet undivided All-Glory that shone upon and from him in his Transfiguration. This one All-Glory of Love wholly given, wholly received, wholly given again, is that flux and reflux of Love between Father and Son in the eternal Spirit which in the circumincession of the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity is *Bliss*, all-satisfying, without beginning and without end; and which in "Christ who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God" (Hebrews ix, 14) is freely-willed *sacrificial* self-oblation unto death and resurrection, that he might lay down his life and take it again to—and by—the Glory of his Father and for the redemption of the world.

Infinite Mystery of Glory. Divine and ineffable *simplicity*

that the eternal Spirit through whom Christ offered himself to the Father—and through whom we also are to offer ourselves *sacrificially* to the Father in union with Christ's perfect self-oblation—should be the self-same Spirit who in the flux and reflux of Love between Father and Son in the Godhead is Bliss. He is the Spirit in whom we—with and in Christ—can say and live: "I will freely sacrifice unto thee: I will praise thy name, O Lord: for it is good" (A.V. Psalm liv, 6. B.C.P. "An offering of a free heart will I give thee . . ."). He is that Spirit of Glory who was both the on-shining and the out-shining of Glory in the Transfiguration: the love-descent of Glory from Father to Son and the love-ascent of Glory from Son to Father.

There have been mendicants of Glory who actually *prayed* to receive an on-shining and out-shining of Glory in some measure like to that of their Lord. To many Westerners this may—and probably will—sound startling and presumptuous; but it will not seem so to the Eastern Orthodox who have so deeply penetrated the Mystery of the Transfiguration, nor to those in the West familiar with the teaching of Eastern or Western mystics and saints. And indeed it is not. Such prayer is not the word or silence—however intense—of a moment, an hour, a day, a week, a year. It is the prayer of a life—and life-time—of progressive self-emptiedness, *humility* and love. There are, moreover, instances—St. Seraphim for one—in which such prayer is known to have been heard by God and the Glory *seen* of others before whom they were transfigured. It is not in the last resort too much to say that, did we but realize it, all Christians are bidden by our Lord himself to pray this very prayer—and do pray it, albeit unwittingly—when praying "Our Father . . . Hallowed be thy Name".

"Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but unto thy name give glory . . ." (A.V. Psalm cxv, 1). We give glory to God only in the measure in which we *receive* him. It is for this reason, for *his sake* increasingly and primarily—and only secondarily even for souls and all creation, itself included—that the soul must never cease its mendicancy of Glory within the

Mystery of the Transfiguration but keep itself as an empty chalice to be filled to overflowing with the Lord who with the Holy Ghost is most high in the Glory of God the Father.

In the *Little Flowers of St. Francis* (*Fioretti*), compiled some time after 1322, Brother James of La Massa is recounted to have seen a vision in the course of which he beheld our Lord seated on a great and shining throne, giving to St. Francis "a chalice full of the spirit of life" and bidding him take it to his brethren that they might drink of it as strengthening against the coming onslaught of the devil. St. Francis came first to Brother John of Parma who "receiving it, drank it all fervently and with haste: and immediately he became all shining as the sun". St. Francis then offered it to the other brethren in turn, but "few of them received it with due reverence and devotion, or drank the whole of it". Those who did receive it devoutly and drink it were seen immediately to become resplendent as the sun, and those who wasted or did not receive it with devotion were seen to become black or deformed and horrible to behold; whilst those who drank part, and in part wasted it, became partly shining and partly dark according to the measure of their drinking or wasting the cup.

What aweing thought for any mendicant of Glory within the Mystery of his Transfiguration—that is for you, for me: for none but is *called* to be such, whether they will hear or whether they will forbear. Has not the Lord time and time and time again spiritually and sacramentally offered his Very Self to souls as the "chalice full of the spirit of life"? How few have responded to his "Receive the joyfulness of your Glory" to the full *even once*—let alone habitually. How few have so unselfed and dispossessed themselves as to be able to receive him in the measure that he desires to give himself.

He in us might now be shining resplendent as the sun to the Glory of his Father and to be a light to lighten a darkened world. But all too many of us have wasted and not drunk fully of his Glory—life of his life, his Very Self—and so we remain ourselves dark and deformed.

But he who might so justly reproach us—with a life-time

of squandered spiritual and sacramental Communions in which self or carelessness left little or no room for true receiving of "the Glory"—is he with whom there is no waste if we want there not to be and obey his "Gather up the fragments that remain, that nothing be lost".

At every second he comes, the Transfiguring Lord, offering us in the sacrament and cross of the present moment, himself the "chalice full of the spirit of life"—full with Glory and with Grace: with every grace he has ever given and with Glory infinite and eternal. He waits but for our being's prayer "So make me to possess the Mystery . . ." to enter and take possession of us, to saturate us with Glory and with grace and permeate and transform us in union with himself in the power of an endless life, the ever-present virtue of the Mystery of his All-Glorious Transfiguration.

CARDINAL POLE

By WILHELM SCHENK

As Pole lay dying in Lambeth Palace he may well have thought of his life as a failure: the future of the English Church once more uncertain—the reform of the universal Church unsettled—he himself suspected of heresy by the reigning Pope. Had all his efforts been in vain? Perhaps he felt then what another English Catholic was to express much later, at the end of another seemingly futile life:

> ". . . birds build—but not I build; no, but strain,
> Time's eunuch, and not breed one work that wakes."
>
> (Gerard Manley Hopkins).

We, too, cannot help seeing his life as a failure if we confine ourselves to Pole's intervention in English affairs. His book against Henry VIII, his various diplomatic missions, his zealous activities during the last five years of his life—none of these could prevent the utter defeat of the Catholic cause in England. Pole's reputation in his native country has suffered accordingly. If "Popery" is indeed the evil thing so many Englishmen believe it to be, so staunch an adherent of the Papacy cannot hope to be held up as a pattern to English schoolboys. Froude, the influential historian and great prose-writer, carried the day in the nineteenth century with his description of Pole as outdoing even foreigners in cunning, in contrast to the homespun honesty of Henry VIII. Some shadows have since been added to the generally accepted picture of that monarch, and Froude's picture of Pole no longer carries so much conviction as it once did, but Englishmen still regard Pole with a good deal of suspicion. Even when he is not hated,

he is little understood. An exile most of his life, he has remained an exile after death.

This is not the place to argue the merits of the English separation from Rome. Some rejoice at it; to others it is a disaster; no Christian can think of it with indifference. But on one of its aspects a measure of common agreement can be reached: its immediate influence on ecclesiastical reform in England. Pole's *Reformatio Angliae* could not take root owing to the reversal of ecclesiastical policy after his death. As a result, Elizabeth's Church became the only unreformed Church in Europe. The Protestant Churches had given expression, in varying degrees and different ways, to their ideas of reform; the Church of Rome had carried out a thorough-going spring-cleaning; but the Elizabethan Church remained unpurged. Whatever may be said of good Queen Bess, one can hardly think of her as a religious figure. The main concern of her ecclesiastical policy was the safe subjection of the Church to the temporal power (combined with the continued pillaging of Church property); to remedy the glaring abuses that had crept into the Church in England (as they had done elsewhere) was not in Elizabeth's interest as she conceived it. Many of the Elizabethan prelates were respectable enough, but hardly any were filled with genuine religious zeal. The archbishop who succeeded Pole was a cultivated don and administrator but a man of little spiritual power. Pluralism and absenteeism among the clergy remained widespread. This state of languor lasted until the early seventeenth century. Then the overdue reform was taken in hand simultaneously by two divergent movements: by the High Anglicans and by the Puritans. The Puritan movement eventually led to the growth of nonconformity outside the Established Church. Would the unity of the Anglican Church have been preserved, one wonders, if the necessary reforms had been carried out under Elizabeth? Be that as it may: it is in any case very regrettable that the sound principles of Pole's reforms were neglected for such a long time.

The *Reformatio Angliae* and the restoration of Catholicism in England were clearly failures. But this is not all that can

be said about Pole's life-work. It is all too easy to echo the insular charge put into the mouth of Gardiner in Tennyson's "Queen Mary":

> "You, my Lord, a polish'd gentleman,
> A bookman, flying from the heat and tussle,
> You lived among your vines and oranges,
> In your soft Italy yonder! You were sent for,
> You were appeal'd to, but you still preferr'd
> Your learned leisure."

"Learned leisure": that takes no account of Pole's strenuous efforts for Church reform abroad, from the *Consilium de Emendanda Ecclesia* to his part in the Council of Trent and his uncompromising advice, whenever it was required, to two successive Popes. The presence of Pole in the College of Cardinals helped to bring about such measure of reform as was achieved in the twenty years after the *Consilium*. That there was not more of it was due to causes beyond Pole's control.

"Learned leisure", then, is not a fair description of Pole's life in Italy after about 1534. But there is an aspect of his life abroad that may well cause some surprise. Why, we must ask ourselves, did not Pole follow the example of his friends Giberti and Sadoleto in devoting himself to the cure of souls? Pole preferred the secular administration of the *Patrimonium Petri* and was not ordained priest until two years before his death (until then he was a deacon). His refusal to take full orders aroused the suspicion of some observers who jumped to the conclusion that Pole did not want to prejudice his claims to the throne of England. Nothing in Pole's character or record suggests that this suspicion was justified. Why, then, his reluctance to become a priest? Was it due to an exaggerated sense of his own unworthiness, something like his old Oxford tutor's "immodest modesty"? Or was it connected with his almost morbid fear of public office? It rather looks as if it had been the latter. If so, we must count this fear of the priesthood among his weaknesses. But it should be remembered that, in a sense, he did have the cure of some souls: not only of his famous friends (Vittoria Colonna, for example, or

Marc-Antonio Flaminio) but of the more reticent members of his household such as Alvise Priuli, Bartholomeo Stella, Thomas Goldwell, and of faithful servants like Bernardino Sandro and George Lily. These men were prepared to follow Pole wherever he went, and admired his character and his learning.[1] To them, and indeed to a much wider circle all over Italy, his way of life meant much. Here, at last, was a Prince of the Church who was not eager for power and had no taste for worldly pomp. In the midst of so much gaily accepted corruption, Pole's life must have put courage into many hearts.

Such an example was all the more important in view of the great difficulties which the Catholic reform movement had to face. At first, the reforming Cardinals were in a small minority. Such reform activities as those of Giberti in Verona, or of the Theatines in various places, or again of the Jesuits, required time to bring forth the expected fruit. Then there were the various political difficulties which first postponed the calling of a Council, and then hindered its work. The Popes themselves were not consistently helpful: Paul III and Julius III vacillated, and Paul IV spoilt much by his uncontrolled passion. It was not until about 1570 that the moral regeneration of the Papacy and the Roman Church as a whole had made decisive progress. The Popes from Pius IV onwards, supported by a new generation of excellent prelates, saw to it that the decrees of the Council of Trent, which had at long last been concluded in 1563, should not remain on paper. Residence of bishops and priests was enforced; seminaries for the education of the clergy were founded (here, Pole's London decree of 1556 served as a pattern); the liturgical ceremonies were everywhere performed with renewed vigour and care; and saints like Charles Borromeo, Philip Neri, or Teresa of Avila set an inspiring example to the people at large. The post-tridentine Church of Rome experienced a genuine revival—the kind of

[1] Cf. Priuli's enthusiastic account of Pole's lectures on the Pauline Epistles (*Epistolae Poli* (ed. Quirini, Brescia, 1744-1757, 5 vols.), Vol. II, pp. CIV-CV), and Beccadelli's similar views in his biography, *passim* (ibid. Vol. V).

revival that Pole had been steadfast enough to believe in when the Church seemed dead.

Nobody would want to diminish the fame of the later reformers and saints. But it is only fair to add that this revival might have been much more difficult or much longer delayed but for the life-work of a small band of early reformers: Contarini, Giberti, Caraffa, Gaetano di Tiene, Pole. By the time the Jesuits began their work (1540) these men had already mapped out Church reform and begun to lay its foundations. To have belonged to such a group, to have prepared such a fulfilment, cannot possibly be called failure, even though the fruits were gathered after Pole's death. In the history of the Roman Church Pole plays a very important part; from the point of view of that Church it may even be regarded as a providential part.

Though Pole had been under a cloud during Caraffa's pontificate, his memory was quickly rehabilitated after Caraffa's death (1559). The Church, as Pole had confidently anticipated, understood the rights and wrongs of his case. Between 1562 and 1569 several of his works were published in Rome, Venice and Louvain, some of them with official backing. Among those who contributed to the clearing of his name was the great Augustinian, Cardinal Seripando, one of the Papal legates at the final session of the Council of Trent. In a letter written two years after Pole's death Seripando speaks of Pole's " sanctity and innocence of life, his gentleness in condemning others, and the compassion he showed to those whose human frailty had made them fall ". Pole himself, Seripando went on, had never been in need of such compassion, " being always irreproachable in word and deed ".[2] An exaggerated account, no doubt, but one which suggests that Seripando looked up to Pole as an ideal, and this view was shared by some of the best of Pole's contemporaries.

" Gentleness in condemning others " (*mansuetudine in*

[2] H. Jedin, *Seripando* (1937), Vol. II, p. 637 (now available in English, in an American edition: St. Louis, 1947). Dr. Jedin emphasizes Pole's decisive influence on Seripando's life.

condennar altri): this remained Seripando's aim, and among those who brought about the triumph of Catholic reform there were other disciples of Pole. But—and this is a very important qualification—Caraffa's spirit had by no means vanished from the Catholic Church. "Nothing fails like success": the revived Catholic Church was now able to counter-attack the Protestants (it is in this sense only that the term "Counter-Reformation" is appropriate), but some of the most successful weapons employed in this counter-attack were such as to distort the original impetus behind the revival. Only considerations of this kind will enable us to grasp the exact historical significance of Pole's life. We must therefore try to clarify this issue as best we can.

What was it that fundamentally separated Pole from Caraffa—that even prevented them, in the end, from understanding each other's language, in a worse-than-Babylonian confusion of tongues? That, surely, was their different relation to humanism. Wide divergences of outlook are covered by the term "humanism". Contarini and More were humanists; but so was Bembo. Behind More stood Erasmus, but ostensibly behind Bembo too. Caraffa refused to make any distinctions. To him, Erasmus was the arch-villain, and therefore he put all works of Erasmus on the Index, even those, he expressly stated, "which contain nothing against or about religion."[3]

This is all the more remarkable as Erasmus' practical concern was identical with Caraffa's: the revival of religion. Part of the way the two could, and did, go together; Caraffa,

[3] F. H. Reusch (ed.), *Die Indices Librorum Prohibitorum des 16. Jahrhunderts* (1886), p. 183. The Index of Pius IV (1564) mitigated the sentence by confining the ban to the following works of Erasmus: *Colloquiorum liber, Moria, Lingua, Christiani matrimonii institutio. De interdicto esu carnium, ejusdem Paraphrasis in Matthaeum.* But it was added: *Caetera vero opera ipsius, in quibus de religione tractat, tamdiu prohibita sint, quamdiu a facultate theologica Parisiensi vel Lovaniensi expurgata non fuerint* (Reusch, *op. cit.* p. 259).

too, was interested in good editions of the Greek Fathers. But soon they came to a point where they parted company. It is not at all easy to indicate this point. In looking for it we may be helped by recalling the fundamental convictions of Pole's most intimate friend, the great Christian humanist Gasparo Contarini: the belief that human reason plays an indispensable part in interpreting and supplementing revelation, and the related belief that men, as rational beings, are free in the sense that any authority over them must be based, not on arbitrary will, but on reason. Reason and Freedom: both of them derive here from a certain trust in man—in man not in himself, but as the likeness, in spite of grievous blemishes, of God. The highest part of man, we are told by Erasmus, is an "image of the Divine mind", *quaedam Divinae mentis imago*.[4] And the law of freedom, as Contarini does not fail to add, is the law of Christ: the trust in one's fellow-man is the secular counterpart to Christian charity.[5]

All this was not, of course, a discovery of the Christian humanists of the Renaissance; it was nothing but the conscious restatement of the main Christian tradition. This tradition is embodied, for example, in the Offertory of the Roman Mass—a text that all these men must have heard and said hundreds of times: *Deus qui humanae substantiae dignitatem mirabiliter condidisti et mirabilius reformasti*—"O God who hast wonderfully created, and still more wonderfully restored, the dignity of human nature". This can be expressed in many different ways; Contarini knew the teaching of Thomas Aquinas better than Erasmus did, and he could therefore formulate these matters more clearly and more comprehensively. But he shared Erasmus' attitude to the chief intellectual issue of their age:

[4] Erasmus, *Opera Omnia*. Leyden 1704, Vol. V, fol. 772 F, quoted in R. Pfeiffer, *Die Einheit im geistigen Werk des Erasmus, Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift*, Vol. XV (1937), pp. 473 *seq.*

[5] It might be thought that in this context I am alluding to Dostoevsky's parable of the Grand Inquisitor. I am not; Dostoevsky uses a different concept of "freedom" (cf. Romano Guardini's analysis in his book on Dostoevsky).

both of them, and Thomas More as well, attempted to accommodate the results of the newly-stimulated learning within the framework of the newly-stimulated Christian religion. A man like Contarini was bound to be utterly dismayed when he became acquainted, in the course of his diplomatic journeys, with the workings of the Spanish Inquisition.[6]

Not so Caraffa, the Grand Inquisitor. His lack of charity is too obvious to need any comment. But here we are mainly concerned with the secular counterpart to this failing; his persistent distrust of other people, the tyrannical imposition of his will on them. Caraffa was unable to master his overbearing temperament; the chaos of his Papacy was merely an outward expression of his inner chaos. This unreasonable man may well have found it difficult to trust the reason of others. And his example was contagious; the Counter-Reformation proceeded more on Caraffa's lines than on Contarini's.

It would, of course, not be true to say that the Counter-Reformation owed nothing to humanism. The Jesuits, for example, made extensive use of the Greek and Latin classics in their famous schools; Catholic scholarship produced such valuable works as those of the historian Baronius; Cardinal Bellarmine, the author of the revised Vulgate, was a truly and widely learned man. Pole had his later successors as well as Caraffa, but they were seldom in decisively influential positions, and all the time Index and Inquisition kept their watch. But when the next challenge came—science—the ultimate response was similar to Caraffa's rejection of humanism. First Erasmus, then Galilei: the principle was the same. And so was the consequence: the divorce, increased by later encounters and still painfully noticeable in our time, between the best secular thought and the Church.[7]

In the history of this conflict a place of honour is due to

[6] F. Dittrich, *Gasparo Contarini* (1885), p. 111.

[7] For an earlier stage of this conflict, cf. Philip Hughes, *A History of the Church*, Vol. III (1947), pp. 112-124.

Reginald Pole, along with Erasmus, More, and Contarini, even if Pole's theological equipment was weaker than that of the other members of this group. In Pole's time, Bembo represented a distorted humanism, Caraffa a distorted Christianity; in his best moments Pole realized that a divorce between humanism and Christianity makes both of them lose their true nature. Herein, perhaps, lies his chief claim to our attention—a claim that transcends the realm of the purely biographical, though it is securely rooted there. Christian humanism is not a ready-made formula one can fall back on but an ever-present task; the study of the lives of Christian humanists is an integral part of this task:

> "We are born with the dead.
> See, they return, and bring us with them."
> (T. S. Eliot).

Such an intimate relationship need not blind us to human weaknesses. *Tout comprendre* is not *tout pardonner*: one can try to comprehend everything, even succeed in doing so to a large extent, and yet condemn the wilful transgression or the culpable negligence. "If we lower our standards in History", was Lord Acton's prophetic warning, "we cannot uphold it in Church or State". In arriving at our verdicts we must, of course, use the judicial experience gained in self-examination; any form of self-righteousness is out of place. We shall not condone the rack or the stake, but we shall remember the concentration-camps; we shall not excuse the shirking of moral responsibility, but we shall not forget how often we have turned our backs on our own duty.

Pole's chief temptation was to escape from public duties to his study and oratory and to the warm company of his friends. Sometimes he overcame this temptation and sometimes he succumbed to it. The greatest blot on his memory, his part in the Marian persecution, was caused by this particular weakness. He was certainly not a heresy-hunter, but he did nothing to stop the persecution. While he was sitting back, much indescribable suffering occurred. It is irrelevant to point to similar sufferings caused by the opponents of Pole's cause, here and abroad; a

hundred wrongs never make a right, and this was a wrong.

Too often, however, Pole is remembered for nothing but this wrong, or the weakness that caused it. Enough has been said to suggest that this is really not the whole story. We must also remind ourselves that, owing to his part in the Catholic reform movement, he was able to take a firm stand against the dangers of the modern State. In claiming room for the newly revived religious forces he was bound to set a limit to the insatiable Leviathan. It is this, too, that should secure Pole a hearing in our time. There is no other refuge, we have learnt, except religion, but that refuge can become a veritable fortress if it is built with the seriousness and care of men like More and Pole. The sphere of inwardness, they knew, must be safeguarded against the brutal attacks of worldly power, and if the State invades this sphere, no natural loyalties must prevent determined resistance against this outrage. No-one would claim that Pole was always successful in this resistance, but there can be no doubt that he tried to perform this task to the best of his ability. And he was among the few men of his time who fully realized the significance of this issue.

We cannot go further than that. Much of his life must necessarily elude us: we cannot listen to his meditations and prayers, we cannot recapture the full quality of his intense religious life. But something that is closely related to that side of him must be duly stressed: his genius for friendship.

Wherever he was, at all stages of his life, he was immediately surrounded by friends. Some, no doubt, were attracted by his princely rank and by hopes of preferment. But there cannot have been many such even in the beginning, and later his worldly prospects were not bright enough to attract place-hunters. Many people felt real, unforced love for him. This love comes out in the pages of his first biographer; in Sadoleto's and Contarini's letters; in letter after letter written by an astonishing number of people. It seems that Pole, who did not feel at ease in public, could quickly establish significant relations with people when he met them in a small group. In his student days he had the reputation of being taciturn, but he

seems not to have retained this habit in later life. We are told in fact that his conversation was animated and gay: "Having seen much of the world and read much, he could entertain anybody in a pleasant manner."[8] But entertainment was only the surface; his friends went deeper in serious dialogue, in common spiritual exploration. We have no direct records of these meetings; we can only infer their quality from the character of those who took part in them. Let us recall some of their names: Contarini, Sadoleto, Flaminio, Vittoria Colonna. It was in the company of these friends that Pole was happiest and at his best. And here we will leave him.

[8] *Epistolae Poli*, Vol. V, p. 385. This article is part of a forthcoming biography of Pole (to be published by Longmans).

RELIGION AND CULTURE

Notes on Some Recent Discussions

By R. H. DAUBNEY

THE study of social culture has been a comparatively recent development among the humane sciences. Its progress has been accelerated primarily by the investigation and comparison of non-European cultures, since the possibility of perceiving as a whole the cultural pattern of one's own society requires a degree of detachment which is seldom achieved. But at the same time, the gradual recognition that the crisis of the western world could not be explained satisfactorily in terms of the disintegration of the various departments of human life, which in turn had been regarded as the key to man's nature and destiny, suggested that an evaluation must be sought for the problem which would take account of the total dimensions of human existence. Thus, V. A. Demant observed in a broadcast talk: "I want here to interpret the crisis of our time as the breakdown of a civilization. As a sociologist and a historian of human cultures I am sure, not only that this is the truest interpretation, but in the end the most hopeful one. If we go on thinking and acting as if this civilization of ours is assured of its survival, or as if its strains could be cured by better political systems or economic methods or even more heroic morals, then—I contend—the breakdown will deepen into complete dissolution. On the other hand, if we frankly recognize that our western civilization is showing, on the largest scale ever known, all the signs which have marked the disintegration of cultures in the past, we may

be able to plant the seeds of a renewal which will not have to wait until after a long period of utter decay."[1]

Confronted with the crisis of western culture, man is equally faced with the problem of the role which religion plays in culture, since it is the common verdict of the anthropologist, the ethnologist and the historian that a social culture only emerges in close association with a religion, and that the fate of the one is closely bound up with the fate of the other. The last six months have seen the publication of some half dozen books concerned with the problem of religion and culture in general, or Christianity and western civilization in particular, which provide a number of valuable insights into the question at issue. The writers include Brunner, Dawson, Eliot, Major, Micklem and Toynbee. The following notes are based on the contributions of the first three of these thinkers;[2] they are limited to the problem of the relation between religion and the cultural pattern, and they do not propose to discuss other components of culture, except by implication.

The fact that some of the best minds of our time have been moved to grapple with this problem indicates that it is one which has now become part of the common consciousness of people, and that its complexities require to be sorted out—indeed, it should have been done long ago, as Brunner observes. Moreover, the fact that the problem has become part of the common consciousness of people is an indication that religion and culture are realities which they no longer possess in any healthy and integrated form. When religion and culture are in a healthy state, the full range and activity of each one, as well as the scope of the interaction between them, is largely unperceived by the majority of the members of a society. It is only

[1] V. A. Demant, "The Breakdown of a Civilization", in *The Listener*, June 26, 1947, p. 993.

[2] T. S. Eliot, *Notes towards the Definition of Culture* (Faber and Faber, 10s. 6d.) Emil Brunner, *Christianity and Civilization*: First Part: Foundations. Gifford Lectures 1947 (Nisbet, 10s.) Christopher Dawson, *Religion and Culture*. Gifford Lectures 1947 (Sheed and Ward, 10s. 6d.)

when either or both of them begin to disintegrate, and disintegration manifests itself in the pattern of the common life, that the problem of their respective functions and inter-relations requires direct attention.

I

The words *religion* and *culture* have both acquired a wide and indefinite area of meaning in contemporary usage. "I have observed with growing anxiety the career of this word *culture* during the past six or seven years", Mr. Eliot remarks in his Introduction (p. 13). It has become part of the vocabulary of the journalist, the politician and the educationist, as well as of the anthropologist, the sociologist and the theologian, to whom it more properly belongs. It is well, therefore, in the present discussion, that Mr. Eliot has attempted the salutary task of clarifying its meaning for us; although he does not claim to differentiate it from *civilization*, since "any such attempt could produce only an artificial distinction." His essay is comparatively brief in compass, but it is nevertheless the product of some five years' meditation on the subject. The present reviewer remembers taking part in the seminars at St. Anne's House in 1943-44 when the subject was first propounded in company with Mr. Philip Mairet, and the draft of the first chapter which appeared in *Prospect for Christendom*. In spite of its brevity, however, the book deserves careful attention: it makes no claim to cover the whole range of the problem, but it is written with that grace and lucidity of thought which we have come to recognize as typical of its author.

Mr. Eliot makes it clear that his argument owes much to the work of Christopher Dawson, V. A. Demant, and the late Karl Mannheim, and had best be stated in his own words: "The term *culture* has different associations according to whether we have in mind the development of an *individual*, of a *group* or *class*, or of a *whole society*. It is part of my thesis that the culture of the individual is dependent upon the culture of a group or class, and that the culture of the group or class is dependent upon the culture of the whole society to which

the group or class belongs. Therefore it is the culture of the society that is fundamental, and it is the meaning of the term 'culture' in relation to the whole society that should be examined first" (p. 21). The inter-relation between these three senses must be kept in mind when we ask how far "the *conscious aim to achieve culture has any meaning*"; and when this is done it is clear that culture in the fundamental sense "is the one thing we cannot deliberately aim at. It is the product of a variety of more or less harmonious activities, each pursued for its own sake" (p. 19). This statement of the problem is closely akin to the definition offered by Christopher Dawson: "A social culture is an organized way of life which is based on a common tradition and conditioned by a common environment. It is therefore not identical with the concept of civilization which involves a high degree of rationalization nor with society itself, since a culture normally includes a number of independent social units . . . Thus culture is the form of society. The society without a culture is a formless society—a crowd or a collection of individuals brought together by the needs of the moment—while the stronger the culture is, the more completely does it inform and transform the diverse human material of which it is composed."[3]

The second point in Mr. Eliot's argument concerns the "relation" between religion and culture. No significant culture has appeared except in relation to a religion, so that according to the point of view of the observer the religion may be regarded as the product of the culture, or the culture as the product of the religion. When the appropriate meanings are attached to the words *culture* and *religion* they may be seen as different aspects of the same reality, and this will enable us to guard against two errors: the one which conceives the possibility of cultural development without religious roots; and the other which believes that the preservation of religion need not concern itself with the preservation of culture. But it must be observed that this view of the identification of religion and

[3] C. Dawson, *Religion and Culture*, pp. 47-48.

culture " holds good only in the sense in which people are unconscious of both their culture and their religion." This immediately exposes the inadequacy of the word *relation* as a description of the interaction between religion and culture. A universal religion cannot be completely identified with a local or national culture, and therefore we must recognize both the unity and diversity in religion as well as in culture. The friction between different levels of cultural achievement in various regions, as well as in different classes and groups, and the different levels of religious sensibility (which are not necessarily correlated with the levels of cultural achievement) provides an essential condition of the health of religion and culture within the whole society. Moreover, this recognition (which Mr. Eliot admits is elusive in its practical application) enables us to " avoid two alternative errors: that of regarding religion and culture as two separate things between which there is a *relation,* and that of *identifying* religion and culture " (p. 33). He prefers, therefore, to regard " the culture of a people as an *incarnation* of its religion."

The three following chapters exemplify the principle of unity and diversity as the source of friction which is necessary for the health of religion and culture with reference to " The Class and the Elite ", " The Region " and " The Sect and Cult." Two notes are added on " Culture and Politics " and " Education and Culture ", while the English version of three broadcast talks to Germany on " The Unity of European Culture " form an appendix. We have no space to follow Mr. Eliot's exposition of these themes in detail as it deserves, or to do justice to the variety of suggestions which he has put forward. The two following quotations will, however, give some indication of the position which he maintains. " Both class and region, by dividing the inhabitants of a country into two different kinds of groups, lead to a conflict which is favourable to creativeness and progress " (p. 59). While later he says that " higher religions " can provide " a ground pattern of common belief and behaviour, upon which a variety of local patterns can be embroidered; and they will encourage a reciprocal influence of peoples upon each other, such that any cultural progress in one

area may quicken development in another" (p. 70). It should be observed, however, that this principle has been qualified by a warning about the disintegration of culture given on an earlier page: "Cultural disintegration is present when two or more strata so separate that these become in effect two distinct cultures; and also when culture at the upper level breaks into fragments each of which represents one cultural activity alone" (p. 26). Such cultural disintegration is the most serious factor which can undermine the cohesion of a society, and as such presents a situation in which the recovery of social health is the most difficult.

The emphasis on the social pattern as the primary conception of culture, and its stratification according to region, group, class and sect, which Mr. Eliot has described, needs to be supplemented by a consideration of cultural transmission and the participation of the individual in social culture. We have a salutary reminder that "the primary channel of transmission of culture is the family: no man wholly escapes from the kind, or wholly surpasses the degree, of culture which he acquired from his early environment . . . In a society of any complexity it is supplemented and continued by other conduits of tradition . . . (but) when family life fails to play its part, we must expect our culture to deteriorate" (p. 43). This demands that the family must be conceived as a continuing entity which maintains its cohesion with past and future generations: it involves "a piety towards the dead, however obscure, and a solicitude for the unborn, however remote. Unless this reverence for the past and future is cultivated in the home, it can never be more than a verbal convention in the community" (p. 44). This, I think, provides a clue to the true character of the participation of the individual in the cultural pattern, and in consequence the role which education plays in culture. Another writer has suggested recently that "a culture is the configuration of *learned* behaviour and results of behaviour whose component elements are shared and transmitted by the members of a particular society."[4] And in this connexion, I recall Tillich's re-

[4] R. Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality*, p. 21.

mark that "the theonomous word for education is *initiation.* While the word *education* points to the *terminus a quo,* the word *initiation* points to the *terminus ad quem.* Secular culture has lost an ultimate and commanding *terminus ad quem,* because it has lost an ultimate and unconditional concern . . . When the element of initiation was lost, education lost the *terminus ad quem* and is now desperately looking for it."[5]

II

We must confine these notes to the problem of religion and culture, however; and therefore at this point we may indicate the approach to the problem offered by Dr. Brunner. It is necessary to make two reservations in reviewing the first volume of his Gifford Lectures: at the time of writing no information is available concerning the method and contents of the second volume; while, on the other hand, the subjects which he has discussed in a summary manner in the various chapters here have in many cases been dealt with much more extensively in his other writings.

In an introductory statement of "The Problem of a Christian Civilization" he notes the ambiguous nature of the issue in that, on the one hand, the New Testament seems little concerned with the problem of civilization; while, on the other hand, civilization itself indicates a certain independence from Christianity. This ambiguity therefore demands a new kind of approach to the problem. He regards civilization or culture as "the sum of productions and productive forces by which human life transcends the animal or vital sphere of self-preservation and preservation of the species" (p. 10). The character of a civilization is determined by three inter-related factors: first, "by natural factors like formation of country, climate, possibilities of maintenance, within which, as a given frame, human life has to develop"; secondly, "by the physical and spiritual equipment of men within a given area, by their physical and spiritual forces, their vitality, their energy and their

[5] P. Tillich, *The Protestant Era,* p. 65.

talent"; and thirdly, by "the spiritual pre-suppositions of a religious and ethical nature which, not in themselves cultural, we might call the culture-transcendent pre-suppositions of every culture. This third factor lies within the sphere of historical freedom, within the area which is open to the free self-decision of man" (p. 11). It is with the component elements of this third factor that Dr. Brunner is essentially concerned in his first volume, because it "affords the possibility for a spiritual force like Christianity to enter the field of culture and give it a certain direction and character."

Accordingly, he selects a number of these basic problems concerning human existence which require an answer of some kind, explicit or implicit in every culture, and indicates the various combinations and permutations of Christian and non-Christian elements which have actually been included in the answers to them in the course of western culture, and which have therefore determined its style in particular periods. These basic problems, which form the subjects of the following chapters, can be divided into three groups. The first group comprises the problems of Reality, Truth and Meaning; the second group includes the more specifically human problems of man's place in the cosmos and of personality and humanity; while the third group deals with the problems of Justice, Freedom and Creativeness. Dr. Brunner includes the problem of Time in the first group, which is legitimate from one point of view, although it does not take sufficient account of the paradox that man is within time and history, while time is also included within man. The first group, however, provides, as it were, the framework of human existence; the second is concerned with man's distinctive place within that framework; and the third considers man's operations within it, the purposes and values which he attempts to realize, and the limitations which are imposed upon their realization. Such is the plan of the first volume. It will be clear that the treatment of any one of these problems within the scope of a single lecture must involve considerable compression and, it may be argued, undue simplification of the issues. Thus, it would be possible to join in debate

with the writer on a number of points which he has made here, even though taken in the context of his other works. Such a discussion would, however, take us beyond the limits of a review. But even if we admit this over-simplification, it is nonetheless valuable to have the thought of a richly-stored theological mind crystallized in this way.

In the light of these discussions, we are now in a position to suggest, in a summary form, the fundamental aspects of the role which religion plays in the formation of culture. We must turn first to the account which Christopher Dawson gives of religion. "All religion", he says, "is based on the recognition of a superhuman Reality of which man is somehow conscious and towards which he must in some way orientate his life."[6] This recognition rests upon the fact that the human mind possesses a natural knowledge of the existence of God, for which he quotes the testimony of Calvin rather than Aquinas, while at the same time "the range of man's rational activity is bounded on the one hand by the depth of his unconscious mind and on the other by the transcendent element in external reality. And this element of transcendence is a primordial element of human experience . . . The difference between the discursive reason and the intuition of the contemplative is not the same as the difference between the natural and the supernatural (in the technical, theological sense of the words)—between reason and faith; it is simply a question of the different levels of consciousness which are equally parts of human nature."[7] The first two chapters, which are devoted to a discussion of "Natural Theology and the Scientific Study of Religion" and God and the Supernatural as the elements of religion, describe the way in which the natural theology of the ages of faith has been transformed by humanism and rationalism to bring about "the divorce between the psyche and the reason" which "is abnormal, unnatural and morbid, since it is only by a conciliation and co-operation of the two

[6] C. Dawson, *Religion and Culture,* p. 25.
[7] C. Dawson, *op. cit.,* pp. 33-34.

that the world of culture in which we live and in which man has always lived has come into existence" (p. 22). It is clear, of course, that revelation is everywhere regarded as the primary source of religious knowledge, and that intuition and reason are secondary; anything that can be called a philosophical theology only appears when social organization is sufficiently developed to provide leisure for reflection and study.

Culture begins to emerge when man attempts to incite nature to produce that which it would not otherwise produce if left to its own cyclic course of development. In this attempt man believes that it is necessary to correlate the superhuman powers with the cyclic process of nature in order to give a fundamental pattern to his existence. "However low is the level of culture, man cannot but recognize the existence of laws and rhythms and cycles of change in the life of nature in which his own life is involved . . . Behind these appearances there are divine powers—gods or spirits or undifferentiated magical forces which must be propitiated and served if man is to live" (p. 41). The religion which expresses this service, and thus moulds the natural foundations of culture, is not a consciously formulated body of knowledge, but lives in myths and rituals and sacred techniques of various kinds. "From the beginning the social way of life which is culture has been deliberately ordered and directed in accordance with the higher laws of life which are religion" (p. 49). It follows that the interaction between religion and culture works in both directions: "The way of life influences the approach to religion, and the religious attitude influences the way of life. Whatever is felt to be of vital importance in the life of people is brought into close relation with religion and surrounded by religious sanctions, so that every economic and social way of life has its corresponding form of religion" (p. 57). It again follows that the cultural pattern is open to change by forces operating on either side: "Any material change which transforms the external conditions of life will also change the cultural way of life and thus produce a new religious attitude. And likewise any spiritual change which transforms men's views of reality will tend to change

their way of life and thus produce a new form of culture" (p. 59).

These quotations represent fairly, I think, Mr. Dawson's conception of the relation between religion and culture. The main body of his book is now taken up with a description of the sources of religious knowledge and the religious organs of society which begin to develop as soon as any degree of complexity is achieved in social organization. These are the Prophet who is regarded as the spokesman of the divine will; the Priest who is trained and set apart to enact the rituals and sacrifices which express the union between the society and its deity; and the King who is conceived to be the personal embodiment of the divine power and the giver of law. The six chapters which deal with the Prophet, Priest and King, the Sacred Science, the Sacred Law and the Way of Perfection, draw their illustrations from a vast range of cultural traditions, so that some readers may be tempted to regard the book as a manual for the comparative study of religion. This would be a mistake, however, since these chapters are in fact studies of the way in which divine archetypes are incarnated and inform the cultural pattern of society. But however interesting and illuminating these studies in the persistence of certain realities may be, we shall perhaps feel that Mr. Dawson stops short at the point where the problem of religion and culture becomes our immediate concern, in that he does not discuss the peculiarly Christian form of the problem. We are here confronted with the revealed fact that the archetypal divine offices of prophet, priest and king, with their functions of declaring the divine will, performing the sacred ritual and giving the divine law, and the whole cultural significance which lies behind them, have been united and incarnated in the Person of Christ, and their exercise is perpetuated in his Mystical Body.

At this point I am constrained to refer to a discussion of the relation between archetypes and Incarnation made by Dr. A. M. Farrer in the sixth of his recent Bampton Lectures. The human prophet, priest or king and their divine archetypes arise at the same time and are inseparable from one another. Once they have developed they must be naturalized or they tend to

support dogmatisms of one kind or another. For the philosophical mind, this naturalization takes place by their "reduction to creative intentions"; while for the primitive mind there is at least an identity of action. "There are, in fact, only two ways in which the archetypal relation can be treated as a dynamic identity: either God must be naturalized, or his expressive instrument must be supernaturalized. God cannot be naturalized, man can merely feign it. But God's instrument can be supernaturalized, for God can effect it. To naturalize God is idolatry: for God to supernaturalize his instrument is incarnation . . . Christ clothed himself in the archetypal images, and then began to do and to suffer. The images were further transformed by what Christ suffered and did when he had put them on: they were transformed also by their all being combined in his one person."[8]

The specific problem of a Christian culture is that of a universal religion which has incarnated the religious elements of a variety of cultures in one Person, and therefore must always transcend the cultural forms and patterns of social life which are the products of human creativeness. The nearest approximation was achieved in the medieval synthesis, but as Mr. Dawson points out, although this appeared "to achieve complete cultural unity and to embrace every aspect of social and intellectual life, it was in fact highly unstable and began to show signs of tension and internal conflict from the moment it was completed" (p. 201). Therefore, he concludes, "the identification of religion with the particular cultural synthesis which has been achieved at a definite point of time and space by the action of historical forces is fatal to the universal character of religious truth" (p. 206). In this situation the comparatively modern issue of a sacred and a secular culture emerges, while at the same time the primitive, magical attitude of man to nature is transformed into a rational and technical attitude. When the natural order was conceived as the manifestation of

[8] A. M. Farrer, *The Glass of Vision*, Lecture VI: "Archetypes and Incarnation", pp. 106, 109.

divine power with which man must co-ordinate his life, the way was open for a symbolical and sacramental attitude towards it which could employ natural realities in sacred service, while recognizing that the New Being in Christ could not be contained entirely within the natural forms, although the natural forms were capable of being incorporated into Christ's Body. The tension between transcendence and immanence, however, is extremely difficult to maintain, and there is always the temptation to exalt the transcendence of the New Being, and leave the immanent natural forms to develop their own autonomy. When man, and not the God-Man, becomes the bearer of the law of life, he will regard the realm of natural reality which he himself transcends as the legitimate field of his own use without reference to the transcendent spiritual reality. Thus, Mr. Dawson remarks that "primitive man in his weakness and ignorance is nearer to the basic realities of human existence than the self-satisfied rationalist who is confident that he has mastered the secrets of the universe. The latter has focused all his attention and all his activity on the region which can be explored by human reason and controlled by human will, and has thereby made it wider and more habitable, but he has not changed the fact of its ultimate limitation . . . He is living precariously on a relatively superficial level of existence and consciousness, and the higher he builds his tower of civilization the more topheavy it becomes" (p. 28).

III

In the present situation an interpretation of the role of the Christian faith as a formative factor in modern culture has to be carried out on three levels and on three sides. In the first place, on the intellectual level, it must show the elements in its heritage which are combined to provide the distinctively Christian interpretation of human nature and existence, as well as the way various elements have been isolated in post-Reformation Christian traditions, and how these in turn have become subject to secular perversion. As the Christian faith lies open to secular criticism, so it acquires the power to criticize the

secular, and "to show that in the depth of every autonomous culture an ultimate concern, something unconditional and holy, is implied. (This) is the task of deciphering the style of an autonomous culture in all its characteristic expressions and of finding their hidden religious significance."[9] This is the task which Brunner has attempted, and which is also attempted in the work of Paul Tillich. Secondly, it must be shown that ideas do not make history and inform culture unless they can be given concrete embodiment. The distinctively Christian ideas about human existence cannot be embodied in purely rational terms because they are partly the structures of human thought striving towards wholeness and at the same time the divine disclosure of ultimate meaning completing the human incompleteness which has been brought to bay at the boundary of the finite. There is always a vertical as well as an horizontal element in human thinking. The divine disclosure is the precondition of the human striving, and the interaction of these two movements can only be expressed in terms of myth, symbol and ritual in which the members of a community actually participate as a creative activity which informs the pattern of their culture according to the dogmas about the nature of human existence in all its dimensions.

Thirdly, the tradition of Christian mythology, symbolism and ritual is entrusted to the guardianship of the Church which embodies the organs and functions of prophecy, priesthood and kingship, because these realities express necessary metaphysical truths about the nature of man's life. Man, as prophet, must interpret the meaning of existence to himself, or his personal and social life will decay at their roots; he must, as priest, mediate between his own and other levels of existence, and thereby express the return of each order of being to its source, or the cosmos will disintegrate into finite centres which have no relation to one another; he must, as king, embody the law of life in his own nature and creative activities, while recognizing that the law is given from a transcendent source and

[9] P. Tillich, *The Protestant Era*, p. 58.

is at the same time immanent in his own being and in the being of creatures generally in a form which has a proper autonomy at every level. Prophecy, priesthood and kingship express realities which belong to the nature of man according to his status in the cosmos, and at the same time their exercise in the supernatural economy of the Church ensures that their purely natural and finite functions are maintained in health because they are constantly directed to their transcendent end.

A SERMON

Preached in the Chapel of Trinity College, Cambridge on Remembrance Day 1948

By F. A. SIMPSON

We are called upon to-day to remember our dead in two great wars. And it is natural perhaps that one, charged with the task of addressing you on such an occasion, should find himself in preparation for it turning over not only old memories, but old letters: letters received in both those wars from members of this college then far sundered from it: from men in France and Italy, Asia and Africa; from barracks, and billets, and hospitals, and from prisoners of war. They were letters naturally of every type and form: some on the crisp and crested paper of newly joined regiments in England; others scribbled in pencil on flimsy sheets from the trenches, reaching me sometimes after their writers were dead. But differing so much in so many ways, these letters were in one thing alike. It was clear that those who wrote them were constantly remembering this place, which they would not see again—for in general I seem only to have kept the letters of those who did not see it again—and it is clear too that in that hour, when they remembered it, they were glad of it. Even as we, when we remember them, are in a sense not only proud of them, but glad of them.

Their thoughts, indeed, during those ten years of war, came flocking back to this place like homing pigeons. I do not mean that there was anything strange in that. The censored letters of town lads in the ranks—for I found myself turning over a bundle of them too—these during those years when they were abroad showed something of the same feeling for the very soil

of Cambridge that our own men, with greater reason, nursed toward the college. But in the case of our own men it displayed itself in many ways; sometimes in forms of which one only learned much later, from those pathetic volumes—such long volumes on such short lives—volumes in which their relatives and friends enshrined the memory of those whom they had lost. From one such volume, I remember, sent to me by his father, I learned how and why, beneath the wooden cross of a boy whom I did not even know by sight, there had been placed the text of a sermon preached here in this chapel: a wooden cross fetched home now from Flanders, and standing to-day, with that text beneath it still, in a village church in Scotland. And besides their own letters and their fathers' were others perhaps more moving still, from those who would have been, but never were, their brides; more than one of whom I was to have married to these men, in short leaves that never came. From these it would obviously be improper for me to quote. But since without some sacrifice of reticence one cannot preach at all, I will allow myself—or force myself—from just one of their own letters, to read a single sentence; since it seems to me to comprehend the spirit of them all. It was written by a scholar of the college, a month or two before he was killed. "The war", he wrote, "has done one thing for me; it has shown me again, what I really knew already, what a grand thing it is to have known and loved people like all of you." With how much greater reason may we say that of them. They have shown us again, what we too really knew already, what a grand thing it is to have known—and loved—people like all of them.

A grand thing yes, but a very grievous thing: rendered more grievous still by the fact that in both wars, but especially in the first, death did not take toll haphazard, but chose the very best. Almost one found oneself predicting for that reason, after the final handshake, "Well, whoever comes back, *he* will not." And too often we were right. And looking then at our deserted courts, and remembering them as they were on the eve of the first war, thronged as perhaps never before or since with the very flower of the race, we were tempted to add

"Never again can such men fill this place". "Never, never more shall we behold the unbought grace of life"—and the rest of it. But there at any rate we were wrong. The genius of the place, and this happy breed of men, were not exhausted: God was able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham. And from their still undemolished beauty, upon their crowded but unconquered occupants, something of that tranquil operation still proceeds.

But a man is vulnerable not only in his affections, but in his hopes. And though both wounds hurt, yet we would not have it otherwise; for to be invulnerable is not to be immortal: it is merely to be dead. But what then, what of our hopes? What of their hopes, whose sacrifice we commemorate once again?

Three years or so after the first war, when wreaths at the foot of the Cenotaph were already becoming few, I chanced to pass it on a day when there was only one. At any rate I only noticed one. Upon it were five words written: "Not in vain, my darling." Would any of us, at this same interval after the second war, dare to word a tribute so? *Then* there seemed ground enough for hope. We had a League of Nations—foredoomed to impotence indeed by America's disowning of it—but at any rate aiming at the reign of justice and of law. Now we have an organization, which virtually announces in advance that it forbids aggression to the weak, and allows it to the strong. Then we had frontiers, not impeccably drawn it is true, but at any rate based upon some sort of principle. Now we have frontiers which, so far as they are fixed at all, are grounded merely on brute force, and can only by brute force be maintained. Worse still, on the morrow of this war a far larger portion of Europe lies under an alien tyranny than on the eve of it; subjected to a despotism by the side of which the Turk was merciful, and the Czardom liberal and humane. Was it all then but wasted labour? Were these lives given in vain? It is not to be thought of that they were. None the less these are facts which we ought not to allow ourselves to blink. It is natural to avert our gaze from evils which we hold ourselves

powerless to prevent; or even, because we cannot prevent them, to try to persuade ourselves that they are not evil. Yet there was an England, not so very long ago, which did not feel herself called upon to do either. True, our strength was still unshorn, and Europe had not then supped so full with horrors. It is true also that though Gladstone might *denounce* atrocities in Italy or Bulgaria, yet it was France, not England, who fought to liberate Italy, and it was Russia, not England, who fought to liberate Bulgaria. We were not exactly knights-errant in the days of our power. Yet it was something, it was much, that there was an England then who could at any rate raise her voice against tyranny: how much, we realize now, when that voice is silent: dumb in the face of cruelties incomparably more widespread and appalling than any which roused the noble wrath of Gladstone. (The several Scots here will, I hope, forgive me if I use the lovely name of England. It would be a pity, I think, if only Germans were allowed to take it on their lips. "England", wrote Swift to Stella, "Pray don't call it Britain."[1] Yet England: Scotland: what matter which? "The poet says, 'Dear city of Kekrops', and wilt not thou say, 'dear city of Zeus'?")

But I was speaking—or rather I will *not* here speak—of the silence of our public men, though it is not a silence which we shall look back upon with pride. But I may in this place speak of the silence of our prayers.

It has become a widespread practice of late in this country to supplement the ancient liturgy of the Church with petitions designed to bring it abreast of modern needs: petitions in which we ask for this, that, or the other thing in terms which have at least the merit of being plain to the meanest intelligence. But while we intercede for — youth-movements, and fellowships of industrial relationships, and the like, in language at times as trumpery as the themes of it are trivial, yet we are altogether silent, in these new-fangled utterances of ours, on the real and terrible new evils of our days. In an age of revived

[1] *Journal to Stella.* November 23, 1711.

slavery we do not pray for slaves; for that would be to admit that there are slaves to pray for. We do not pray for our persecuted fellow-Christians; why should we? It is a great deal pleasanter to pretend there are none. For men kidnapped: for men tortured: for men judicially murdered: for men in their uncounted myriads done to death in forced-labour gangs and concentration camps: for these we dare not—or at least we do not pray. To whose torments—for I will break that silence for a moment—to whose torments may God in his mercy set a term. But the rest is silence. We exclude such topics not only from our Press: our starveling but not yet muzzled Press: we exclude them even from our prayers. It may well be that the arm of England is so shortened that our protests could not help; but do we really think that of our prayers?

There is in fact a worse thing even that easy optimism, and that is faithless pessimism; of which, even in popular and non-Christian parlance, it is the very symbol to say, that things are past praying for. It will not profit us to escape the town of *Fair-speech* and the company of *Vain-confidence* only to become the prisoners of *Giant Despair*. All war indeed has an aftermath of disillusion. "Victory", said the Duke of Wellington—who had some experience of it—"Victory is the greatest tragedy in the world, except defeat." But that, after all, is rather an important exception. Victorious we fare ill: beaten we should have fared immeasurably worse. It is the true and sufficient achievement of those whom we commemorate, to have saved us from defeat, and to have helped to liberate others who *had* been defeated and could never, from now to Doomsday, have liberated themselves.

But how do we know, persists the pessimist, how do we know that even that achievement was final? We do not know it. We do not know whether Europe can long remain half slave, half free. We do not know whether even for this dear land the *fuit Ilium* may not some day sound: *Fuit Ilium et ingens gloria Teucrorum*. But until that day—until that *night*—it would not be nothing to have added were it only a few years to the period in which free and Christian men could

still live and move in some portion of Europe. But we may reasonably hope that these lives have gained us more than that. Time and again before now has the flood of Asiatic barbarism threatened to submerge the civilization of Europe; from the days when its very cradle was saved at Marathon and Salamis, to the times when twice the Turk laid vain siege to Vienna. And always, when all seemed lost, the tide was turned: turned so dramatically that the Father of History—and other things—recorded portents of more than mortal aid for Athens in her mortal need[2]: turned so dramatically that the preacher in St. Stephen's, after John Sobieski's amazing victory beneath its walls, took for his triumphant text: "There was a man sent from God, whose name was John". A graver menace than the Muslim overshadows the Christendom of Eastern and Central Europe to-day; nor do we now, as then, make intercession for it in our churches. But at least we can allow ourselves to hope, that attempts to extinguish it will fail. And for Western Europe, what looks for the moment like a precarious brief reprieve may yet be set for the rising again of all for which these men died. To doubt that would be unworthy of those who against hope believed in hope, and believing in it justified it.

For though England's arm is shortened, we believe that God's is not; and who can tell that he will not deliver us again, as he has delivered us, and others through us, in the past. But if not: then by the Splendour of God, and the glory of his Saints, and the examples of these men, we will *not* worship their gods, whose service is perfect slavery, nor bow down before the image they have set up. So help us God.

Forgive me. I know well that the Church of England is far from sharing the uncharitable judgement of the Church of Rome, that two contradictory propositions cannot both be true. But if it be a sin to think they cannot, then with Rome and against charity will I sin. You need not be a fool to be a Christian. You need not be a fool to be a Communist. But it

[2] Herodotus VIII, 65.

takes a fool to believe—or a knave to pretend—that you can be both a Christian and a Communist at once. For Christianity is one of the things that Communism seeks to exterminate. True, there are several other things, conducive to the decency and dignity of man, that must go first: freedom of thought and speech, of study and discussion; of meeting and movement, writing and printing; fair trial, free election, and every other element of political self-government. But all these things, wherever Communists have power, they have already, by methods of gross terrorism, suppressed. And what they do, and defend, elsewhere, they would, if they could, do here.

Yet lest, finally: lest I should seem to forget that this most evil thing—for it is I think a form of moral cowardice, of a kind not altogether uncommon in this place, to grudge that description to the greatest organized force for evil at present existing on the earth—lest I should seem to forget that this most evil thing is itself a corruption of things most good: I will choose as valediction on these our dead a passage from one of the nobler line of English Socialists, before their doctrines had been rewritten in terms of hatred and class war, by men whom England sheltered, but did not breed. Those English Socialists were inspired by love of the many, not by hatred of the few; and though they had fire in their bellies, and indignation to match their eloquence, that was because they too, like Another before them, had compassion on the multitude. "Yea, forsooth"—these are words which the last great English Socialist put into the mouth of the man he imagined to be the first of them—"Yea, forsooth, once again I saw, as of old, the great treading down the little, and the strong beating down the weak; and cruel men fearing not, and kind men daring not, and wise men caring not, and the Saints in heaven forbearing, and yet bidding *me* not forbear. Forsooth, I knew once more than he who doeth well in fellowship shall not fail, though he seemed to fail to-day; but in days hereafter shall he and his work yet be alive, and men be holpen by them to strive again and yet again: and yet even *that* was

little, since to strive was my pleasure and my life."[3]

It was their pleasure and their life: it was their pleasure and their death. And like Lincoln, half way through *his* war against slavery, we too " here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain".[4] We resolve, God helping us, that their purpose shall not fail, though it seem to fail to-day: to-day when yet once more we see cruel men fearing not, and kind men daring not—and wise men caring not. We resolve that in spite of all these things those three words " not in vain " shall still be an epitaph their loved ones may apply to any one of them.

Yes, those three words, even when they are also a portion of those five: " Not in vain, my darling."

And now to him to whose infinite mercies we commend them:
Who to us weaklings can give strength: Who to us
fearful can give courage: Who to us sorrowful,
the comfort of his help again: To him,
Holy God, Holy and Mighty, Holy and
Immortal, Holy and Undivided
Trinity, be ascribed by us
and by them.
κ. τ. λ.

[3] William Morris, *A Dream of John Ball,* ch. IV.
[4] *Gettysburg Address.* November 19, 1863.

REVIEWS

HENRY VIII AND THE REFORMATION. By H. MAYNARD SMITH, D.D., Canon of Gloucester. (Macmillan.) 30s.

THE material that is now available in print, let alone in manuscript, for the historian of the Reformation in the English Church, is so abundant that it has almost ceased to be possible for any single author to examine and digest it all. It is possible, and it will always be possible, to write a short outline picking out the essential points, like the admirable chapter on "Anglicanism and the Reformation in England" in Professor Norman Sykes' *The Crisis of the Reformation* (1938). It is far more difficult to compile a history that shall be truly comprehensive, or to enter into details without dislocating the chronological framework of the narrative.

The sequel, so long and so eagerly awaited, to Canon Maynard Smith's *Pre-Reformation England* (1938), does not wholly surmount this latter difficulty. There is, in the first place, a certain amount of overlapping between the two books, since the former volume already contained "a lengthy essay on Sir Thomas More as a Christian humanist and Catholic reformer", and an important section on "Henry VIII the Traditionalist." In the second place, the author's treatment of his subject in *Henry VIII and the Reformation* is a mixture of the topical and the chronological: thus we find five successive chapters on The Royal Supremacy (1529-1534), The Dissolution of the Monasteries (1535-1540), Negotiations with Germany (1533-1540), Henry at Bay (1537-1539), The Defender of the Faith (1536-1539), followed, at some interval, by an isolated chapter on Gardiner and Cranmer. The quality of Dr. Maynard Smith's work is such that the reader does not fail to receive a clear and fairly consecutive impression of the movement of events: yet inevitably there are occasional hitches, such as the abrupt and unexplained reference to the examination of Dr. Crome on p. 218. It is, however, fair to add that these are miraculously few, and that the author has succeeded in producing a history of the Reformation under Henry VIII, and not a series of loosely connected biographical studies or essays on particular aspects of it.

He has been wise in dividing his book into two parts, which he calls respectively "The Political Reformation" and "The

Religious Reformation." The division is in practice somewhat arbitrary, but it is convenient, and enables the author to tuck away into the second half of the volume a particularly valuable and fascinating essay on "The Universities (1500-1528)" and a chapter on six selected cases of martyrdom, as well as chapters on the English Bible and its Translators, Doctrine, Ceremonial and Worship, Uniformity and Dissent.

The value of the work lies chiefly in the shrewd and sturdy independence of the author's judgements. As the inspired writer of the "blurb" on the publisher's jacket succinctly puts it: "Dr. Maynard Smith has studied most modern authorities, and is not in entire agreement with any of them. That is his excuse for writing this book." It is a more than adequate excuse, since the matter is of general interest, and the author's dissentient judgements are always reasonable and courteous.

The thesis of the book—in so far as it has a thesis—is that the Reformation in England (which was overdue) came to pass in a very haphazard way, and can be justified only by taking a long-term view. "Those who have considered the facts recorded in this book will not be inclined to boast overmuch about our *Glorious Reformation*" (p. 452). Nor, on the other hand, will they overmuch decry it. For wisdom is justified of her children, in the long run. "A church is strong which can suppress those who deviate from her standards; a church is still stronger which can afford to tolerate them, confident that in the end truth will prevail" (p. 460). By that faith Anglicanism stands or falls. We are at once reminded of the section on "The Diffusive Authority of the Church" in *The Claims of the Church of England* by the Archbishop of York.

Dr. Maynard Smith has made a signal contribution to our understanding of the Reformation under Henry VIII, and of the complex personalities of the men and women who had a hand in it. He is extraordinarily skilful in his assessment and delineation of character: he can hit off Katherine Howard or William Tyndale in a few sentences, while his running commentary on the Majestic Lord himself is a most masterly performance. (He is not, perhaps, quite so successful in his portrait of Cranmer, who is a notoriously difficult sitter.) Again, he is to be commended for recognizing that the history of the Reformation in England, even at this stage, should not be written without some reference to parallel events in Ireland and Scotland, although Fr. Aubrey Gwynn's *The Medieval Province of Armagh* (1470-1545) doubtless appeared too late for him to make use of it. Nor has he made use of the Rev. E. G. Rupp's *Studies in the Making of the*

English Protestant Tradition (mainly in the reign of Henry VIII). presumably for the same reason.

A few criticisms may be offered. Even if Professor Firth has written that "Minstrels who sang 'pestilent and abominable songs' were among the favourite instruments of the Reformers" (p. 69), it may be thought that Dr. Maynard Smith is a little obsessed with these gentry. Marsiglio's *Defensor Pacis* was certainly published in an English translation (p. 70), but, for obvious reasons, it was somewhat bowdlerized. Dr. Maynard Smith does not seem altogether to have grasped the importance of the medieval theory of the Divine Right of Kings (*cf.* Marc Bloch's *Les Rois Thaumaturges*) as a background to the Royal Supremacy: but this complex problem has not yet received the attention it deserves. Since Starkey's *Dialogue between Pole and Lupset* is admittedly fictitious (p. 267), it is surely hazardous to accept it as evidence of Pole's opinions (p. 110). On p. 374, the teaching of the Council of Trent appears to be misrepresented (*cf.* Session XXIII, cap. iv). The statement that Cranmer "was not musical" (p. 402) is a little difficult to reconcile with Fagius' letter to his son-in-law, Johann Ulstetter, in which he says that the Archbishop "is extremely fond of music." The proof-reading seems to have been slightly careless (missing stops, and the like), and some names are mis-spelt, including Professor Deanesly's (pp. 276, 462) and my own (p. 361 a.). But all these criticisms are concerned only with minor details, and in no way detract from the solid and outstanding merits of this lively, judicious, and extremely illuminating book, which is a worthy successor to *Pre-Reformation England* and exhibits the same distinctive qualities.

CHARLES SMYTH.

NEWMAN AND BLOXAM. By R. D. Middleton. (Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1947.) 18s.

BLOXAM of Magdalen has been as a rule little noticed by the historians of the Oxford Movement. The incomparable classic of Dean Church does not mention him. Unlike William James of Oriel, Whately, Hawkins, the Froudes and the Kebles, he had no perceptible influence on the history of Newman's religious opinions. He had no such part in the *Tracts for the Times*, or in the other literary enterprises of the Tractarians, as had Williams, Bowden, Marriott, Church, and Copeland. He was not ὁ Μέγας, like Pusey. He was not like Ward, a Phaeton

in the chariot of the sun. A reader of the immortal *Apologia* might not suspect his existence. Yet he is significant, less perhaps as the father of all ritualists, than as an enthusiast for Anglo-Roman reunion.

Bloxam's friendship with Newman began in 1837, when largely at his own suggestion he became curate at Littlemore. It ended only with the Cardinal's death in August, 1890. Gossip, as far afield as Italy, was that in 1879 (after the journey to Rome for the red hat), "the only visit Cardinal Newman has made since his return to England has been to Dr. Bloxam of Beeding." About 1882 Bloxam began his collection of notes, letters, transcripts and cuttings concerning his illustrious friend. It is now kept, in four folio volumes, in Magdalen library. It forms the basis, though by no means the sole primary authority, for this delightful book, in which the Vicar of St. Margaret's, Oxford, tells the story of this Oxford friendship, with a sympathy delicately expressed, and a self-effacement becoming a Tractarian essay.

Littlemore chapel was consecrated on September 22, 1836. "I never forget September 22nd", wrote Newman in 1864. "All day long yesterday", Bloxam wrote to his friend on the 23rd, two years later, "I was full of recollections of Littlemore. How well I remember thirty years ago the consecration of the little chapel—Isaac Williams reading the morning prayers, your text and sermon, the little child getting its head fixed in the altar-rails, Ward of Balliol walking back with the Warden of Wadham, etc., etc." Newman kept happy memories of the place, in spite of all he had gone through there. Leaving it in the new year of 1846 was very sorrowful. "Perhaps I shall never have quiet again—Shall I ever see Littlemore again?"

Newman's happiness in the first years at Littlemore lay much in the society of friends, and the simple duties of the country priest. He zealously attended to the clean frocks of the children, to their knowing their catechism, and to their learning new tunes, to sing to his accompanying them on his violin. Friends came out from Oxford. "One day at the Littlemore Festival", Bloxam recalled, "when Dr. Pusey was sitting in my room there, and the door was open, Ward said to me loud enough for Pusey to hear him, 'I understand that you are going to give a ball tonight, and that Dr. Pusey has consented to come and dance at it'." The adornment of Littlemore Chapel Newman left very much to Bloxam, being himself no ritualist, and somewhat contemptuous of "the gilt-ginger bread school". Bloxam followed the customs of his college in the furnishings of the new sanctuary. Oakeley looked to Littlemore as a model for the

Margaret chapel. At Littlemore began, too, the revival of church needlework, in the beautiful new "altar-cloth", falling in handsome folds at the corners of the holy table. In 1840 Bloxam resigned his work at Littlemore, to attend his father in his last illness, and perhaps also because of rumours that he had been at the Roman liturgy at Alton Towers, and had bowed his head at the elevation of the Host.

Newman's partiality for Littlemore increased. There he was loved and appreciated, but at Oxford felt only growing coldness and opposition. In February, 1842, he moved all his books there, to live with a few friends, in retirement from the society that in the condemnation of *Tract Ninety* seemed to have disowned him. Already his mind was haunted by the conviction he could not shake off, that Rome after all was right, though not as yet that to continue in the English Church was wrong, and "unsafe." He retired from active ministry in September, 1843. "Perhaps", says Mr. Middleton, "he was the last person who should have lived in seclusion." Bloxam was never a resident at the Littlemore μονή, but advised Newman about the furnishing of its oratory, a little dark room at the end of the corridor. The life there was extremely rigorous. Asceticism, one may suspect, went beyond what was wise. Father Dominic's comment is entirely borne out by the descriptions collected in this book, that "a Capuchin monastery would appear a great palace compared with Littlemore."[1]

Discerning Roman Catholics had watched the Oxford Movement from the beginning. Wiseman had been so much impressed by Newman and Froude when they had visited him at Rome in 1833, by their Catholic temper and burning sincerity, that he gave up his former studies, to devote himself wholly to the bringing back of England to the Roman obedience.[2] In 1838 an association of prayer was started for the same object, with centres of influence on the continent, and even beyond. But not until 1841 was there any considerable intercourse between the Oxford men and Roman Catholics. Bloxam was the original point of contact, partly through his friendship with Pugin, whose ecclesiological interests and tastes he shared, but more through his correspondence with Ambrose Phillipps de Lisle (or Lisle Phillipps, as he then called himself), the wealthy founder of the

[1] Urban Young, *Life and Letters of the Venerable Father Dominic* (1926), p. 265.

[2] W. P. Ward, *Life and Times of Cardinal Wiseman* I (1897), p. 119.

Cistercian abbey of Mount St. Bernard's, some miles outside Leicester.

On the feast of the Conversion of St. Paul, 1841, the date remarkably enough of *Tract Ninety,* Phillipps wrote to Bloxam a most eloquent letter, whose text Mr. Middleton gives in full, expressing the hope that the efforts of the "*Catholicks* of Oxford" would lead to a reunion with Rome. Of the letters which followed, a good deal has already appeared in Purcell's *Life* of Phillipps de Lisle, but in a confused way, which Mr. Middleton has corrected, besides bringing new material out of the Bloxam papers. Phillipps thought of the Church of England as like the Orthodox, schismatic, but professing sound doctrine, and with valid ordinations. He thought also, partly in a political way, of the reunion as aided by a moderate Conservative Government, and as paralysing the dissenters. As plainly appears from these letters, his view of what could be done was romantic to a degree.

Inevitably there was in the Roman approach some ambiguity of motive. Phillipps and Wiseman hoped for a corporate reunion, bringing in the "great body" of the Anglican Church. But they did not (how on their principles could they?) discourage individual conversions, against which Newman and Bloxam spoke decidedly. Father Dominic observed that the Oxford men were "not yet as near as some think, and that a corporate reunion would present unusual difficulties. 'It will be easier to convert individuals who seek the truth in good faith."[3] Once Wiseman had been won over to the idea of a "negociation", he and Phillipps worked together closely, more closely than appears from this book. Wiseman, discussing with Russell of Maynooth the policy to be followed in dealing with the Oxford men, wrote that "when . . . they have not been so far enlightened by faith and grace as to feel that it is a risk to their own salvation to remain united in the Anglican Church, though they consider it a duty of that Church to bring itself into communion with the Catholic Church, all we can do is to push them forward in their view so as to make them diffuse it in every direction, and to invite them towards us rather than to repulse them."[4] It is hard to see how, on Roman premisses, there could be any other intelligent conclusion. The secessions of 1841, and the other troubles following *Tract Ninety,* put an end to the Bloxam-Phillipps "negociation". Bloxam could but comment sadly that "the

[3] Urban Young, *op. cit.,* p. 195.
[4] W. P. Ward, *op. cit.,* I, p. 388.

secession of Sibthorp, and the evident eagerness of Dr. Wiseman and Mr. Phillipps to receive deserters from our Camp . . . at once dispelled the notion of a Re-union of the Churches, which vanished like a dream; and I no longer took any part in the correspondence with Mr. Ambrose Phillipps, which was, however, continued by Ward and Dalgairns, and perhaps others."

There is little discussion in these letters of the fundamental theological problems of unity. Perhaps full dogmatic agreement was attainable more easily then, than after the *Pastor Aeternus* of 1870. It is noticeable also, how few of the Tractarians were concerned, the "Mountain" only, to which Bloxam was held to belong. Yet Bernard Smith was in 1841 already "quite tired of Bloxam and Company, who are after all in advance of the rest of the Oxford party". Bloxam, he said, was "tied very closely to Newman at present, and Newman . . . to Keble."[5]

Contrary to a general expectation, Bloxam did not follow Newman to Rome. He thought (though this was not Newman's view), that if all in authority had treated Newman "as the old President of Magdalen did", he would not have seceded. It was only natural that Newman and other converts of 1845 should try to persuade Bloxam to follow them. But Bloxam's loyalty to the Church of England was no more shaken than his loyalty to Newman as a friend. On Christmas Eve, 1845, between eight and nine at night, Newman turned up at Bloxam's rooms, and proposed that he "should go and be admitted a member of the Church of Rome on the following day". "My dear fellow . .", he wrote from Rome in 1847, "do become one of us . . . At Rome . . . they (i.e., the Oratorians) are the ritualists of the place. How can you remain at Oxford? What sympathy do you meet with there?" Of Charles Marriott, Newman could only say, "I don't think he has any argument . . . except Pusey and sanguineness."

Newman's later letters to Bloxam contain many interesting confidences—words of distress at Pusey's *Eirenicon* in 1865, hopes and fears in 1869-70 for the Vatican council. The Oratorians at Birmingham kept closely in touch with Bloxam in the last days of the Cardinal's earthly pilgrimage. When the two friends had been together at Littlemore and St. Mary's, they had agreed that on the death of one the other should say for him the Roman office of the dead. This Bloxam did for Newman at Beeding, the church flag flying at half-mast. He died himself half a year after, in January 1891.

[5] E. S. Purcell, *Life and Letters of Ambrose Phillipps de Lisle* (1900), I, pp. 252, 253.

Mr. Middleton, using a method Newman thought good, has let his documents speak for themselves, giving no more than necessary (perhaps almost too little) of his own commentary. *Newman and Bloxam* is a refreshing book, because so much is told in it of forbearance, of mutual loyalty, of hopefulness, so much of charity, so much (unlike many modern books) of the fruits of the Spirit. It is a useful book, which adds to our knowledge of the Tractarian history.

R. W. GREAVES.

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE. By KENNETH KIRK. Second Edition, 1948. (Hodder and Stoughton). 7s. 6d.

THE best commendation of this book lies not in the eulogies of an enthusiastic reviewer but in the proved worth of its predecessor. When the first edition appeared in the *Standpoints* series in 1933, its author described it as "merely a discussion of some points of immediate practical interest at the present day" (p. 7). It was quickly recognized to be much more. Its lucid exposition and cogent defence of the first principles of marriage, its succinct explanation of the more important technical terms unavoidable in any serious study of the subject, its judicious use of relevant historical and legal data, and its penetrating analysis and criticism of non-Christian conceptions of permissible sex-relations, gave to the book a more than passing usefulness. The same is even truer of this thoroughly revised and enlarged edition.

All that was of positive value in the first four of the five original chapters has been retained, but several valuable additions have been made: a five-page digression, re-emphasizing the clear-cut distinction between separation (*divortium a mensa et toro*) and divorce (*divortium a vinculo*), and criticizing the 1937 Matrimonial Causes Act for confusing the distinction between nullity and divorce by allowing "wilful refusal to consummate" as a specific ground for nullity (pp. 37-43); two paragraphs stressing the dire social consequences of an unrestrained exchange of sex-partners (pp. 80-1); an expanded section, exploding the argument that "adultery destroys the marriage bond", showing that "it is no longer possible to base our English divorce law on any specific New Testament pronouncement", and pointing out how mistaken is that benevolence which can be persuaded to legislate simply by the argument from "hard cases" (pp. 81-6); an effective answer to the objection that the "sordid beginnings and miserable consummation" of many marriages make it ridiculous to "discuss the matter in terms of vocation" (pp. 95-7); and an entirely new

section indicating the importance of relating Christian teaching on marriage "to the whole co-ordinated scheme of Christian doctrine, and the degrees to which the contradiction of our Lord's explicit words will affect other elements in our faith" (pp. 97-105).

The last section referred to above was itself sufficient to make this second edition worthwhile. Only rarely is one privileged to discover a passage like the following, which speaks of the power of God's grace to overrule even the sin of a second marriage:

> "For the grace of God often opens the eyes of the offender to the gravity of the sin he has committed . . . he experiences conversion and repentance, and desires nothing more earnestly than to make such reparation as is possible . . .
>
> This, if his conversion is genuine and unswerving, will call from him the exercise of Christian fortitude of the most exacting kind; he must behave towards his second partner in all respects as a loving husband should, though he knows that according to the gospel he has now embraced he is not entitled to use the name 'husband' in respect of his relation to her. He will experience many dark hours during his hard spiritual pilgrimage; but if by God's grace he perseveres in this path—lonely, anxious and painful though it will be—his character will undergo a refinement of rare beauty, and he will come near to saintliness. And even at the worst moments of his journey the one human factor which will sustain him more than anything else will be the knowledge that, though he has failed, his original partner remains true, even at great cost to herself, to the ideals which they jointly accepted" (pp. 99-100).

A mere flight of imagination? No. "It is based," writes Dr. Kirk, "upon instances with which I have been personally concerned."

Chapter five, necessarily rewritten in the light of far-reaching developments in legislation and public opinion during the past fifteen years, gives Dr. Kirk's answer to the pressing question: How ought the Church of England to exert and extend her discipline in matrimonial causes? It should be studied alongside the relevant sections of the Canon Law Report (*C.L.R.*) now under discussion in Convocation, and the Resolutions (*L.R.*) and Marriage Report (*M.R.*) of the recent Lambeth Conference. On one point some readers will be disappointed, and on another many will certainly disagree. (*a*) One indirect consequence of the 1937 Act has been to make the institution of Church courts, with juris-

diction in matrimonial questions relating to her own members, no longer an impossibility *in principle*, and such courts are envisaged by the *C.L.R.* [Canon XXXVI, 2]. There could hardly be a more persuasive argument in their favour than that here presented by Dr. Kirk. Nevertheless, after noting the many practical difficulties, he adds: "the plea for Church courts, taken by itself, seems to me to have not the slightest chance or hope of success" (p. 128) [*cf.* Lacey, rev. ed., pp. 207-8; and *M.R.* Nullity Courts, p. 102, "should be carefully considered"]. (*b*) There would be at least more chance of success, he argues, if the proposal were linked with another for universal civil marriage. Not everyone will agree with Dr. Kirk that logically both belong together, or that the system he proposes is the ideal one. He himself recognizes several serious problems which that system would bring with it, and for many there is one argument against it which will be final: since marriage before a civil registrar is perfectly valid, "the effect of compulsory civil marriage in England must necessarily be that thereafter no one could ever be validly married in church. They could only have their unions blessed" (Lacey, rev. ed., p. 187).

Convinced that Church courts will not be set up within "any measurable period of time", Dr. Kirk offers seven suggestions for immediate consideration (pp. 133-45). He observes that the unsatisfactory situation arising from nullity decrees granted for "wilful refusal" would be eased if this plea were transferred to the list of grounds for *divorce*, and that the Church might justifiably attempt to lead public opinion to request the amendment of the 1937 Act in this direction. The Appendix (III) on this subject should be studied closely. [*cf. M.R.* Nullity Courts, para. 2; very indirectly (?) *L.R.* 97.] Despite the almost irresistible appeal of genuine "hard cases", he is convinced that any but the strictest interpretation of the 1938 Convocation Resolution [re-affirmed *L.R.* 94; also *C.L.R.* C. XXXVIII, 1], that no one with a previous partner living shall be married in church, would be disastrous. His reasons are many and weighty. It follows that the practice of blessing the "marriages" of divorcés at a service in church after the register-office ceremony, must be severely deprecated. Dr. Kirk adds a careful statement about the kind of *private* prayers a priest may justifiably use with an offending couple who are in absolute good faith. [*cf. M.R.*, p. 101, para. 2; *C.L.R.* C. XLIII]. On the question whether "remarried" divorcés should be refused communion, a careful analysis of the problem leads him to recommend that at present one should do no more than entreat the couple with the utmost urgency to refrain from presenting themselves *as an act of self-*

discipline. [*cf. M.R.* pp. 101-2, "refer to bishop"; repeated *L.R.* 96]. The next suggestion would seem to permit of no debate: no one who offends against our Lord's essential teaching about marriage should be allowed to occupy any ecclesiastical office whatsoever. He remarks that "if the bishops at a Lambeth Conference (let us say) gave a clear lead in the direction suggested, the effect would be electric." [No such "clear lead" in *M.R.* or *L.R.*!] In view of the well-known promises exacted of the non-Roman partner when marrying a Roman Catholic, Dr. Kirk writes: "it is to be hoped that the Church of England will publicly proclaim that Anglicans are forbidden to make these promises, and must regard themselves, and be content to be regarded, as no longer loyal members of the Church if they do so." [This implicit in *M.R.* p. 103, "To give such an undertaking is a sin . . ."; also *L.R.* 98, "The Conference earnestly warns . . ."]. Finally, marriage of the unbaptized. Here Dr. Kirk admits that when one of the parties is unbaptized the ceremony might conceivably be allowed, "under strict limitations," on the principle of I Cor. vii, 14. If both parties are unbaptized, he suggests how, in the absence of civil and canonical legislation of which there is manifest need, the priest might do everything within his lawful power to deter them. [*cf. M.R.* p. 103; *C.L.R.* C. XXXVII, forbidden if both unbaptized, refer to bishop if one unbaptized].

In the face of an inescapable challenge to act quickly in a situation that is gradually worsening, it is vital that we preserve our sense of proportion. Discipline is a necessary and important part of the Church's commission, and one which we may hope to see exercised more effectively than in recent years. Yet it remains only a part, and a negative part; and in practice it is the specialized concern of professional moralists, canonists and administrators. More important, and the concern of all, is the Church's positive duty: the unqualified declaration and maintenance of her own ideals of marriage, by explicit teaching and constant pastoral guidance. It is on this note that Dr. Kirk appropriately concludes. Unfortunately, it cannot be presumed that Christian teaching about marriage is rightly understood even by every official body now striving to arrest the moral decline, much less by the majority of private citizens. Despite everything hitherto attempted by associations of various types, the need still remains for plain but authoritative instruction on a vast scale. All teachers, pastors and welfare workers engaged in this task will find in this second edition of *Marriage and Divorce* not a little to assist them.

THOMAS WOOD.

THE CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING OF HISTORY. By E. C. RUST. (Lutterworth Press.) 17s. 6d.

MR. Rust aims at showing, in this book, first, that God has a purpose running through history: history will be taken up into God's final pattern. In this he does good service to those of us who refuse to believe the world so corrupt as to be beyond the reach of God's ordinary working. Second, he maintains that this purpose is undiscoverable by pure reason and disclosed only to faith: for it is God's action in history, not man's, which gives to it its meaning.

The scheme of his book is very clear-cut. In the first part he states his thesis, and then deals with various false interpretations of history. The positivists failed through treating history as something over against them, when in fact they were within it. The naturalists (Spengler) hit upon a truth, when they recognized the cyclic nature of history, but they failed to diagnose its cause. Dr. Toynbee has said that the repeated failure of civilizations " springs out of an inherent defect in the human soul ".

In chapter III Mr. Rust demolishes the humanist, the Marxist, and the Pelagian Englishman: there are no Utopias for Mr. Rust. In doing so he overstates his case a little: " It cannot honestly be said that men are morally better to-day than they were in earlier times ". That is surely untrue. Nor would it even be true to say that they are better only through Christian influence. Zarathustra, Confucius, Gautama, Socrates, Marcus Aurelius, surely indicate a spontaneous tendency for fallen human nature to rise. What he is right to emphasize is that man can never reach a true goodness, or a true understanding of history, because he can never reach God: but he can reach a point at which God can reach him. On p. 54 again he undervalues the upward movement of man towards God. It was God who visited and redeemed his people, but only those who were looking for such redemption: if all real life is meeting—at its highest point the meeting of man with God—we must see it as a two-way movement. One does not *meet* a man if he is standing still or walking more slowly in the same direction. But if Mr. Rust shares a seat on the swing which has carried Barth and Brunner away from the humanists and the save-the-world-by-science school, and across the middle line of truth, he avoids much of their exaggeration. No reader of this book has any excuse for the feeling that human effort is pointless, or that our part is to sit still and wait for God to act.

Chapter IV discusses the Idealists, and is not everywhere so convincing as most of his book. His emphasis on the " other-

ness" of God leads him into some difficulties on pp. 44 and 45: "To argue that all thinking is within the Absolute Spirit and an expression of its immanence implies that true and false values and meanings in our review of the past cannot really be distinguished, since they all have their ground in Absolute Being." To the theist surely all thinking is in the Mind of God: short of dualism this must be so. The "Thou" within the Mind of God is that thought which he objectifies, makes into a free agent, and then accepts or rejects. Acceptance or rejection belongs to every moral being and so to God. The idealist does not identify himself and all his actions with God's will and purpose, but he sees himself as within God's Mind: the question is whether he stands on the acceptance or rejection side. For an attribute of God is his mysterious ability to stand over against his own ideas, and if necessary deny them. Mr. Rust's emphasis, with Kierkegaard and his school, is rather upon the terrifying freedom of personal decision without God. For the Christian the terror is removed but not the awe, in the opportunity of an I-Thou relation between God and Man.

Other religions have failed to reach a point of meeting with God: Christians have met him in Jesus Christ, the historical myth, "for whom there is only one tense, the present". Nor is the myth to be watered down by Christian humanism. Christ is the centre of history. As the old canon said in Professor Saurat's book (*Death and the Dreamer*), "People think that there is a period before Christ and a period after Christ. That is all nonsense. Everything was created in that instant nine months before the birth of Christ. Of course, after that things had to be put in order . . . . You people think that time is something that unrolls itself beginning at count one, then becomes two, three, four, and so on. That is stupid. Time begins at nine months B.C. And it ends there too. But it makes, so to speak, a lot of noise in all directions: backwards, forwards, all round." "You are trying to insert Christ into Time: so you fail, of course. Think of the prophets: they astonish you, those prophets. Don't you understand? Christ was there; Christ is here; the prophets came after Christ, flowing backwards in time from Christ. Of course, they could not understand. Did not Moses tell you that he saw the hinder parts of God? They could only see the back of Christ—the darkness behind him." The old canon gives the feeling of the truth upon which Mr. Rust insists. To this truth Mr. Rust bears witness throughout his book, and it is the strength of it that he succeeds in doing so with so little over-emphasis. He is a Christian existentialist, but remains English: he is able to

keep his eyes fixed uncompromisingly upon this truth, without losing his outer vision.

The second part of his book is the most readable part, and the most useful for the ordinary Christian: it takes him straight through the Bible and throws light in many dark corners. This part can be read by itself and should be read widely. Its scholarly treatment does more than merely support his thesis.

Not that all his points are beyond dispute. When he dismisses Israel's religious genius in a page and a half of examples of obtuseness and fallings-away (pp. 87-89), he does not carry conviction. No Christian doubts that God was "thundering at the gates" (to use Barth's own phrase): the initiative was with God: but he was thundering at other gates as well. But whether by spasmodic response of the Israelites themselves; or through action and reaction producing the prophetic, then the priestly, and finally the Hasidaean answer to the God without the gate, their genius for religion was shown. Israel was chosen not arbitrarily but for the seed of faith which was found in them from the days of Abraham.

An example is in Moses, who did not act entirely "against his will" (as Mr. Rust states definitely on p. 92) in taking sides with Israel against Egypt. The human decision which made his meeting with God possible was made when he killed the Egyptian: hence perhaps Stephen's emphasis on the incident in his speech. There was indeed "supernatural constraint"—there always is—but the prodigal must be on his way home before his Father can meet him. But Mr. Rust's emphasis is right and valuable in that "it is not the right human thoughts about God which form the content of the Bible, but the right Divine thoughts about men" (Barth: *Word of God and Word of Man,* p. 43).

Curiously enough, there are moments when Mr. Rust is ready to give away too much to semi-Christians: and unnecessarily, too. For instance, on p. 154, "It would appear that Jesus expected the Parousia to take place in the immediate future . . . . On the evidence it would seem that our Lord was mistaken, but we must take into account the peculiar characteristics of all eschatological thinking." Our Lord denied knowledge of the day or the hour. To be ready to think him mistaken in the realm of the supernatural is to set in motion an idea which once started is difficult to stop. Again, on p. 184, "John heightens and distorts history that the dimension of super-history may be unveiled." If the unveiling of super-history demands deliberate mis-statements of fact, can we recon-

cile it with a Gospel of truth? He suggests two exaggerations: that the blind man was not in fact born blind; and that John meant to imply that Lazarus' body was already partly decomposed—an opinion held by Martha but not necessarily by John. John, or any New Testament writer, may have made mistakes; but deliberate distortion is another story.

The third part of the book is the most difficult to read. Inevitably so: it is the most difficult thing in the world to fit salvation history and world history together. But Mr. Rust succeeds. Chapter XIV on history and eschatology is outstanding. Eternity has come upon us without robbing us of the reality of time. For Christians there is no unmaking the past. "The Biblical emphasis on the divine action within history, the eruption of Eternity into Time, demands that the actual succession of history should belong to ultimate reality, and be real to God." (p. 196). Christ himself accepted death and became "what every man becomes, pure past". Eternity is realized in Time in Kierkegaard's category of "Repetition", which "means that the future acts in the present in order to restore and repeat the past on a higher level." (p. 200). There is an End, when all Time is summed up in Eternity: that is the Resurrection. At the same time there is a sense in which we are all for ever trembling on the verge of that Kingdom which is at hand. Eternity is "not only above Time but ahead of it".

He next discusses fallen man and his existence under the Wrath of God, and among Satanic distortions: he rejects the temptation to any dualism, however modified: Tillich's *Interpretation of History*, he says, is informative but tends to the mystical dualism of Eckart and Boehme (for "Urgrund" at the bottom of p. 222 should we read "Ungrund"?).

Fallen man in society is particularly vulnerable: the group becomes demonic. On p. 238, "We have a strange antinomy between the political acts of a nation, and the moral ideals of its individual members": but "Although the group is unable to rise above itself in self-criticism, that function is performed by a prophetic minority of its members". Whilst the Absolute is present in, and fits, every epoch, the temporal seeks to imitate this and so falls. Its fall is due to its claim to a strength it was never intended that it should possess. On pp. 237-246 there is a particularly acute analysis of the demonic nature of the group.

Chapter XVII deals with the Atonement, election, and the Church as the "saving remnant". The necessary process of salvation and reconciliation is shown in Christ. First the Act of God, when Christ as God revealed God to man. Second, the act

of Man, when Christ as Man denied his right to himself. The denial of himself by fallen Man reveals him not as man but as the Son of God.

In secular history, human institutions are only valid in so far as they accept the Life-Death-Resurrection pattern. No institution except the Church is prepared to do this—and sometimes not the Church.

His final chapter is no anti-climax, unlike so many final chapters: it sums up his thesis and ends a very satisfying book. It brings together many great writers and thinkers, and for that reason only might be commended. But Mr. Rust is not content with an assembling of others' ideas: his book is a true synthesis.

He has taken the trouble to avoid the mass of Latinisms which makes weary reading of good ideas in so many of our younger theologians. Technical terms cannot always be avoided, but they need not be multiplied. For instance, it is a relief to read an author who, in spite of his subject, so seldom uses the words "tension" and "dialectical".

Mr. Rust's book is profound, readable, and (humanly speaking) true. Its emphasis is always valuable.

H. A. Blair.

The Architectural Setting of Anglican Worship. By G. W. O. Addleshaw, M.A., B.D., F.S.A., and Frederick Etchells, F.R.I.B.A. (Faber and Faber.) 288 pp. 25s.

"When the Church of England in 1559 finally decided to use a vernacular liturgy at its public services, the authorities in Church and State were faced with a serious practical problem. How were the existing churches to be made suitable for that corporate liturgical worship presupposed by the Book of Common Prayer? It is not enough for the laity to be merely present in church; the Prayer-book intends that they should enter into the liturgy, making its moods their own, and following intelligently the action of the rite."

Thus Canon Addleshaw and Mr. Etchells set the stage for their competent and exhilarating survey of the principles of liturgical architecture in this country from the opening of the Reformation until the middle of the last century. Though every architect who designs a church, or rehandles one, should regard this as an essential text, the aim of the book is

never purely archaeological; the arrangement of parish churches during the last four centuries is studied only in relation to the precise use to which the buildings have been put, and throughout their inquiry the authors have clearly shown how the changes of theological emphasis which have occurred during their period have been reflected in the architecture and furnishing of new buildings and in the adaptations of the old.

Outstandingly important is Canon Addleshaw's presentation of the Reformation in this country as a Liturgical Movement, and if we raise an eyebrow at such a conception, perhaps it is because we fail to see the wood for trees. On the material expression of this Movement, the authors have something in common with Le Corbusier's conception of the dwelling house as the "living machine": here we find the church considered as the liturgical machine, the essentially functional building exactly adapted or fashioned for the intelligent enactment of the liturgy by the whole body of the faithful; and the successive chapters which describe the experiments, successes, and failures of the architects and craftsmen and their patrons in achieving their ends are stimulating, sometimes surprising, and frequently challenging. The authors loosen the mind, as it were, and help us to relax from rigidity.

Of an admirably-produced volume—it is Faber's, of course—one of the outstanding features is its profuse illustration, which includes more than fifty attractively free-hand plans of churches and their furnishing, supported by skeleton notes. The full plates are mainly reproductions of old prints, of which two of the most arresting are (1) "The Lord's Supper" (1674) showing the altar moved from under the tables of commandments at the east end and set tablewise in the chancel, shrouded in ample white fair linen cloth all over, and surrounded by kneeling communicants; and (2) the post-Laudian frontispiece of Wheatley's *Rational Illustration of the Book of Common Prayer* (1714), where no choir stalls hinder the gathering of the kneeling communicants within the chancel, before a canopied altar reminiscent of the "Torrigiano" restoration in Henry VII's chapel, though the tester itself is concealed by a heavenly vision of Christ the high priest with hands upraised in the holy place, pleading the eternal sacrifice. It presents an almost exact parallel with Charles Wesley's noble hymn "Victim divine, thy grace we claim", and gives a glimpse of the dignity and orderliness of eucharistic worship at a time when we are apt to assume the reverse.

In the sustained argument of this book, which rests on wide and copious quotation from contemporary literature, it is possible

to trace the preoccupation of past generations with the urgent task of adapting a medieval church, with its long chancel, to the needs of a vernacular liturgy which was not solely the eucharistic liturgy; the Prayer-book aimed deliberately at the laity's full co-operation in hearing and saying the quire offices which had hitherto been essentially a clerical concern. How could the late medieval building which was divided into two unequal halves by the rood screen, loft, and tympanum, and within which people had become used to only a reduced participation in the liturgy, best be handled to meet the demands of this new liturgical movement? Attendance, occupation with non-liturgical prayers, and "gazing", were to be replaced by vital concern with the content of an audible liturgy and the act of communion. One method was to treat the church as having three liturgical centres.

The font usually remained at the west end as one centre, and was sometimes provided with what was known as the "christening pew"—seats and standing room around for the party concerned. In the nave, the priest from his reading pew was audible to his whole flock and vocal participation in a vernacular quire office presented no more difficulty than the hearing of a sermon. From the reading pew also, until the Laudian movement, the altar prayers were commonly read, but when there was a Communion it was usual for the communicants to move up at the Offertory or the Invitation into the third liturgical centre, the chancel, where they could kneel either at benches or desks around the altar, and, if such existed, in the old stalls within the screen. The altar was not always in the same place, but more often it was brought from the east end for the occasion and set tablewise at the lower end of the chancel, decently veiled (at least in service time) with an all-over "frontal" of silk, velvet, or buckram, or such like.

But there were obvious disadvantages in this position, or in setting the altar outside the screen. As Canon Addleshaw points out, "when the Eucharist was rarely celebrated more than once a month, and often only once a quarter, it was easy for people to forget the real purpose of the altar and the reverence which is its due." Laudian principles ultimately brought the altar to fixity under the east window; it should be remembered too, that until then the Holy Sacrament was carried around to worshippers kneeling in their places, even in pews, and we are reminded that it is possible that the present custom of receiving at the rails before the altar is something the Church owes largely to Charles I's sense of what was reverent and seemly in worship.

The authors advance through the later history of church building and furnishing in a crescendo of interest under chapter headings such as "The Laudian Altar", "The Setting of the Altar", "The Altar and the People", "Eighteenth Century Experiments", "The Victorian Age", "The Surpliced Choir", "The Cathedral Service." *En route* they stumble on remarkable curiosities, such as the font in a bracket attached to the altar rails, and the font on wheels kept under the altar in St. George's, Hanover Square, looking like a wine cooler. They might have added the pulpit on tram lines in Wild's Christ Church, Streatham Hill (1841) which even now may be wheeled into the centre for the sermon. At Llangelynin they note the use of the holy water stoup continued until early in the 19th century, and that the Bristol Cathedral paintings of Moses and Aaron over the altar displayed the latter as raised to the cardinalate, red hat and all.

Hardly as curiosities, they describe the provision of specially constructed pews for important officials such as the sumptuous Speaker's Pew in St. Margaret's, Westminster. A gruesome curiosity not described was the "Condemned Pew" in Newgate Prison, an oval-shaped sable-coloured box, with a coffin on the table in the middle; as late as 1825 it was described as being in the middle of the chapel, capable of holding 30, the condemned occupants being "the gazing blocks of other prisoners and of those who had paid a shilling for admission to the gallery."

Of the experiments in arranging the "single-room" or auditory churches of the 18th century, none is more interesting than the setting of the seats college-chapel-wise, or cathedral-wise without a nave. The charming church of Glenealy in Co. Wicklow is noted, with its ranges of parallel stalls, the rear ones with canopies, and returned stalls at the west. It is possibly within living memory here that the reading pew, which was originally half way down the nave, was discarded in favour of a commercial desk in the altar space, facing west.

Reference is made to "Ridley's altar" which has at last found a home in Newtown Mount Kennedy, Co. Wicklow. Wisely it is said that its woodwork "may be" of the 16th century. It may be, but its tabernacle work suggests some other object than an altar, the characteristic note of which, whether under the Latin or the English rite then, would surely have been severe plainness. It may be regretted that a modern desire to display the carving has produced the impression of an altar which has swallowed its clothes. It is rightly argued by Canon Addleshaw that however magnificent the carving of a period altar may be, it should not be left uncovered.

The book is rounded off with a wholly admirable conclusion on the present opportunity and practical considerations for the future, such as the use and abuse of the nave altar, and the position of the choir: it is interesting to note a whole-hearted support for the Archbishops' Committee's Report on Music in Worship in recommending the west end of the church as usually the best position, practically and aesthetically, for the choir and organ. There are rousing and well-balanced suggestions for handling the arrangement of new and old churches, and they deserve at least the close consideration of clergy and architects. Also there is a prophetic warning that there are limits to the practicable size of a church which electrical amplification cannot overcome; and on purely practical grounds as well as aesthetic, the removal of the solid stone quire screens from cathedrals is trenchantly and convincingly condemned. Of the Victorian screen destroyers it has been said " they desired a vista and obtained a void."

The Cambridge Camden Society of 1839, which has exerted an immense influence on church building ever since, is severely whipped by these authors, probably with some justice, and it is right that we should hear the charge—and discriminate. Most revivals suffer periods of indigestion which leave permanent scars, and it is good that the apostles of pre-Camden ecclesiology should present the fruit of their researches so generously and attractively: the corrective they administer should provide the material for a better ordered digestion in the future.

J. H. Arnold.

The Religious Orders in England. By Dom David Knowles. (Cambridge University Press.) 30s.

This book is the first volume of a continuation of the author's great work *The Monastic Order in England,* and takes the story from 1216 to 1340. Readers of the earlier book may perhaps approach this volume with some fear of an anti-climax. The last three centuries of the medieval period have not the freshness and enthusiasm of the tenth century reformation or the coming of the Cistercians and Carthusians in the twelfth century. Certainly in the first ten chapters, which discuss the history of the old orders in this period, we are on a lower level, but that is not to say that the story is uninteresting. Professor Knowles has used to good advantage the work of Mr. Pantin on the provincial chapters of the Black monks, the investigations of the late Dr. Smith into monastic economy, and the many published records of episcopal visitations of monasteries. The Professor brings to

his task sympathy and unusual understanding so that we are given a fascinating as well as an authoritative picture of the daily life of great monasteries such as Christ Church, Canterbury, and made to understand the problems economic and religious which beset them. In the third part of the book the monasteries are considered in relation to the Church at large. There is a chapter on the cathedral monasteries and one on the boroughs. Special mention must be made of the account of the monastic contribution to history, art and music. Here again the Professor's familiarity with the monastic life is most valuable and we have three pages on music which are much more informative than the perfunctory references usually given by historians. Professor Knowles is right to emphasize the number of bishops and other dignitaries in this period who died in the odour of sanctity, many of them of monastic origin. He writes: "Certainly it is the opinion of the present writer, after many years of deliberation, that the greater abbeys, though far from being the abodes of ascetics and solitaries, were *c.* 1300 still offering a framework within which a devout and worthy life could be lived."

Chapters XI to XX are devoted to the history of the friars in England. Here again the author is able to use the work of many earlier writers, particularly in the field of Franciscan history, but the story has never been told so clearly, so comprehensively and so sympathetically as this. We may quote two sentences from his account of St. Francis. "Those who have studied the history of the religious orders in the twelfth century will have no difficulty in recognizing the accuracy with which Francis's intuition had hit upon the three great contemporary sources of spiritual corruption. The avarice and capitalization of all religious bodies; the litigation and chicanery that accompanied the struggle for privilege and exemption; the dessication of theology, and particularly of those branches of theology concerned with Scripture and the spiritual life, and the prevalence of an arid and heartless ingenuity among the class of clerics who still held almost a monopoly of learning—these are, and must continue to be, the commonplaces of all who consider the life of the Church in the fifty years following the death of St. Bernard."

The history of the friars leads the author into the universities where he is an uncommonly clear and helpful guide through the theological and philosophical controversies in which the Franciscans and Dominicans particularly became involved. The other orders are not, however, forgotten, though Professor Knowles declines to give more than a passing humorous reference

to the supposed origins of the Carmelite Friars and the Augustinian Hermits.

This is a difficult book to review as it is only the first part of what is to be a two-volume work and it is not clear whether any of the subjects omitted here will be dealt with in the second part. We may, however, regret now that Professor Knowles did not devote more space to the activities of abbots and priors in Parliaments and Convocations, with the connected question of the taxation of monastic property. One is puzzled on examining lists of members of Convocation to know on what principle certain abbots and priors were cited and others not. We shall look forward eagerly to the Professor's second volume for this as well as for the later history of the orders.

ERIC KEMP.

LIFE OF LORD LLOYD. By Colin Forbes Adam. (Macmillan.) 21s.

MR. Forbes Adam has produced a lively and readable sketch—it is perhaps fair to describe it as a sketch rather than as a full-dress biography—of a highly interesting personality. He has used his materials with taste and discretion; and the result has been to give us, not only a faithful portrait of the late Lord Lloyd of Dolobran, but a judicious and well-balanced appraisement of his many-sided activities.

The task that confronted the author was not altogether a simple one. George Lloyd died barely eight years ago: yet he seems already to belong to a generation which, in the Thucydidean phrase, has won its way into the realm of legend. He was the last and not the least conspicuous link in a long and illustrious chain: a chain which, though it may now be snapped beyond hope of repair, runs like a golden thread through the past two centuries of British history. It stands for an aspect of our national record of which, despite all that our detractors may choose to say, Englishmen have every right to feel proud. The days of "imperialism" may be over; but the work accomplished by our empire-builders, by the men who for two hundred years maintained British authority and fostered British traditions among subject populations, can never be shorn of its outstanding distinction. The honour-roll of British proconsuls is full of august names. It can challenge comparison even with the most famous and long-lived of royal dynasties. The succession suffered scarcely a break: *uno avolso non deficit alter aureus*: from Clive and Warren Hastings the line flowed on in majestic sequence through Dufferin, Curzon and Raffles to Cromer, Milner and

Lugard. And the last name in the long list was that of George Lloyd.

There was one article of faith that all these men held in common. They all believed fervently in the British Empire, and deemed no effort too great, and no personal sacrifice too costly, if it served in any degree to promote the welfare and security of an institution to whose beneficent potentialities their vision set no limit. In small things as in great, the same profound faith, the same single-minded devotion, regulated their every action and their every aspiration. No doubt it is easy enough, in what we are pleased to call our own more enlightened days, to question their political doctrines or to belittle their administrative achievements. Disparagement of the past is seldom a difficult task. It may be—though the test of practical success has still to be applied—that we have, in sober truth, arrived at sounder principles than our predecessors; that the creed of empire is an outworn delusion; that the white man's claim to guide and direct the less favoured races is no longer compatible with the general conscience of humanity. The future alone can show; only experience can demonstrate whether a final solution of such problems has yet been reached or is within measurable distance of attainment. Whatever our present certitudes, it is well to remember that, in most epochs in the history of every country, the policy of the moment has been looked upon as the last word in political wisdom. In any case we should be seriously at fault if, in our supposed superior enlightenment, we minimized the accomplishments of those that came before us. They acted according to their lights, and according to the lights that prevailed in their day; they had to work, as all men have to work, on the material that lay to hand. In an age which placed a high value on imperial responsibilities, they saw to it, to the utmost of their ability, that those responsibilities were discharged faithfully, justly and to what they held to be the general advantage. If personal ambition influenced them at all—and whom does it not influence in some measure ?—it was at least an ambition stripped of ignoble qualities: a desire for high service rather than for high reward, for a name that would live after them, not on the scroll of purple-visaged tyrants, but among the benefactors of the human race.

The lives of the great proconsuls make a study from which, however stimulating the story may be, a note of painfulness and frustration is seldom wholly absent. Theirs was no smooth course, no passage of unchequered or unalloyed prosperity. Lord Curzon once remarked, perhaps in one of those brief fits of petulance to which he was occasionally prone, that the British Cabinet

had broken the hearts of all its agents overseas, from Warren Hastings to Bartle Frere. That there have been unhappy incidents and regrettable dissensions is beyond dispute. As a general axiom, it may be allowed that the Governor in his Province and the Minister in London seldom find it easy to treat the problems of the hour from precisely the same standpoint. How could it be otherwise? The Minister has one background, the Governor another. The Governor must concentrate his energies and attention upon the pressing needs of the local situation. The Minister has to think of Parliament, of public opinion, of an army of critics, ignorant for the most part of local conditions and local realities, but undeterred by ignorance from opening fire upon the Government of the day. It is small wonder that differences should arise; the wonder is, not that there have been so many of them, but that their number was not greater.

Lord Lloyd's own proconsular career ended in a conflict with Downing Street over British policy in Egypt. Relations became strained almost to breaking point during the closing months of the Conservative administration of 1924-1929. The Labour Government, which came into power in the latter year, lost no time in bringing matters to a head. Lloyd was virtually asked to resign and at once complied with the request. On the rights and wrongs of the dispute materials for a final judgement are still lacking. But one general conclusion may safely be drawn. The episode marked a clash—probably an inevitable clash—between the old order and the new. A generation had arisen to which the political and diplomatic standards of the past no longer made appeal. The Cairo Residency might still cling to the old faith, but Downing Street had strayed into other paths and bowed before new altars. The outcome could not be in doubt. The last of the proconsuls, as gallant a figure in his fall as in his hour of triumph, passed silently into the shadows.

Lloyd was not the man to waste his energies in self-pity or in vain regrets for what was beyond recall. If the Government needed him no longer, there were other ways of serving his country and the Empire to which he was so deeply attached. He made the most of them. His work for the British Council, which provided an unofficial agency for the spread of British culture throughout the world, was as important and as far-reaching as any that he had undertaken during his official career. He threw himself into the new task with characteristic thoroughness. No movement could have had a more inspiring leader or a more devoted and indefatigable champion. None can tell whether, in the re-

cesses of his mind, he cherished the hope, or the expectation, that he would one day be called back to the service of the Crown. In the event, as all the world knows, the call came; and it came with a compelling urgency that brooked no refusal or hesitation. The times were dark and desperate; Nazism was triumphant on the continent, France was on the brink of surrender, and England stood in more imminent peril than at any moment in her long history since the Spanish Armada drifted to destruction through the angry seas. War memories tend to grow dim, but many will recall that historic Friday evening in May 1940 when the news was broadcast that Mr. Winston Churchill had been summoned to the helm to retrieve our sinking fortunes. The tidings brought profound relief, and renewed hope, to countless thousands of his countrymen. Nor was their confidence impaired when he made known the names of those whom he had chosen to assist him in his stupendous task. Lloyd's fitness for the Colonial Office was nowhere seriously questioned. Mr. Churchill himself had no doubt on the subject. "When I was called upon to form the present Administration", he told the House of Commons after Lloyd's death, "it was a comfort to me to be able to reach out to so trusted a friend." To Lloyd the appointment was one after his own heart, a fitting climax to a long career spent in grappling with the problems of Empire. The tragedy was that so brief a span of life remained to him; but, even in the few months that separated his appointment as Secretary of State from his untimely death in February 1941, he did work that left an abiding imprint both upon the Colonial Office and upon the Colonial Empire. His memory will long be cherished by those who had the privilege of serving under him. He was not perhaps "everybody's man"; he was not always easy of approach; he had his angularities, his moods of stubbornness and (as it seemed to some) even of unreason. But those were minor imperfections. The memories that will endure are those of his fine presence, his quick wit, his calm courage in the hour of adversity, his unchallengeable integrity and selfless devotion to the public interest. He was, and felt himself to be, the inheritor and trustee of a great tradition; never, in any single action of his life, did he forget the trust that lay upon him, or swerve from the path prescribed by his overwhelming sense of duty. Few nobler hearts or more intrepid spirits ever gave themselves to the service of the state.

JOHN PULLEN.

PERIODICALS

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KENDALL, GUY .—*The Social Application of Christianity*, 144 pp. (Duckworth). 5*s.*

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NEILL, STEPHEN.—*The Cross Over Asia*, 159 pp. (The Canterbury Press). 8*s.* 6*d.*

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CARPENTER, E.—*Thomas Tenison*, 466 pp. (S.P.C.K.). 30*s.*

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